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2515 
A TRIP DOWN LEGISLATIVE MEMORY 
LANE: HOW THE FMLA CHARTS A PATH 
FOR POST-COVID-19 PAID LEAVE REFORM 
Abstract: Before the COVID-19 pandemic, the United States was the only high-
ly-developed nation in the world not to guarantee paid family and medical leave 
(PFML) for its citizens. In 2020, during the early days of the pandemic, Congress 
passed temporary PFML to alleviate the hardship on families forced to choose 
between health and a paycheck. That legislation is no longer in effect. Many in-
terest groups and lawmakers feel that the COVID-19 crisis has finally presented 
the moment to make PFML permanent in the United States. Yet, other conserva-
tive and pro-business groups resist the idea. The dynamics unfolding over the fu-
ture of PFML are highly reminiscent of a policy debate that took place during the 
1980s and 1990s over the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA). The 
current debate over PFML provides a fortuitous opportunity to look back and 
learn from history. First, this Note suggests that the legislative history of the 
FMLA provides an insightful model of bipartisanship and coalition-building that 
should inform present PFML policy-making. Second, this Note gives an instruc-
tive comparison of the corporate and political landscape in the 1980s versus 
2020s to frame these policies. Finally, this Note offers potential solutions for the 
roadblocks to PFML imposed by the business community, which mirror similar 
pushbacks against the FMLA three decades ago. 
INTRODUCTION 
In September 2020, on their children’s first day of school, a group of 
mothers in New Jersey gathered in solidarity outside their homes to let out a 
unified scream.1 After many months living with the coronavirus (hereinafter 
“COVID-19” or “the Pandemic”), many parents and caregivers simply could 
 1 See Julia Carmel, To Hear America’s Mothers, We Let Them Scream, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/06/insider/primal-scream-section.html [https://perma.cc/
K84Y-7V4R] (recounting the stories of mothers around the country and their struggle with at-home 
work and parenting). During the first seven months of the coronavirus pandemic, over one million 
parents left their jobs due to school closures. Id. As part of a larger series exposing the widespread 
troubles of American parents, the New York Times tracked the daily lives of three women, all moth-
ers. Jessica Bennett, The Primal Scream: Three Mothers, on the Brink, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/02/04/parenting/covid-pandemic-mothers-primal-scream.
html [https://perma.cc/RP75-BSWT]. The three women conveyed unique, but thematically similar 
tales of the hardships that accompanied parenting during a global pandemic without adequate gov-
ernment support. See id. (documenting the stories of three women living in Maryland, Washington, 
and California). 
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not take it anymore.2 Due to the Pandemic, American families broke beneath 
the weight of simultaneous at-home work, virtual schooling, and caretaking of 
loved ones.3 The lack of child care forced approximately twenty-five percent 
of working women in the United States to reduce their work schedules or leave 
their jobs entirely.4 Analysts anticipate that the negative effects of this unex-
pected flight of women from the workforce will reverberate through the Amer-
ican economy for years to come.5 
The lack of national paid family and medical leave (PFML) has made the 
Pandemic uniquely difficult for American families.6 PFML guarantees em-
ployees paid time off for long-term absences from work to care for a child, 
loved one, or themselves.7 Before COVID-19, the United States was the only 
                                                                                                                           
 2 See, e.g., Anne Marshall-Chalmers, ‘How Am I Going to Keep This up?’ COVID Intensifies 
Plight of Family Caregivers, CALMATTERS (Jan. 21, 2021), https://calmatters.org/health/2021/01/
covid-family-caregivers-plight-california/ [https://perma.cc/C4CT-CDRL] (reporting that some profes-
sional caretakers experienced a surge in business from exhausted family members); Heidi Stevens, ‘Par-
ents Are Spinning 8 Plates at a Time Right Now.’ Stop Shaming Them for Relying on Screen Time to 
Make It Through a Pandemic, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 22, 2021), https://www.chicagotribune.com/columns/
heidi-stevens/ct-heidi-stevens-parents-feel-screentime-shamed-covid-0122-20210122-74mo3bk4
mfgzrlkv5xfrhyok2y-story.html [https://perma.cc/U4H9-L38J] (describing the novel challenges of 
parenting during coronavirus (hereinafter “COVID-19” or “the Pandemic”). 
 3 See Ruth Igielnik, A Rising Share of Working Parents in the U.S. Say It’s Been Difficult to Han-
dle Child Care During the Pandemic, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 26, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/
fact-tank/2021/01/26/a-rising-share-of-working-parents-in-the-u-s-say-its-been-difficult-to-handle-
child-care-during-the-pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/9G2C-374B] (finding that the number of parents 
reporting stress and difficulty balancing their duties has increased since the onset of the Pandemic). 
 4 See Alicia Sasser Modestino, Coronavirus Child-Care Crisis Will Set Women Back a Genera-
tion, WASH. POST (July 29, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2020/07/29/childcare-
remote-learning-women-employment/ [https://perma.cc/9XXU-E66E] (analyzing the long-term eco-
nomic ramifications of the number of women suddenly leaving the American workforce). The impact 
of child care is significant for the United States economy because working parents represent approxi-
mately fifty million people. Id. 
 5 See Abby Vesoulis, ‘If We Had a Panic Button, We’d Be Hitting It.’ Women Are Exiting the Labor 
Force En Masse––And That’s Bad for Everyone, TIME MAG. (Oct. 17, 2020), https://time.com/
5900583/women-workforce-economy-covid/ [https://perma.cc/PL6L-U4WE] (explaining that the 
economic outcomes for women due to COVID-19 will prolong the United States’ future economic 
recovery from the Pandemic). 
 6 See Diana Boesch, Sarah Jane Glynn & Shilpa Phadke, Lack of Paid Leave Risks Public Health 
During the Coronavirus Outbreak, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.american
progress.org/issues/women/news/2020/03/12/481609/lack-paid-leave-risks-public-health-coronavirus-
outbreak/ [https://perma.cc/4WM5-JEK7] (opining that the absence of paid leave in the United States 
forces workers to choose between caring for themselves or ill family members and job loss); How the 
Lack of Paid Sick Leave Will Make Coronavirus Worse, ECON. POL’Y INST., https://www.epi.org/
multimedia/coronavirus-paid-sick-leave-explainer/#:~:text=Over%2030%20million%20American,
Economist%20Elise%20Gould%20explains [https://perma.cc/7JYN-NWYQ] (projecting that the large 
segment of Americans without access to paid leave may augment the effects of the pandemic). 
 7 See U.S. DEP’T LAB., WHAT’S THE DIFFERENCE?: PAID SICK LEAVE, FMLA, AND PAID FAMI-
LY AND MEDICAL LEAVE 1 (2016), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/oasp/legacy/files/paidleave
finalrulecomparison.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BLK-566H] (defining paid family and medical leave 
(PFML)). Generally, when this Note uses the term “PFML,” it refers to a federal policy imposing a 
government-mandated minimum standard for PFML benefits for private sector employers. See id. 
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highly-developed country in the world without a national PFML policy.8 After 
the global COVID-19 outbreak, the United States’ outlier status became glar-
ingly obvious and, even worse, devastating for public health.9 During the Pan-
demic, more Americans died per capita than any other country in the world, 
with some experts suggesting that the lack of national PFML contributed to the 
disproportionate impact.10 
                                                                                                                           
(reviewing the various federal programs that provide leave benefits to working Americans). This Note 
briefly discusses PFML programs at the state level, as opposed to federal level, but this usage is lim-
ited. See infra Part I.C. (laying out various state PFML policies). The scope of this Note, however, is 
limited to policies affecting private employers, not the government or public sector. See infra note 142 
and accompanying text (providing statistics regarding the percentage of Americans with access to 
PFML, referring exclusively to the private sector). 
 8 HYE JIN RHO, SHAWN FREMSTAD & JARED GABY-BIEGEL, CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y RSCH., 
CONTAGION NATION 2020: UNITED STATES STILL THE ONLY WEALTHY NATION WITHOUT PAID 
SICK LEAVE 3 (2020), https://cepr.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/2020-03-Contagion-Nation-2020.
pdf [https://perma.cc/R5XC-MN2A] (finding that the United States is the sole country out of twenty-
two highly-industrialized nations to not grant any payment to workers suffering from short-term ill-
ness). The other nations included in the March 2020 study were: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. See id. at 5 (gra-
phing the paid sick leave provisions provided by twenty-one nations plus the United States). The 
study selected the twenty-two nations based on the United Nations’ Human Development Index, with 
the caveat that all countries had verified cases of COVID-19 as of March 2020. Id. at 4. The United 
States is also the only Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member 
nation not to provide any type of paid family leave policy. See Stefan Pichler, Katherine Wen & Nico-
las R. Ziebarth, COVID-19 Emergency Sick Leave Has Helped Flatten the Curve in the United States, 
39 HEALTH AFFS. 2197, 2197 (2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/pdf/10.1377/hlthaff.2020.
00863 [https://perma.cc/26NC-M3E2]; see also Where: Global Reach, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/
about/members-and-partners/ [https://perma.cc/A7KE-HAJB] (listing the thirty-seven member coun-
tries of the OECD). The OECD is a global organization aimed at implementing economically and 
socially beneficial policies around the world, and membership is selective. Id. Within the OECD na-
tions, there is a wide range of family leave policies. SARAH A. DONOVAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 
R44835, PAID FAMILY LEAVE IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (2019). For example, Spain offers citizens 
up to three days of paid leave to care for a terminally ill family member, whereas Denmark offers 
unlimited paid leave under similar circumstances. See id. at 14 (comparing the paid family leave poli-
cies of OECD nations). 
 9 See Pichler et al., supra note 8, at 2197 (noting the attention the United States garnered for its 
lack of national paid leave policies amid the COVID-19 outbreak); see also Taylor Bleistein, The 
United States’ “Most Inclusive” Paid Parental Leave Policy Pales in Comparison to Foreign Coun-
tries Policies, 41 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 52, 68 (2019) (calling the United States an “[i]nternational 
[e]mbarrassment” compared to other industrialized nations that offer a minimum paid leave of two-
thirds of an employee’s wage for at least fourteen weeks). As of January 2021, the United States sus-
tained twenty-one million contracted cases of COVID-19 and suffered 360,000 deaths due to the vi-
rus. Mark Katov, U.S. Records More Than 4,000 Dead in 1 Day from COVID-19, a Grim New Rec-
ord, NPR (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2021/01/08/954848161/
u-s-records-more-than-4-000-dead-in-1-day-from-covid-19-a-grim-new-record [https://perma.cc/
R7Q7-VARK]. 
 10 See Jason Beaubien, Americans Are Dying in the Pandemic at Rates Far Higher Than in Other 
Countries, NPR (Oct. 13, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/10/13/923253681/
americans-are-dying-in-the-pandemic-at-rates-far-higher-than-in-other-countries [https://perma.cc/
SS7H-JGVP] (finding that the death rate from COVID-19 in the United States was 85% higher than in 
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When the Pandemic struck, the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 
(FMLA) governed family and medical leave benefits in the United States.11 The 
FMLA, still law, guarantees job protection for employees taking long-term ab-
sences from work, but without any provision for paid leave.12 Because the 
FMLA dictates most Americans’ leave benefits, the Pandemic forced many indi-
viduals to make an impossible choice between caring for themselves and their 
loved ones or continuing to go to work and earning a paycheck.13 This moral 
quandary highlighted the inadequacy of unpaid family and medical leave.14 
                                                                                                                           
some European countries when adjusted for population); see also How the Lack of Paid Sick Leave 
Will Make Coronavirus Worse, supra note 6 (noting the harmful effects of a lack of PFML on Ameri-
cans during the Pandemic). Scholars studied the effects of a lack of paid leave on working popula-
tions. See, e.g., Johanna Catherine Maclean, Stefan Pichler & Nicolas R. Ziebarth, Mandated Sick 
Pay: Coverage, Utilization, and Welfare Effects 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 
26832, 2020) (studying “presenteeism behavior” or “working sick”). Essentially, employees without 
access to paid benefits are less likely to take sick leave and more likely to report to work ill, thus in-
creasing the spread of contagious or infectious diseases in the workplace. Id. 
 11 Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601. 
 12 See id. § 2612(c) (describing the unpaid leave provision of the FMLA); id. § 2614(a)(1) (de-
scribing the guaranteed job protection for employees taking qualifying FMLA leave). This Note will 
use the term “leave benefits” as a catchall description for the privileges that employees receive while 
taking absences from work. See, e.g., U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., U.S. DEP’T LAB., NATIONAL COM-
PENSATION SURVEY: EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES, MARCH 2019, at 119 (2019), 
https://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2019/employee-benefits-in-the-united-states-march-2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JL5D-37ED] (showing that the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics uses 
“[l]eave benefits” as an umbrella term to include sick leave, holidays, military leave, and family 
leave––both paid and unpaid). These privileges may include wage replacement, job protection, or any 
other benefits offered by the employer during the leave period. See id. (exemplifying the breadth of 
leave benefits). Within the broader category of leave benefits, there is paid and unpaid leave, sick 
leave, and family and medical leave. See infra notes 39–42 and accompanying text (laying out the 
different types of leave benefits employers typically offer). 
 13 See Kim Bellware, Paid Family and Sick Leave Could Expand for the First Time in Decades 
Because of the Pandemic, WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
2021/02/06/coronavirus-paid-leave/ [https://perma.cc/4R22-WBCL] (documenting the difficulties that 
COVID-19 imposed on many Americans, especially women, to balance work and health). 
 14 See 50 Prominent Women Run Full Page Ad in the New York Times Calling on President Biden 
to Implement Marshall Plan for Moms in First 100 Days, GIRLS WHO CODE (Jan. 26, 2021), https://
girlswhocode.com/news/50-prominent-women-run-full-page-ad-in-the-new-york-times-calling-on-
president-biden-to-implement-marshall-plan-for-moms-in-first-100-days [https://perma.cc/6FJR-
RYSX] (displaying an ad sponsored by female business leaders and celebrities campaigning for more 
generous family policies from the new presidential administration). Statistical evidence shows that job 
loss during COVID-19 disproportionately affected women. See CLAIRE EWING-NELSON, NAT’L 
WOMEN’S L. CTR., ALL OF THE JOBS LOST IN DECEMBER WERE WOMEN’S JOBS 1 (2021), https://
nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/December-Jobs-Day.pdf [https://perma.cc/96FV-BKVG] (stat-
ing that women have endured over half of the net job loss during the Pandemic, at a total 5.4 million 
net jobs). This Note occasionally emphasizes the plight of mothers over fathers because the battle to 
balance work and family, historically, falls unevenly upon women. See I-Hsuan Lin, Work-Family 
Conflict and Gender Equality: Theory Development, Responses of Policy Regimes, and Immigrants’ 
Experiences 74–75 (August 2019) (Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University) (ProQuest) (analyzing the 
gendered dynamic implicit in work and family duties). This slanted emphasis toward women and 
mothers does not discount the struggles of working fathers, which is the subject of gender legal stud-
ies beyond the scope of this Note. See, e.g., Joseph Rebello, Note, Red, White, and Blue-Collar Dads: 
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In March of 2020, Congress took action and passed the first PFML law in 
American history.15 The legislation Congress enacted, however, was only a 
temporary measure.16 The benefits from the law expired in March 2021, and 
now, once again, the United States remains the sole developed nation without 
guaranteed paid leave.17 Meanwhile, the COVID-19 PFML program stoked the 
flames of the paid leave policy debate.18 More so than ever, lawmakers and 
citizens want permanent PFML.19 Policy-makers are reviving paid leave pro-
posals that have been languishing for years in hopes they may find fertile 
ground in a post-COVID-19 environment.20 
Other health crises over the past fifteen years quell this optimism.21 In 
2009, the swine flu outbreak caused rampant school closures that sparked a 
                                                                                                                           
Using International Examples to Establish a Paid Federal Parental Leave Policy to Benefit Low-
Income Fathers in the United States, 50 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 139, 146 (2019) (discussing how the ste-
reotype of women as primary caretakers leaves men behind in family policy reform). 
 15 See generally Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA), Pub. L. No. 116-127, 134 
Stat. 178 (2020) (implementing emergency paid leave benefits for American workers). 
 16 Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA), H.R. 6201, 116th Cong. § 3102(a)(1)(F) 
(2020) (enacted). 
 17 See Pichler, supra note 8, at 2197 (commenting that the United States is the only nation among 
its peers to not provide paid leave to private sector workers). 
 18 See Abby McCloskey & Angela Rachidi, Opinion, The Pandemic Has Exposed a Need for 
Better Paid Leave Policies, AEI (May 26, 2020), https://www.aei.org/op-eds/the-pandemic-has-
exposed-a-need-for-better-paid-leave-policies/ [https://perma.cc/U9AP-3GAY] (discussing the legis-
lative proposals and debates that Congress raised in the wake of the Pandemic). Some scholars, how-
ever, caution that the paid leave policies enacted during the Pandemic should not necessarily lay the 
roadmap for permanent legislation. Id. The Pandemic bears unique challenges that may not transfer to 
a post-COVID-19 world. Id. Even so, the momentum spurred by COVID-19 reforms will be difficult 
for many Americans to forget, as the new laws gave many citizens PFML benefits for the first time. 
See Austin R. Ramsey, Calls for Permanent Paid Leave Grow as Temporary Measures Fade, BLOOM-
BERG L. (Jan. 27, 2021), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/calls-for-permanent-paid-
leave-grow-as-temporary-measures-fade [https://perma.cc/ZA88-RSM8] (stating that the new paid 
leave laws passed during the Pandemic provided additional coverage for approximately eighty-seven 
million Americans). 
 19 See Press Release, The White House Briefing Room, Fact Sheet: The American Families Plan 
(Apr. 28, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/28/fact-sheet-
the-american-families-plan/ [https://perma.cc/B4U9-QANH] (outlining President Joseph Biden’s most 
recent plan to address the lack of paid leave support for American families at the federal level). In the 
spring of 2021, President Biden announced his American Families Plan, which would introduce 
twelve weeks of PFML by the end of the program’s ten-year arc. Id. 
 20 See id. (demonstrating that because of COVID-19 family and medical leave is a legislative 
priority). Several bills previously proposing paid leave resurfaced during COVID-19 with greater 
support as a result of the Pandemic. See, e.g., New Parents Act, S. 920, 116th Cong. § 219(b) (2019) 
(proposing paid leave for parents after the birth or adoption of a child); FAMILY Act, S. 248, 117th 
Cong. § 4(a) (2021) (creating a federally-funded paid leave program for family and medical leave). 
 21 See, e.g., Marianne DelPo Kulow, Legislating a Family-Friendly Workplace: Should It Be 
Done in the United States?, 7 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 88, 89, 90 (2012) (discussing the impact of the 
swine flu outbreak on American families). 
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similar outcry for expanded paid leave for working parents.22 Despite health 
and policy experts impressing the importance of parental paid leave, no lasting 
legal change resulted.23 Given previous public health episodes like the swine 
flu, the potential benefits of national PFML are not news.24 COVID-19 has 
merely created another window of opportunity to finally implement PFML at 
the federal level.25 Congress cannot allow such a rare opportunity to pass 
again.26 
                                                                                                                           
 22 Id. The lack of paid sick leave for working parents exacerbated the negative effects of the 
swine flu outbreak and subsequent school closures. See JEFFREY LEVI, THOMAS V. INGLESBY, LAURA 
M. SEGAL & SERENA VINTER, TRUST FOR AMERICA’S HEALTH, PANDEMIC FLU PREPAREDNESS: 
LESSONS FROM THE FRONTLINES 10 (2009), https://www.tfah.org/wp-content/uploads/archive/assets/
files/pandemic-flu-lesson.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SPG-JEP8] (announcing that 48% of American em-
ployees had to decide between going to work and taking care of their children during the swine flu 
school closures because they did not have paid sick leave). 
 23 See Kulow, supra note 21, at 89 n.7 (introducing the legislative initiatives for employee bene-
fits proposed in response to the swine flu). In 2009, Representative Rosa DeLauro introduced the 
Healthy Families Act to Congress, a bill that would have mandated employees to provide up to fifty-
six hours of paid sick time depending on the number of hours worked. Healthy Families Act, H.R. 
2460, 111th Cong. § 5(b) (2009). The bill has recently gained traction in Congress. See All Actions: 
H.R.2465—117th Congress (2021-2022), CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-
congress/house-bill/2465/all-actions?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22healthy+families+act%
22%5D%7D&r=2&overview=closed&s=1#tabs [https://perma.cc/UZW7-64XR] (showing that Con-
gress referred the bill to the House Committee on Education and Labor and the Committee on House 
Administration, and Oversight and Reform on April 13, 2021). The parallel version of the bill in the 
Senate has also gained momentum recently; it was last read before the Senate Health, Labor, Educa-
tion, and Pensions Committee in April 2021. S.1195—Healthy Families Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://
www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/1195/text [https://perma.cc/Q2M9-TKPV]. Further, 
President Biden officially endorsed the legislation in a spring 2021 announcement. Press Release, 
White House, supra note 19. Even though the endorsements from both the White House and Congress 
show some progress for family leave policy, generally, the Healthy Families Act provides only for 
paid sick time, not PFML. Id. 
 24 See, e.g., Examining the Importance of Paid Family Leave for American Working Families: 
Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Soc. Sec., Pensions & Fam. Pol’y of the S. Comm. on Fin., 115th 
Cong. 2 (2018) [hereinafter Senate Hearing 2018] (statement of Sen. Bill Cassidy, Chairman, Sub-
comm. on Soc. Sec., Pensions & Fam. Pol’y, Comm. on Fin.) (documenting the inadequacy of the 
FMLA and noting that many American families are struggling without access to guaranteed paid fami-
ly leave); see also Bellware, supra note 13 (acknowledging the notable bipartisanship behind PFML 
legislation since the onset of the Pandemic). 
 25 See Bellware, supra note 13 (explaining the urgency circling around PFML proposals in the 
aftermath of COVID-19). Scholars note the significant impact that cultural and social evolutions have 
had, historically, on the enactment of legislative reform. See, e.g., Kulow, supra note 21, at 108 (em-
phasizing that when business interest groups were willing to undergo change, legislative enhance-
ments to the workplace were most successful); JOHN H. LANGBEIN, DAVID A. PRATT & SUSAN J. 
STABILE, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 81 (5th ed. 2010) (analyzing the early public attrac-
tion to pension reform that eventually led to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)). 
 26 Cf. Senate Hearing 2018, supra note 24, at 3 (statement of Sen. Bill Cassidy, Chairman, Sub-
comm. on Soc. Sec., Pensions & Fam. Pol’y, Comm. on Fin.) (“We must address this looming crisis 
. . . . Doing nothing is not an option.”). 
2021] The FMLA Model for Post-Pandemic PFML 2521 
This Note uncovers the legislative history of PFML to understand why, 
after decades of congressional effort, PFML is still not the law of the land.27 
Without addressing the roadblocks that have thwarted PFML, Congress cannot 
expect to enact lasting legal change.28 The origins of PFML stem from the ear-
liest days of the FMLA.29 Despite the FMLA’s criticisms, policy experts view 
the law’s legislative history as a commendable tale of bipartisan compromise.30 
The FMLA’s successful coalition-building model offers hope for the stalled 
efforts to implement federal PFML.31 Most importantly, the legislative history 
of the FMLA reveals the deeply-rooted resistance from corporations to a na-
tional paid leave policy.32 
                                                                                                                           
 27 See, e.g., Kelly McDonald Garrison, Avantica Shinde, Mary Stoney, Daniel Wood & Xiaodan 
Zhang, The Family and Medical Leave Act & Parental Leave Policies, 21 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 333, 
365 (2020) (postulating that if employers paid for FMLA leave, the policy would ameliorate the en-
trenched gender norms that assume men will be breadwinners and women will be caretakers); Juan C. 
Flores, Note, 12 Months, 12 Weeks, 1250 Hours, 75 Miles, and 50 Employees: Why the Numbers of 
the FMLA Don’t Add Up for New Parents of Color and Low-Wage Workers, 54 U.S.F. L. REV. 313, 
336 (2020) (theorizing that an ideal PFML statute would be flexible to the needs of local economies 
and avoid an overly simplistic approach); Ryan H. Nelson, Federalizing Direct Paid Leave, 20 U. PA. 
J. BUS. L. 623, 629 (2018) (proposing a statute to standardize paid leave called the “Uniform Direct 
Paid Leave Act (‘UDPLA’)”); Gillian Lester, A Defense of Paid Family Leave, 28 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 1, 14 (2005) (exploring the potentially adverse effects PFML could have on employers and 
employees under an insurance theory lens). 
 28 See Kulow, supra note 21, at 108 (indicating that legislation can be a better instrument for 
reform when private actors respond slowly to society’s demands for change). 
 29 Megan A. Sholar, The History of Family Leave Policies in the United States, ORG. AM. HISTORI-
ANS (Nov. 2016), https://www.oah.org/tah/issues/2016/november/the-history-of-family-leave-policies-
in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/65PP-EEHQ] (noting that early proponents of family and medi-
cal leave reform in the 1980s sought paid leave benefits). 
 30 See, e.g., Nicole Buonocore Porter, Finding a Fix for the FMLA: A New Perspective, a New 
Solution, 31 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 327, 347, 351 (2014) (addressing the pitfalls of the FMLA, 
including that employees abuse FMLA leave and it is difficult for employers to comply with the law’s 
various regulations); see also Deborah J. Anthony, The Hidden Harms of the Family and Medical 
Leave Act: Gender-Neutral Versus Gender-Equal, 16 J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 459, 474 (2008) 
(critiquing the FMLA for providing limited access to benefits for underrepresented groups, such as 
women, minority populations, and low income communities). The FMLA did, however, show a suc-
cessful effort by policy-makers to compromise and build strong interest group coalitions. See DONNA 
R. LENHOFF & LISSA BELL, NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMS., GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR 
WORKING FAMILIES AND FOR COMMUNITIES: FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE AS A CASE STUDY 1 
(2002), https://www.nationalpartnership.org/our-work/resources/economic-justice/fmla/fmla-case-
study-lenhoff-bell.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CHS-776J] (chronicling the almost decade-long effort re-
quired to gain enough support to pass the FMLA). 
 31 See LENHOFF & BELL, supra note 30, at 1 (urging today’s policy-makers to seek better family 
leave benefits to follow the successful example established by FMLA advocates). 
 32 See Lisa L. Tharpe, Comment, Analysis of the Political Dynamics Surrounding the Enactment 
of the 1993 Family and Medical Leave Act, 47 EMORY L.J. 379, 381, 383 (1998) (stating that the 
FMLA endured “a turbulent history in politics” and that pro-business lobbyists opposed the law from 
its inception). 
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This Note transforms the business community’s long-held defiance 
against PFML into an instructive tool for today’s policy-makers.33 Part I of this 
Note first gives an overview of the American approach to employee benefits 
law before delving into the legislative history of the FMLA.34 Part II provides 
an objective comparison of the political and economic landscapes in the 1980s 
during the FMLA debate and today during the PFML debate, with a particular 
focus on the corporate lens.35 Part III asserts that the arguments corporations 
use to delay PFML are vestiges of a bygone era and ineffectual in a Pandemic-
ridden America.36 This Note concludes by suggesting that the legislative histo-
ry of the FMLA offers a valuable template to dismantle the roadblocks corpo-
rations pose against future PFML legislation.37 
I. THE PROGRESSION OF FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE 
Generally, leave benefits give employees job security in the event that 
they become ill, get summoned to military duty, give birth to a child, or any 
other reason that would require taking time away from work.38 Leave benefits 
fall into three principal categories: sick leave, family leave, and medical 
leave.39 Sick leave refers to the time an employee is eligible to take off work 
after accruing a certain number of hours working at a job.40 Family leave en-
compasses absences to care for a sick, or otherwise in-need, family member.41 
                                                                                                                           
 33 Donna R. Lenhoff, Family & Medical Leave in the United States: Historical & Political Reflec-
tions 7 (Oct. 1, 2004) (unpublished conference paper) (on file with Western Oregon University) (ex-
plaining that the success of the FMLA model came from its ability to harness the power of existing 
coalitions to overcome the bill’s roadblocks). Donna R. Lenhoff was an attorney for the Women’s 
Legal Defense Fund during the evolution of the FMLA in the 1980s and remains a key policy expert 
on the topic. Id. at 1. Lenhoff notes that any policy reform seeking to impose government-mandated 
labor standards on employers can expect a fervent opposition from business lobbying groups. Id. at 6. 
 34 See infra notes 38–155 and accompanying text. 
 35 See infra notes 156–249 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra notes 250–286 and accompanying text. 
 37 See infra notes 287–326 and accompanying text. 
 38 See U.S. DEP’T LAB., supra note 7, at 1. 
 39 See id. (outlining the different forms of leave benefits available in the United States). 
 40 Id. Sick leave is intended for short-term illnesses or absences. AEI-BROOKINGS WORKING GRP. 
ON PAID FAM. LEAVE, THE AEI-BROOKINGS WORKING GROUP REPORT ON PAID FAMILY AND MEDI-
CAL LEAVE 13 (2018), https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/The-AEI-Brookings-Working-
Group-Report-on-Paid-Family-and-Medical-Leave.pdf [https://perma.cc/LVW8-DKPV]. Although 
the federal government does not mandate paid sick leave, many employers offer it voluntarily because 
it promotes a consistent and healthy workforce. Id.; Sick Leave, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.
gov/general/topic/workhours/sickleave [https://perma.cc/993Q-W4HK]. Sick leave can be either paid 
or unpaid, but usually it is paid. See infra note 142 and accompanying text (discussing the availability 
of paid sick leave in the United States compared to PFML). 
 41 U.S. DEP’T LAB., supra note 7, at 1. The definition of “family member” varies depending on 
the state. See U.S. CHAMBER COM., A POLICY PATCHWORK: PAID FAMILY LEAVE LAWS IN THE 
STATES 50 (2020), https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/023871_empl_paid_family_leave_
report_jan_web1.pdf [https://perma.cc/3X35-2ZJG] (providing an overview of covered family mem-
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Medical leave covers time away from work because the employee themself is 
ill.42 Typically, lawmakers classify sick leave separately and bundle family and 
medical leave together.43 Lawmakers tend to regulate family and medical leave 
in tandem because both involve long-term absences from work, whereas sick 
leave covers short-term absences.44 
This Note focuses only on family and medical leave policy because, as 
the Pandemic illustrated, American employees often struggle the most to re-
ceive pay during long-term absences from work.45 Section A of this Part gives 
a brief overview of the origins of employee benefits law, particularly on the 
development of leave benefits.46 Section B provides a thorough legislative his-
tory of the FMLA.47 Part C explains the existing laws governing family and 
medical leave in the United States: the FMLA at the federal level, as well as 
state-level policies.48 Finally, Part D introduces the temporary measures Con-
gress enacted to address the Pandemic.49 This historical background of Ameri-
can family and medical leave policy informs lawmakers’ struggle to enact 
PFML––even in the wake of an unprecedented global health crisis.50 
A. A Brief Introduction to Employee Benefits Law 
In the United States, most people receive basic benefits through their em-
ployers, such as retirement funds and health insurance.51 Employers are also 
the conduit for funding marquee programs like Social Security and Medicare 
                                                                                                                           
bers across different states). For example, California, New York, and Washington state include grand-
children in defining the term under their state paid family leave laws, whereas Rhode Island does not. 
AEI-BROOKINGS WORKING GRP. ON PAID FAM. LEAVE, supra note 40, at 23. 
 42 U.S. DEP’T LAB., supra note 7, at 1. 
 43 AEI-BROOKINGS WORKING GRP. ON PAID FAM. LEAVE, supra note 40, at 13. 
 44 U.S. DEP’T LAB., supra note 7, at 1. An example of a short-term absence prompting an em-
ployee to use sick leave is a doctor’s appointment. See AEI-BROOKINGS WORKING GRP. ON PAID FAM. 
LEAVE, supra note 40, at 13 (discussing the parameters and details of sick leave). 
 45 See infra notes 51–326 and accompanying text. 
 46 See infra notes 51–67 and accompanying text. 
 47 See infra notes 68–120 and accompanying text. 
 48 See infra notes 121–142 and accompanying text. 
 49 See infra notes 143–155 and accompanying text. 
 50 See infra notes 68–120 and accompanying text (discussing the history of the FMLA and family 
and medical leave policy, more broadly); see also infra notes 241–249 and accompanying text (pre-
senting some of the current challenges to enacting paid leave reform). 
 51 See COLLEEN E. MEDILL, INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW: POLICY AND PRAC-
TICE 1 (3d ed. 2011) (introducing the broad concept of employee benefits within the American land-
scape of social entitlements). In 2019, approximately 55% of Americans received health care through 
their employer. See KATHERINE KEISLER-STARKEY & LISA N. BUNCH, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2019, at 3 (2020), https://www.census.
gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2020/demo/p60-271.pdf [https://perma.cc/CHB3-FY8Y] 
(reporting that in 2019 the percentage of Americans with employer-provided health care was 55.4%). 
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through payroll taxes.52 As a result, businesses large and small have a signifi-
cant stake in the development of employee benefits law and play key roles in 
its policy-making.53 
Employee benefits law intertwines social, tax, and corporate policy.54 The 
provision of benefits hinges on employers’ general incentive to maintain a 
healthy, productive workforce.55 Offering employee benefits aids employers by 
attracting the best job candidates and preventing health-related absences dis-
ruptive to workflow.56 Providing employee benefits, however, is an expensive 
undertaking for employers.57 For this reason, some employers classify their 
workers as “independent contractors” instead of “employees” to avoid paying 
                                                                                                                           
 52 See JAMES A. MORONE & DANIEL C. EHLKE, HEALTH POLITICS AND POLICY 254 (5th ed. 
2013) (stating that employers provide health insurance for most Americans). Employers have been the 
largest purchasers of private health plans since President Franklin Delano Roosevelt signed the Social 
Security Act of 1935. Id. at 255. Further, payroll taxes paid by most American workers fund Social 
Security and Medicare. How Is Social Security Financed?, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/
news/press/factsheets/HowAreSocialSecurity.htm#:~:text=Social%20Security%20is%20financed%
20through,self%2Demployed%20pay%2012.4%20percent [https://perma.cc/3MTZ-CDP6]; How Is 
Medicare Funded?, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/about-us/how-is-medicare-funded 
[https://perma.cc/6DTE-V5CM]. 
 53 See LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 26, at 85 (framing employee benefits as a labor-focused area 
of law). When Congress first began regulating pension funds, the government had to decide whether 
regulations should be promulgated from the Department of Labor (DoL) or the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC). Id. Lawmakers decided on the DoL to assure employers and labor unions 
that their interests would be acknowledged in forthcoming regulations. Id. 
 54 See MEDILL, supra note 51, at 2 (explaining the breadth of issues encompassed in employee 
benefits and the public policy implications for the American workforce). The tax implications of em-
ployee benefits are complex and inextricable. Id. at 3. This Note will briefly mention or allude to tax 
policies as necessary, but the intersection of tax and employee benefits planning is a robust area of 
study unto itself and is not the focus here. Id. See generally Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple 
Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 177 (1989) (exploring more deeply the eco-
nomic implications of mandated government programs). 
 Although they are ubiquitous in the twenty-first century, employee benefits are a relatively recent 
legal invention. See MEDILL, supra note 51, at 4 (explaining that companies did not begin to embrace 
employee benefits plans until the 1930s and 1940s). In the early 1920s, there was minimal legal regu-
lation over employers regarding employee benefits, so individual businesses could elect to provide 
any or no sort of benefit beyond compensation. Id. at 3. Then, the 1960s bore an era of legislative 
revolution for American social benefits, known as the “Great Society.” Eva Bertram, Democratic 
Divisions in the 1960s and the Road to Welfare Reform, 126 POL. SCI. Q. 579, 600 (2011). During this 
time, the notion of expanding government entitlements to support poor and underserved Americans 
gained popularity, setting the stage for progressive reform. Id. 
 55 See MORONE & EHLKE, supra note 52, at 255 (noting that employers benefit from providing 
employees with health insurance). 
 56 See, e.g., id. (using health insurance as an example of an employee benefit with positive exter-
nalities for businesses). 
 57 See Jessica Looman, The True Cost of Misclassification, U.S. DEP’T LAB. BLOG (May 6, 2021), 
https://blog.dol.gov/2021/05/06/the-true-cost-of-misclassification [https://perma.cc/V7G5-B3TS] 
(explaining that employers do not need to pay for benefits such as healthcare, overtime, or paid leave 
if workers are not properly classified as “employees”). 
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for employee benefits.58 This practice frequently leads to “worker misclassifi-
cation” litigation, particularly in the gig economy.59 These lawsuits involve 
claims that employers intentionally and erroneously mischaracterized workers 
to circumvent the cost of employee benefits.60 
In 1974, Congress laid the cornerstone of American employee benefits 
law by enacting the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).61 
Although ERISA only governs retirement benefits, its legislative history set the 
stage for all employee benefits reform that came after, including family and 
medical leave.62 The collective realization from the American public that fed-
                                                                                                                           
 58 See id. (noting that the Pandemic showed an increase in employer misclassification practices); 
Abigail S. Rosenfeld, ABC to AB 5: The Supreme Court of California Modernizes Common Law Doc-
trine in Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court, 61 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. II.-112, II.-116 
(2020), https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3857&context=bclr [https://
perma.cc/C3WU-U643] (explaining the essential difference between employees and independent 
contractors for labor protections and rights); How Well Are Independent Workers Prepared for Re-
tirement?, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 28, 2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2019/06/
independentworkers_brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6QS-ETSB] (same). 
 59 See Mark Anderson & Max Huffman, Labor Organization in Ride-Sharing—Unionization or 
Cartelization?, 23 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 715, 737 (2021) (discussing the prevalence of worker 
misclassification cases brought by drivers for ride-sharing companies, such as Uber) (citing O’Connor 
v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2015). Ride-share companies hesitate to 
provide their drivers with “employee status” because this characterization entitles them to state and 
federal protections, which impact workers’ ability to organize. See id. (recognizing that independent 
contractors do not share the same rights as employees regarding collective bargaining rights). 
 60 See, e.g., Harper v. Amazon.com Servs. Inc., No. 19-21735, 2020 WL 4333791, at *1 (D.N.J. 
July 28), appeal filed, No. 20-2614 (3d Cir. Aug. 11, 2020) (alleging that delivery drivers were em-
ployees not independent contractors); Cunningham v. Lyft, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 3d 37, 39 (D. Mass.), 
appeal filed, No. 20-1567 (1st Cir. June 17, 2020) (challenging the worker classification of app driv-
ers); Colopy v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 19-cv-06462, 2019 WL 6841218, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec.16, 
2019) (arguing that Uber app drivers were misclassified as independent contractors). In some states, 
Attorneys General play an active role in bringing and settling these cases on behalf of workers. See, 
e.g., Healey v. Uber Techs., Inc. & Lyft, Inc., No. 2084-cv-01519, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 25, 
2021) (denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss the worker misclassification claims brought by 
Massachusetts Attorney General Maura Healey); Settlement Agreement, New York v. FedEx Ground 
Package Sys., Inc., No. 402960/10, at 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Dec. 20, 2018) (settling a case over the 
classification status of certain FedEx Corp. drivers); Complaint, District of Columbia v. Power De-
sign, Inc., No. 2018-CA-005598, at 2 (D.C. Super. Ct. filed Aug. 8, 2018) (demanding an employer 
pay restitution to workers deprived of the District of Columbia’s minimum wage). 
 61 See MEDILL, supra note 51, at 17–18 (calling ERISA the beginning of an evolution in employ-
ee benefits law). See generally Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (creating national standards and 
regulations for employee retirement plans). 
 62 See MEDILL, supra note 51, at 18 (acknowledging that employee benefits have changed since 
ERISA, but that ERISA provides the foundation for modern changes to employment law). The pivotal 
moment for ERISA occurred in 1963, when a major auto plant in South Bend, Indiana closed. Id. 
Studebaker-Packard Company (Studebaker), the employer, infamously mismanaged private pension 
funds for its employees resulting in the loss of retirement funds for thousands of workers. LANGBEIN 
ET AL., supra note 26, at 78–80. The idea that decades of hard-earned retirement savings could vanish 
in an instant because of an employer’s capriciousness shocked the public. See id. at 86 (describing the 
explosiveness of the Studebaker case for the American public). 
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eral regulations could safeguard their individual livelihoods generated support 
behind ERISA.63 ERISA’s passage proved that public opinion can tremendous-
ly influence sweeping policy reform.64 Congress bitterly debated the minutia of 
ERISA for years, but eventually the undeniable will of the American people 
forced the legislature’s hand to end the squabbling and pass the bill.65 In 
ERISA’s wake, Congress passed a slew of other policies to regulate the em-
ployee benefits space and to meet the expectations of an increasingly modern 
workforce.66 This era of reform shows that family and medical leave did not 
grow in a vacuum, but rather represents one piece of a broader movement to-
ward more progressive employee benefits over the last fifty years.67 
B. The Genesis & Evolution of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 
Until the late 1970s, family-focused policies were not a legislative priori-
ty for the federal government.68 Then in 1976, in General Electric Co. v. Gil-
bert, the Supreme Court ruled that an employer’s failure to provide disability 
benefits to a pregnant employee did not constitute sex discrimination.69 This 
ruling surprised members of Congress and spurred legislative action to protect 
                                                                                                                           
 63 See LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 26, at 80 (observing that many scholars have cited the Stu-
debaker incident as a rallying point for federal regulation of employee benefits). 
 64 See id. at 92 (asserting that there was a huge imperative for Congress to pass ERISA because 
the idea of federally-regulated pension plans had already enraptured the minds of American workers). 
In the wake of the Pandemic, lawmakers have been similarly motivated by the strong public opinion 
in favor of PFML. See infra note 321 and accompanying text (noting the momentum built behind 
PFML as a result of COVID-19). 
 65 See LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 26, at 91–92 (detailing the negotiations taking place in the 
Senate committees over the particulars of the ERISA, and the ultimate, inevitable result to pass the 
bill at the behest of broader public opinion). The passage of ERISA succeeded largely because social 
activists were ready to capitalize on the Studebaker incident and convert the energy that Studebaker 
created into support for pension reform. See James A. Wooten, “The Most Glorious Story of Failure in 
the Business”: The Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 
683, 684 (2001) (observing the impact that Studebaker made by initiating lasting change for employee 
benefits). 
 66 See MEDILL, supra note 51, at 18 (using employees’ transition away from outdated employer-
managed pension funds to modern employee-managed retirement plans as an example of the evolving 
regulatory needs in employee benefits law). Other federal laws regulating employee benefits include: 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, Uniformed Services Em-
ployment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. § 4301, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 
29 U.S.C. § 621. Id. at 363. 
 67 See id. at 363 (showing the legislative development over time to expand employee rights). 
 68 See Sarah E. Towne, Developing Family-Friendly Policies in the Public Sector in Wake of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, at 7 (Aug. 1, 2013) (Ph.D. dissertation, American University) (Soc. Sci. 
Rsch. Network) (explaining that family-focused policies took a backseat to other, seemingly more 
pressing issues like the economy and ongoing military conflicts). 
 69 See 429 U.S. 125, 145–46 (1976) (holding that the denial of disability benefits did not violate 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
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mothers in the workplace.70 In 1978, Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimi-
nation Act (PDA) to protect female employees from discrimination at work 
because they are pregnant.71 These events drew attention from the White 
House and led President Jimmy Carter to summon a conference dedicated to 
family-centered policies.72 The conference exposed the panoply of social is-
sues brewing in American society including same-sex marriage rights, abor-
tion, and school prayer.73 Although it did not yield tangible legislative or ad-
ministrative policy changes, the conference served as an incubator for a di-
verse slate of policy reforms, including parental leave.74 
In 1983, Congress charged a Select Committee on Children, Youth, and 
Families to investigate the gaps in child and family welfare policy in the Unit-
ed States.75 When the Select Committee issued its report in 1985, it recom-
mended that Congress enact legislation incentivizing private companies to of-
                                                                                                                           
 70 See Rozlyn Fulgoni-Britton & Joel P. Schroeder, Tackling the Challenges of Accommodating 
Pregnant Workers Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
61 FED. LAW. 35, 35 (2014) (noting that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) was Congress’s 
answer to the unexpected outcome of the Supreme Court’s ruling in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 
429 U.S. 125 (1976)). 
 71 See Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, sec. 2, § 2000e(k), 92 Stat. 2076, 2076 
(1978) (amending Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-1786, at 4 
(1978) (Conf. Rep.) (clarifying that the legislation intentionally covered all conditions related to preg-
nancy including abortion). Despite this progress, some lawmakers viewed the PDA as only the tip of 
the iceberg for the parental rights that American families needed. See Anthony, supra note 30, at 465 
(referencing legislators’ conclusion that any amendments to Title VII would not be sufficient to ad-
dress family or parental leave). 
 72 See Jimmy Carter, President U.S., White House Conference on Families Remarks at a White 
House Reception (July 20, 1979) (calling on the government to consider reforms to “strengthen Amer-
ican families”). These remarks came one week after President Jimmy Carter’s famous “Crisis of Con-
fidence” speech. Crisis of Confidence, PBS: AM. EXPERIENCE (July 15, 1979), https://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/americanexperience/features/carter-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/Z2HK-472K] (addressing tangible 
problems facing the United States––like the 1970s energy crisis––as well as a broader admonishment 
for the loss of faith in the American spirit). 
 73 See Spencer Rich, Carter Opens Conference on Families, WASH. POST (June 6, 1980), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1980/06/06/carter-opens-conference-on-families/c9a4d
872-0ea5-46e9-ba52-0140d4ac2046/ [https://perma.cc/YAW5-V5RT] (discussing the various interest 
groups attending the White House Conference on Families and their platforms). 
 74 See Leo P. Ribuffo, Family Policy Past as Prologue: Jimmy Carter, the White House Confer-
ence on Families, and the Mobilization of the New Christian Right, 23 REV. POL’Y RSCH. 311, 333 
(2006) (discussing the range of social and political groups present at the White House Conference on 
Families). President Carter’s conference partially served its intended purpose to spur policy ideas, but 
it also backfired politically. Id. The progressive reforms unearthed by the conference sparked even 
greater conservativism among right-wing groups that eventually swelled to a Republican-led move-
ment against President Carter. Id. In fact, some scholars mark the conference as a catalyst for the 
Christian right movement. See Seth Dowland, “Family Values” and the Formation of the Christian 
Right Agenda, 78 CHURCH HIST. 606, 631 (2009) (explaining that President Carter’s conference broad-
ened the appeal to the Christian right movement by inadvertently politicizing the term “family”). 
 75 See SELECT COMM. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH, & FAMS., FAMILIES & CHILD CARE: IMPROVING 
THE OPTIONS, H.R. REP. NO. 98-1180, at 10 (2d Sess. 1985) (investigating the impact that the grow-
ing number of working mothers had on the availability of child care). 
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fer parental leave benefits.76 This recommendation planted the seed for wide-
spread parental leave reform in the private sector.77 
Prompted by the Select Committee report, progressive lawmakers intro-
duced the Parental and Disability Leave Act (PDLA) in 1985.78 The PDLA 
marked the first bill to propose a national mandate for parental leave.79 The bill 
included unpaid, job-protected leave for reasons such as the birth of a child or 
temporary disability.80 Concurrently, a critical ruling from the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals propelled support for heightening leave benefits standards.81 
                                                                                                                           
 76 See id. at 21 (listing increased leave benefits as one option that the private sector could adopt to 
alleviate the financial pressure of child care). 
 77 See id. (proposing progressive family-centered policies to Congress for legislative action). 
During the early 1980s, lawmakers and scholars were still reckoning with the dramatic demographic 
shifts in the American workforce since the 1960s, particularly the significant increase in working 
mothers. See Parental & Disability Leave: Joint Hearing on H.R. 2020 Before the H. Subcomm. on 
Civil Serv. & the H. Subcomm. on Compensation & Emp. Benefits of the H. Comm. on Post Office & 
Civil Serv. & the H. Subcomm. on Lab. Mgmt. Relations & the H. Subcomm. on Lab. Standards of the 
H. Comm. on Educ. & Lab., 99th Cong. 26–27 (1985) [hereinafter House Hearing 1985] (statement of 
Sheila B. Kamerman, Ph.D., Professor of Social Policy and Planning, Columbia University School of 
Social Work & Alfred J. Kahn, Ph.D., Professor of Social Policy and Planning, Columbia University 
School of Social Work) (introducing statistics concerning the number of women re-entering the work-
force after having a child). 
 78 See generally Parental and Disability Leave Act of 1985, H.R. 2020, 99th Cong. (1985) (setting 
forth unpaid, job-protected leave for parents and employees with a disability). 
 79 See Sholar, supra note 29 (clarifying that the Parental and Disability Leave Act (PDLA) was 
the first paid family leave bill brought to the House floor). The first bill written, although never for-
mally introduced to Congress, was the Family Employment Security Act (FESA). See id. (calling 
FESA the first introduction to a national family-leave provision); see also Jillian J. Rennie, Comment, 
Constructive Notice Under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 118 YALE L.J. 795, 799 n.24 (2009) 
(clarifying that the drafters of FESA also wrote the PDLA and what would eventually become the 
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA)). These proposals aimed to establish a minimum 
legal standard for parental and disability leave benefits because the federal government regulates a 
minimum required standard for other workplace benefits. See generally Fair Labor Standards Act of 
1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219) (establishing baseline 
standards for employment conditions, such as minimum wages and prohibiting certain types of child 
labor). Following this notion, this Note will use “mandate” in the same way policy-makers use the 
term in the PFML context: to refer to a minimum legal standard of leave benefits set and regulated by 
the federal government. LENHOFF & BELL, supra note 30, at 7 (using the term “mandates” to refer to 
minimum standards of labor conditions enforced by the government). 
 80 See H.R. 2020 (requiring at least eighteen weeks for parental leave and twenty-six weeks for 
disability leave). The PDLA did not limit the size of the employers to be covered; even large compa-
nies would be required to comply with the bill’s minimum standard. See id. (noting that the bill does 
not contain an employer threshold). 
 81 See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390, 396 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that the 
state maternity leave law did not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act), rev’g No. 83-4927R, 1984 
WL 943 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 1984), aff’d 479 U.S. 272, 292 (1987). Despite the Ninth Circuit’s ruling 
upholding the maternity leave law, national policy-makers worried that a federal law protecting only 
mothers would spur future Title VII litigation and risk being overturned. See Patricia A. Shiu & 
Stephanie M. Wildman, Pregnancy Discrimination and Social Change: Evolving Consciousness 
About a Worker’s Right to Job-Protected, Paid Leave, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 119, 125 (2009) 
(acknowledging that equality legislation could potentially spurn different treatment between genders 
in parental leave laws). At the FMLA’s inception, proponents settled that all future proposals would 
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In 1985, in California Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, the Ninth Cir-
cuit upheld a California maternity leave law, reasoning that it did not give 
women unlawful, preferential treatment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964.82 The court held that Congress intended the PDA to establish a mini-
mum standard for women’s rights in the workplace, not to impose a limitation 
upon them.83 The Ninth Circuit’s decision preserved the potential for greater 
rights to working women in the future, affirming that leave mandates merely 
create a floor for minimum employment standards, not a ceiling.84 
Although Guerra created modest momentum for parental leave reform, 
generally, the legislative environment in the early 1980s was still unfavorable 
for paid leave, specifically.85 Since the FMLA’s inception, policy-makers grap-
pled with whether to make leave paid or unpaid.86 Even policy experts support-
ive of the bill balked at the task of building a new entitlement program from 
the ground up.87 The same experts noted, however, that the failure to give 
                                                                                                                           
be inclusive to avoid potential litigation. See Towne, supra note 68, at 8 (emphasizing the importance 
of the “special treatment” versus the “equal treatment” issue in the early iterations of the FMLA). 
 82 See Guerra, 758 F.2d at 396 (“[A] state law that guarantees pregnant women a certain number 
of pregnancy disability leave days . . . is neither inconsistent with, nor unlawful under, Title VII.”). 
The Ninth Circuit rejected California Federal Savings’s argument that the law was unequal under the 
standards of Title VII. See id. (noting that in the disability rights community, under the social model 
of disability, equality is measured by providing functionally equivalent opportunities based on differ-
ing needs, not literally identical services). The disability rights community defines the “[s]ocial 
[m]odel of [d]isability” as a movement to reimagine the popular understanding of what it means to be 
a disabled person. See Michelle A. Travis, Disabling the Gender Pay Gap: Lessons from the Social 
Model of Disability, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 893, 914 (2014) (explaining the goal of the social model of 
disability). The term implies that the common, and false, understanding of a “disability” as a funda-
mental physical affliction results from unchallenged social norms and restrictive environmental struc-
tures. See id. (differentiating an “impairment” from a “disability” under the social model lens); see 
also Stephen Bunbury, Unconscious Bias and the Medical Model: How the Social Model May Hold 
the Key to Transformative Thinking About Disability Discrimination, 19 INT’L J. DISCRIMINATION & 
L. 26 (2019) (advancing the adoption of the social model of disability within legal frameworks). 
 83 Guerra, 758 F.2d at 396. 
 84 Id. (“[T]he PDA’s enactment . . . makes clear that Congress intended . . . to construct a floor 
beneath which . . . benefits may not drop––not a ceiling above which they may not rise.”). 
 85 See STEVEN K. WISENSALE, FAMILY LEAVE POLICY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WORK 
AND FAMILY IN AMERICA 138 (2001) (remarking that the political and economic forces at work in the 
1980s that were unfriendly to paid leave). 
 86 See id. at 136 (discussing the many factors that early policy-makers considered when drafting 
the FMLA). Policy-makers wanted to ensure that any future bill contained a provision for job protec-
tion while employees are on leave. See id. at 136–37 (including job protection as one of the original 
goals of FMLA policy-makers). Paid leave was a primary issue for policy-makers at the beginning of 
the FMLA. See id. at 138 (indicating that paid leave, or “wage replacement,” was one of the major 
concerns for FMLA policy-makers early on). Although the proposed law would guarantee job protec-
tion for employees, it did not require that employers would pay them during their absence. See id. at 
139 (remarking that offering job protection without a paid-leave provision would make the American 
law conservative compared to industrialized European countries). 
 87 See, e.g., House Hearing 1985, supra note 77, at 12–13 (statement of Wendy W. Williams, 
Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center) (supporting the legislation by listing 
the three areas where the PDLA would supplement the PDA). In her testimony, Professor Williams 
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some level of wage replacement would make the United States an outlier when 
compared to other countries.88 Instead of providing paid leave immediately, the 
bill created a special commission charged with investigating the possibility of 
a paid leave policy in the future.89 This measured approach accommodated the 
hesitancy from policy experts and the outright opposition from business interest 
groups.90 Policy-makers’ decision to sacrifice paid leave proved to be a strategic 
one because it insulated the bill from extraneous criticism and ultimately pre-
served its future.91 
Between 1986 and 1987, leave legislation gained momentum because 
both Congressional chambers introduced bills on the floor.92 On this founda-
tion, proponents of the proposal began a serious coalition-building effort to 
broaden support for leave benefits reform.93 Progressives successfully recruit-
ed key groups––like labor unions––to their side.94 Additionally, the bill gained 
                                                                                                                           
acknowledged that the tax and administrative implications of financing a new paid leave benefit pro-
gram would be significant. See id. (endorsing the careful approach of the PDLA to compensation). 
Further, she noted that several models for paid leave exist in the United States at the state-level and 
around the world, and that it may be beneficial for Congress to first learn from the experience of these 
other entities. Id. 
 88 See id. at 13 (stating that a wage replacement provision was “[c]onspicuous by its absence”); 
see also 131 CONG. REC. 8318 (1985) (statement of Rep. Patricia Schroeder) (urging that it is time for 
the United States to join other industrialized nations and enact some form of paid leave). 
 89 Parental and Disability Leave Act of 1985, H.R. 2020, 99th Cong. (1985) (calling for a con-
gressional commission to investigate paid leave policies and make recommendations to Congress in 
two years). 
 90 See House Hearing 1985, supra note 77, at 13 (statement of Wendy W. Williams, Associate 
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center) (advocating for an exploratory committee to 
investigate the ramifications of a paid leave program in the United States); WISENSALE, supra note 
85, at 138 (discussing the leverage from business interest groups on lawmakers to not support the 
proposed family leave measures). 
 91 See WISENSALE, supra note 85, at 138 (explaining Democrats’ motivation to avoid a conflict in 
Congress over the cost of their proposed paid leave program). 
 92 See id. at 141–42 (noting that for years Representative Patricia Schroeder was the lone sponsor 
on House Bill 2020, and no parallel bill had been introduced in the Senate). In 1986, Senator Christo-
pher Dodd introduced a bill to the Senate. Parental and Medical Leave Act of 1986, S. 2278, 99th 
Cong. (1986); WISENSALE, supra note 85, at 142. 
 93 See LENHOFF & BELL, supra note 30, at 5 (listing the groups that progressives recruited to 
support the family and medical leave bill). For example, Congress changed the name of the bill from 
the “Parental and Disability Leave Act” to the “Parental and Medical Leave Act” because the term 
“disability” was offensive to some interest groups. WISENSALE, supra note 85, at 141 (recognizing the 
blowback from advocates in the disability community). Lawmakers circulated the bill through the 
relevant committees in the House of Representatives. See generally Parental & Medical Leave Act of 
1986: Joint Hearing on H.R. 4300 Before the H. Subcomm. on Lab.-Mgmt. Rels. & the H. Subcomm. 
on Lab. Standards of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Lab., 99th Cong. 11 (1986) [hereinafter House Hear-
ing Educ. & Lab. 1986] (reviewing the ramifications of the bill for labor industry groups); House 
Hearing 1985, supra note 77, at 54–57 (including testimony from women in labor unions); id. at 3 
(setting forth the purpose of the bill as addressing the increased number of parents in the workplace 
without access to child care). 
 94 See House Hearing Educ. & Lab. 1986, supra note 93, at 80–92 (including letters of support 
for H.R. 4300 from multiple labor unions); WISENSALE, supra note 85, at 138 (explaining the strong 
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support from two powerful interest groups: the Catholic Church and the Amer-
ican Association of Retired Persons (AARP).95 In fact, the AARP persuaded 
lawmakers to change the name of the bill to the FMLA, as a gesture to the el-
derly community.96 These changes indicate the significant progress the FMLA 
bill made during the late 1980s as it churned through congressional hearings 
and gained traction with influential policy groups.97 
Despite measured bipartisan progress, pushback from the business com-
munity and conservative lawmakers persisted during this time.98 Conservatives 
vocalized two major criticisms of the FMLA bill.99 First, critics predicted that 
the bill would harm small businesses.100 Opponents asserted that imposing a 
                                                                                                                           
backlash from business groups, such as the United States Chamber of Commerce); LENHOFF & BELL, 
supra note 30, at 4 (emphasizing that support from labor unions was instrumental for the FMLA be-
cause the bill sought to regulate federal labor standards). 
 95 See U.S. CATH. BISHOPS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL: PASTORAL LETTER ON CATHOLIC 
SOCIAL TEACHING AND THE U.S. ECONOMY 46, ¶¶ 207–208 (1986), https://www.usccb.org/upload/
economic_justice_for_all.pdf [https://perma.cc/8U2J-HHFD] (expressing support for public policy 
initiatives to improve resources and leave benefits for working parents); Parental & Medical Leave 
Act of 1987: Hearing on S. 249 Before the Subcomm. on Children, Fam., Drugs & Alcoholism of the 
S. Comm. on Lab. & Human Resources, 100th Cong. 183 (1987) [hereinafter Senate Hearing 1987] 
(statement of Reverend Monsignor Daniel F. Hoye, United States Catholic Conference) (advocating 
for greater parental and disability leave); Family & Medical Leave Act of 1987: Joint Hearing on H.R. 
295 Before the H. Subcomm. on Lab. Mgmt. Relations & the H. Subcomm. on Lab. Standards of the 
H. Comm. on Educ. & Lab., 100th Cong. 69 (1987) [hereinafter House Hearing 1987] (statement of 
John Denning, President, American Association of Retired Persons (AARP)) (calling the FMLA “crit-
ical” to caregivers and families); Sholar, supra note 29 (describing the AARP’s motivation to lobby in 
favor of the bill in order to make eldercare a protected excuse for leave). 
 96 See 132 CONG. REC. 26,373 (1986) (statement from Rep. William (Bill) Clay) (calling the bill 
the “Family and Medical Leave Act of 1986”). The AARP persuaded sponsors of the bill, including 
co-sponsor Representative William Clay, to change the word “Parental” to “Family.” See Sholar, 
supra note 29 (signaling the AARP’s influence as the reason for the change in the bill’s name from 
the “Parental and Disability Leave Act” to the “Family and Medical Leave Act”). The word “Family” 
showed that the legislation would also cover the need to leave work to care for elderly family mem-
bers, as well as children. Id. 
 97 See LENHOFF & BELL, supra note 30, at 6 (listing the many advocacy groups that ultimately 
joined the FMLA coalition, including Business and Professional Women USA, the Children’s De-
fense Fund, the United Steel Workers, the National Senior Citizens Council, the Epilepsy Foundation, 
the American Academy of Pediatricians, and the Union of American Hebrew Congregations). Im-
portantly, 1987 was also the year when the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Cali-
fornia Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra. See 479 U.S. 272, 292 (1987) (upholding the Ninth 
Circuit’s reasoning that a California maternity leave law was not preempted by Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act), aff’g 758 F.2d 390, 396 (9th Cir. 1985). The Court’s ruling amplified support for the 
FMLA as it continued to move through Congress. See id. (affirming that leave laws supporting moth-
ers were lawful); see also WISENSALE, supra note 85, at 140 (observing that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Guerra came at a pivotal moment in the FMLA’s development). 
 98 See LENHOFF & BELL, supra note 30, at 8–9 (noting the strong Republican opposition to the 
FMLA that prevented its passage in 1986). 
 99 See infra notes 100–104 and accompanying text (explaining the conservatives’ critique that the 
bill would negatively impact both businesses and employees). 
 100 See 132 CONG. REC. 30,426 (1986) (statement of Rep. David Dreier) (suggesting that the 
FMLA would worsen the financial struggles of small businesses already operating with limited budg-
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national standard would unfairly impact small businesses that rely on the par-
ticularized skills of individual employees to operate.101 Small businesses, they 
argued, do not necessarily have the same liberty that large businesses do to 
grant employees extended periods of leave.102 Second, the bill’s opponents ar-
gued that the FMLA would restrict employers’ right to contract.103 Pro-
business lawmakers purported that employers would be forced to compensate 
for the additional cost of the FMLA by cutting other employment benefits, 
thereby restricting their flexibility to contract optimal terms with employees.104 
To address these concerns, conservative politicians proposed an amend-
ment to limit the FMLA’s scope.105 Principally, the amendment altered the 
bill’s “employer threshold,” to cover only employers with more than one hun-
dred employees, as opposed to the fifteen-employee threshold progressives 
originally proposed.106 The employer threshold remained a key point of con-
                                                                                                                           
ets and narrow profit streams); 132 CONG. REC. 23,365 (1986) (statement of Rep. Larry Combest) 
(stating, explicitly, that the federal leave mandate was a “threat to small business[es]”). 
 101 See House Hearing Educ. & Lab. 1986, supra note 93, at 70 (statement of Frank S. Swain, 
Chief Counsel for Advocacy, Small Business Administration) (opining that a government mandate for 
family and medical leave benefits would harm small businesses because these businesses could not 
afford the disruption of allowing their limited labor resources to take long-term absences). 
 102 See id. (emphasizing the adverse effect on small businesses when an employee leaves for a 
long period of time). 
 103 See 132 CONG. REC. 25,385 (1986) (statement of Rep. Tom DeLay) (stating that businesses 
should be empowered to “set up leave policies . . . that suit[] them and their employees”); 132 CONG. 
REC. 25,382 (1986) (statement of Rep. Alfred McCandless) (claiming that the FMLA would 
“shortchang[e]” employees in negotiations). 
 104 See, e.g., 132 CONG. REC. 30,426 (1986) (statement of Rep. David Dreier) (opposing the idea 
of a federal mandate on all businesses regardless of size); 132 CONG. REC. 25,385 (1986) (statement 
of Rep. Tom DeLay) (suggesting that the bill would prevent businesses from “hiring women of child-
bearing age”); 132 CONG. REC. 25,382 (1986) (statement of Rep. Alfred McCandless) (accusing the 
bill of limiting the “flexibility” employers need); 132 CONG. REC. 23,365 (1986) (statement of Rep. 
Larry Combest) (expressing concern for the effect of House Bill 4300 on small businesses); 132 
CONG. REC. 23,369 (1986) (statement Rep. Tom DeLay) (calling the FMLA a “yuppie bill”). 
 105 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-699, pt. 2, at 49 (1986) (indicating the objections to House Bill 4300 
from Representative Marge Roukema and discussing some proposed revisions). 
 106 See id. (dissenting to House Bill 4300, Rep. Roukema and some of her conservative col-
leagues felt the bill was overreaching). Rep. Roukema urged her House colleagues to consider raising 
the threshold for eligible employers and acknowledge the hardships a uniform standard would impose 
on small businesses. See id. at 50 (calling for Congress to consider increasing the employer threshold 
to one hundred employees or more to protect more small businesses, among other suggested reforms). 
Ultimately, Rep. Roukema would propose her own bill to counter H.R. 4300, calling for a mandate to 
cover employers with fifty employees or more. See Linda Greenhouse, Momentum and ‘Family Leave,’ 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 1987), https://www.nytimes.com/1987/02/03/us/washington-talk-momentum-and-
family-leave.html [https://perma.cc/XMZ6-8JPW] (detailing Rep. Roukema’s impact in the family leave 
debate, particularly in regard to the fifty-employee threshold). Rep. Roukema’s proposed reforms 
significantly impacted the final version of the FMLA, which implemented her suggested fifty-
employee threshold. See WISENSALE, supra note 85, at 142 (noting Rep. Roukema’s influence on the 
minutia of the FMLA). 
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tention for the business community throughout the FMLA’s progression.107 By 
the end of the congressional term in 1986, however, politicians could not reach 
a consensus and the bill hung in legislative purgatory.108 
Then in 1988, President George H.W. Bush was voted into office.109 The 
Bush White House signaled a specific aversion to the FMLA, but demonstrated 
a general willingness to consider family-friendly issues.110 Under the new ad-
ministration, progressives fostered much needed support from conservative 
lawmakers by framing the FMLA as a pro-family and anti-abortion bill.111 By 
1990, the FMLA accumulated enough bipartisan congressional support to send 
it to President Bush’s desk.112 President Bush, however, vetoed the bill making 
it clear that he did not support a mandatory national standard for employee 
benefits.113 
                                                                                                                           
 107 See WISENSALE, supra note 85, at 142 (describing how Rep. Roukema fought to raise the 
employment threshold throughout the FMLA’s development). Ultimately, Congress raised the em-
ployer threshold in the final version of the FMLA to fifty employees, largely as a result of the push 
from the business community. Id. 
 108 See 132 CONG. REC. 33,620 (1986) (statement of Rep. William (Bill) Clay) (applauding the 
progress the FMLA made accumulating bipartisan support in 1986). Rep. Clay, an early co-sponsor of 
the FMLA, stated that the 1986 legislative session “laid the groundwork” for the FMLA, and implored 
Congress to enact the law in the following session. Id. 
 109 E.J. Dionne Jr., The 1988 Elections; Bush Is Elected by a 6–5 Margin with Solid G.O.P. Base 
in South; Democrats Hold Both Houses: How the Poll Was Taken, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 1988), https://
www.nytimes.com/1988/11/09/us/1988-elections-bush-elected-6-5-margin-with-solid-gop-base-
south-democrats-hold.html [https://perma.cc/PK4D-967B]. 
 110 See David Hoffman, Bush to Address Parental Leave, Wage Floor, WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 
1988), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/09/11/bush-to-address-parental-leave-
wage-floor/e48cb1a3-8053-43d0-9f96-8b324de283a1/ [https://perma.cc/4NLU-DUAY] (relaying 
President George H.W. Bush’s campaign promise to promote “kinder, gentler” polices to support 
workers and families). President Bush did not, however, support the FMLA bill because he did not 
believe in a uniform standard for employer-provided benefits. Id. Subsequently, in 1990, President 
Bush signed a child care bill into law that paved the way for more support behind the FMLA. 
WISENSALE, supra note 85, at 146; see also CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL30785, THE CHILD CARE AND 
DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT: BACKGROUND AND FUNDING 1 (2014) (explaining the evolution of 
the Child Care and Development Block Grant, initially enacted by President Bush in 1990, which 
assisted families in need with procuring child care). 
 111 See WISENSALE, supra note 85, at 146 (framing the legislation to remove the impetus for 
women to abort their pregnancies in the interest of saving their jobs). 
 112 See id. at 147 (stating that the House of Representatives passed the bill by a 237–187 vote). 
 113 See MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, VETO OF H.R. 770, THE “FAMI-
LY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT OF 1990,” H.R. DOC. No. 101-209 (1990) (criticizing the FMLA as a 
“one size fits all” approach). The House of Representatives could not muster enough votes to override 
President Bush’s veto. See Steven A. Holmes, House Backs Bush Veto of Family Leave Bill, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 26, 1990), https://www.nytimes.com/1990/07/26/us/house-backs-bush-veto-of-family-
leave-bill.html [https://perma.cc/PW9W-TDYB] (describing the outcry from Republicans and Demo-
crats regarding President Bush’s veto). Senator Dodd, the bill’s lead sponsor in the Senate, vowed to 
bring the law to President Bush’s desk every year until he agreed to sign it. Id. Representative Rou-
kema, one of the initial critics of the FMLA whose amendments significantly altered the final bill, was 
incensed by the veto. See id. (quoting Rep. Roukema saying that President Bush’s rejection of the law 
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In his 1992 presidential campaign against Bill Clinton, President Bush 
proposed his own leave policy to counter the FMLA.114 President Bush’s poli-
cy embodied the strong opposition the business community harbored against 
the FMLA from the beginning.115 Notably, the proposal heeded the original 
criticism from conservatives over the employer threshold.116 To appease pro-
business supporters, President Bush’s policy included the highest employer 
threshold ever proposed––a five-hundred-employee threshold––effectively 
exempting every large corporation in America.117 
Yet, in 1992, Congress dismissed Bush’s alternative proposal by passing 
the FMLA again, forcing the President to veto it a second time on the eve of 
the presidential election.118 President Bush lost the race to Bill Clinton, whose 
first act as President was signing the FMLA.119 After an almost nine-year ef-
                                                                                                                           
was “beyond [her] understanding”); see also supra notes 105–107 and accompanying text (chroni-
cling Rep. Roukema’s activism during the FMLA legislative process). 
 114 See WISENSALE, supra note 85, at 148–49 (describing President Bush’s proposed policy). The 
alternative plan President Bush suggested in his veto of the 1992 FMLA was business-friendly. See id. 
(outlining a program funded by tax incentives instead of imposing a federal mandate and setting a 
five-hundred-employee threshold). 
 115 See MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, VETO OF S. 5, THE FAMILY AND 
MEDICAL LEAVE ACT OF 1992, S. DOC. NO. 102-26, at 1 (1992). President Bush proposed that instead 
of mandating employers to provide family leave, the government should incentivize them by offering 
businesses refundable tax credits. Id. at 2 (calling for a leave policy that would “provide the flexibility 
workers and employers need” to reach “the optimal package of benefits”). The proposal to finance 
leave benefits through tax incentives in lieu of payroll taxes is a common policy among Republicans 
today. See infra notes 205–208 and accompanying text (laying out paid leave policies currently pro-
posed by Republicans). When rolling out his policy, President Bush argued that many big businesses 
had their own existing family leave policies, and thus should not be required to meet a federal stand-
ard. Michael Wines, Bush Vetoes Bill Making Employers Give Family Leave, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 
1992), https://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/23/us/bush-vetoes-bill-making-employers-give-family-leave.
html [https://perma.cc/XF4G-DYMS]. Also, President Bush stated that a national mandate would 
disadvantage small businesses who would struggle to afford leave benefits. Id. 
 116 See MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, VETO OF S. 5, THE FAMILY AND 
MEDICAL LEAVE ACT OF 1992, supra note 115 (calling for an exclusion for companies with more 
than five hundred employees). 
 117 Id. President Bush’s proposal is the first reported leave policy to suggest a five-hundred-
employee threshold, planting the seed for the employer threshold in later pieces of legislation like the 
Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA). See infra notes 225–227 and accompanying text. 
 118 WISENSALE, supra note 85, at 149. 
 119 See Remarks on Signing the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 WEEKLY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 144 (Feb. 5, 1993) (acknowledging the FMLA as his first bill signed into law as Presi-
dent). See generally Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.) (implementing new leave benefits for 
American employees). In his statement signing the FMLA, President Bill Clinton lauded the new 
legislation as a “fair and sensible” solution for families. Presidential Statement on Signing the Family 
and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 145 (Feb. 5, 1993). At the end of his 
presidency, President Clinton authorized the DoL to pass regulations allowing unemployment insur-
ance (UI) funds to compensate working parents taking leaves of absence after the adoption or birth of 
a new child. Lester, supra note 27, at 8. The program was repealed by President George W. Bush. 
Unemployment Compensation—Trust Fund Integrity Rule; Birth and Adoption Unemployment Com-
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fort, the United States finally secured a national family and medical leave poli-
cy, albeit unpaid.120 
C. The Existing Law: The Reign of FMLA & the Rise of State Paid Leave 
The FMLA still anchors family and medical leave policy in the United 
States.121 The law grants eligible employees twelve weeks of job-protected 
leave during any twelve-month span of time due to family or personal reasons, 
such as the birth of a child or military duty.122 Further, the law allows employ-
ees to take leave if they suffer from a health condition that inhibits them from 
performing their job.123 The FMLA standards apply to all private employers 
                                                                                                                           
pensation; Removal of Regulations, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,540 (Oct. 9, 2003) (codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 
604). In his 2016 presidential campaign, then-candidate Donald Trump proposed a similar scheme to 
the one President Clinton enacted, allocating UI funds to provide parental paid leave. Debra Fitzpat-
rick & Colleen Manchester, Gender Pol’y Report, Baby UI Revisited: Paid Parental Leave Under 
Trump, U. MINN. (Feb. 8, 2017), https://genderpolicyreport.umn.edu/baby-ui-revisited-paid-parental-
leave-under-trump/ [https://perma.cc/P4MY-6H2P]. President Donald Trump never implemented the 
policy during his four-year term. See Isabel V. Sawhill & Sarah Nzau, What Are the Challenges to 
Adopting a Federal Paid Leave Program?, BROOKINGS INST. POL’Y 2020 (Oct. 15, 2019), https://
www.brookings.edu/policy2020/votervital/what-are-the-challenges-to-adopting-a-federal-paid-family-
leave-program/ [https://perma.cc/8R4S-27Y9] (noting that President Trump’s paid leave plan had not 
garnered much support among legislators in Congress). Policy experts debate the merits of a national 
UI-funded parental leave program, but that conversation goes beyond the scope of this Note. See, e.g., 
Fitzpatrick & Manchester, supra (debating the pros and cons of a parental leave program funded 
through UI). 
 120 See Remarks on Signing the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, supra note 119, at 144 
(observing that “it took [eight] years and two vetoes” to pass the FMLA); LENHOFF & BELL, supra 
note 30, at 1 (describing the FMLA as an almost decade-long effort beginning in 1984). 
 121 Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601; see also Bellware, supra note 
13 (recognizing the stagnancy of family and medical leave policy during the last twenty-eight years). 
The FMLA aims to give employees flexibility between work and family responsibilities. See 29 
U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) (describing the purpose of the law); see also Donna Lenhoff & Claudia Withers, 
Implementation of the Family & Medical Leave Act: Toward the Family-Friendly Workplace, 3 AM. 
U. J. GENDER & L. 39, 48–50 (1994) (outlining the three principal goals of the FMLA). 
 122 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). The permissible reasons for leave under the FMLA have come under 
scrutiny from those who believe the definitions of “child,” “spouse,” and “parent” unfairly narrow the 
scope of the law. See generally Jennifer Ludden, FMLA Not Really Working for Many Employees, 
NPR (Feb. 5, 2013), https://www.npr.org/2013/02/05/171078451/fmla-not-really-working-for-many-
employees [https://perma.cc/2PQW-QZVE] (reporting that American workers feel the FMLA does 
not have an adequate understanding of which relationships encompass family). 
 123 29 U.S.C. § 2614(c)(3)(C)(i). The FMLA defines “serious health condition” as a medical state 
that requires the employee to either be physically in the hospital or receive ongoing care from a 
healthcare professional. Id. § 2611(11). 
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with more than fifty employees.124 Ultimately, the FMLA trades unpaid leave 
for federally-mandated, guaranteed job protection.125 
But, the FMLA’s coverage is not universal.126 The most recent available 
data shows that just over forty percent of American workers, about thirty-four 
million people, do not qualify for FMLA leave.127 Among those who do not 
qualify, low-wage workers, women, and workers of color are disproportionate-
ly represented compared to the broader population.128 Moreover, even employ-
ees that do qualify for FMLA leave often fail to take it because they cannot 
afford leave without pay.129 As a result of these structural gaps, the FMLA fails 
                                                                                                                           
 124 Id. § 2611(4)(A). The DoL enforces and interprets the meaning of the FMLA. MEDILL, supra 
note 51, at 368. The DoL provides further guidance on such matters as intermittent leave and substitu-
tions for other available paid leave accrued by the employee. See id. (detailing how the DoL regula-
tions play a crucial role for employers interpreting the FMLA). 
 125 See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(c) (noting that FMLA leave may be unpaid by law); id. § 2614(a)(1) 
(stating that the FMLA entitles employees to resume their former employment or a substantially simi-
lar job upon returning from FMLA leave). 
 126 See SCOTT BROWN, JANE HERR, RADHA ROY & JACOB ALEX KLERMAN, ABT ASSOCS., EM-
PLOYEE AND WORKSITE PERSPECTIVES OF THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT: RESULTS FROM 
THE 2018 SURVEYS 7 (2020), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/OASP/evaluation/pdf/WHD_
FMLA2018SurveyResults_FinalReport_Aug2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/6T7E-H5B2] (prepared for 
the U.S. Dep’t of Labor) (showing the percentage of American employees covered by FMLA); see 
also Lenhoff, supra note 33, at 2 (clarifying that while the FMLA helped millions of people, it still 
left notable gaps). Most people who claim FMLA leave do so to care for their own illness. See 
BROWN ET AL., supra, at 32 (reporting that 51% of Americans used FMLA leave for personal health 
reasons). 
 127 BROWN ET AL., supra note 126, at 43. Some employees do not qualify under the FMLA be-
cause they work at a business with fewer than the required fifty employees or have not worked for the 
requisite number of hours. Id. at 7. 
 128 See id. at 21 (presenting 2018 data on the unequal outcomes for FMLA leave). In 2018, 80% of 
moderate-to-high wage workers had access to FMLA leave to care for their own medical condition, while 
only 52% of low-wage workers shared that same access. Id.; see also Sharon Terman, Protecting Work-
ers’ Jobs and Income During COVID-19, in ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19, at 205 (Scott 
Burris, Sarah de Guia, Lance Gable, Donna E. Levin, Wendy E. Parmet & Nicolas P. Terry eds., 2020), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5956e16e6b8f5b8c45f1c216/t/5f445e858d971650463d0f2e/
1598316165870/Chp28_COVIDPolicyPlaybook-Aug2020.pdf (announcing that in 2020, 71% of 
Latinx adults were ineligible for FMLA leave as opposed to 59% of white adults); Ann P. Bartel, 
Soohyun Kim & Jaehyun Nam, U.S. Bureau Lab. Stat., Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Access to and 
Use of Paid Family and Medical Leave: Evidence from Four Nationally Representative Datasets, 
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Jan. 2019, at 2, https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2019/article/pdf/racial-and-
ethnic-disparities-in-access-to-and-use-of-paid-family-and-medical-leave.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZJ3-
FSF7] (supporting the finding that Hispanic people have less access to all categories of paid leave 
compared to non-Hispanic people). Studies consistently report that employees in higher-paid, manage-
rial, or white-collar professions are more likely to have access to paid leave benefits than workers in 
the service industry or lower-wage jobs. See AEI-BROOKINGS WORKING GRP. ON PAID FAM. LEAVE, 
supra note 40, at 8 (explaining that lower-earning jobs often require employees to be physically pre-
sent at work, and thus cannot provide the same flexibility as managerial jobs). 
 129 See BROWN ET AL., supra note 126, at 41 (finding that most FMLA-qualified employees who 
do not take leave do so because they cannot afford to go without a paycheck). Women and low-wage 
earners predominate the group of employees who choose to forego FMLA leave in the interest of 
continued earnings. Naomi Gerstel & Amy Armenia, Giving and Taking Family Leaves: Right or 
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to provide financial coverage for millions of Americans taking leave for family 
and medical reasons.130 
To fill these gaps, some states took initiative to enact their own PFML 
laws, providing the paid leave the FMLA lacks.131 Currently, nine states and 
the District of Columbia have PFML laws.132 These state-level policies contain 
                                                                                                                           
Privilege?, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 161, 172 (2009). Some female-dominated occupations report 
returning to work prematurely because of the perceived stigma to taking leave. See id. (drawing con-
clusions from a case study of female nurse assistants who rarely used their eligible FMLA leave due 
to fear of retaliation from their employers). Additionally, single-income households are more likely to 
forego FMLA leave in the interest of earning a paycheck than dual-income households. BROWN ET 
AL., supra note 126, at 41. Critics of the FMLA argue that the policy perpetuates patterns of inequity 
among already disadvantaged groups. See Gerstel & Armenia, supra, at 170 (claiming that the FMLA 
aggravates existing dynamics of economic inequality). 
 130 See Paid Family and Sick Leave in the U.S., KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Dec. 14, 2020), https://
www.kff.org/womens-health-policy/fact-sheet/paid-family-leave-and-sick-days-in-the-u-s/ [https://
perma.cc/BH4S-2XWP] (acknowledging that many American employees are at the mercy of their 
employers’ generosity when it comes to PFML). The only other paid option some employees have for 
medical leave is disability insurance. See AEI-BROOKINGS WORKING GRP. ON PAID FAM. LEAVE, 
supra note 40, at 6 (discussing long-term and short-term disability insurance for medical reasons). 
Federally, there is Social Security Disability Insurance, which allows eligible workers to apply for 
benefits in the event of a long-term medical need. Benefits for People with Disabilities, SOC. SEC. 
ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/disability/ [https://perma.cc/59Y6-ZM7X]. Additionally, five states 
mandate temporary disability insurance (TDI), which provides benefits for qualifying short-term 
needs. See Which States Require Employers to Have a Short-Term Disability Plan?, SOC’Y FOR HU-
MAN RES. MGMT. (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/tools-and-samples/hr-
qa/pages/stateswithstd.aspx [https://perma.cc/3KTV-XLDA] (listing California, Hawaii, New Jersey, 
New York, and Rhode Island as requiring TDI). Some women who live in TDI states use this benefit 
during pregnancy or maternity leave. AEI-BROOKINGS WORKING GRP. ON PAID FAM. LEAVE, supra 
note 40, at 6. In addition to government programs, some private employers voluntarily provide long-
term and short-term disability benefits to their employees. Id. That said, among private employees in 
March 2019, 42% had access to short-term disability insurance and 34% had access to long-term ben-
efits. U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., supra note 12, at 59. It is important to be aware of disability insur-
ance programs in the landscape of PFML because these programs add to the inconsistency of benefits 
available across different states. See infra Part I.C. (explaining how disability benefits interact with 
leave benefits at the state level). 
 131 See generally NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMS., STATE PAID FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE 
INSURANCE LAWS 1 (2021), https://www.nationalpartnership.org/our-work/resources/economic-justice/
paid-leave/state-paid-family-leave-laws.pdf [https://perma.cc/L94J-L7W4] (laying out presently en-
acted state PFML laws). State policies serve as critical vehicles for policy experimentation as a pre-
cursor for federal reform. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, 
if it citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk 
to the rest of the country.”); cf. Lenhoff, supra note 33, at 7 (calling state laws a “prerequisite” for 
federal legislation, in specific reference to the FMLA). Many municipalities have also experimented 
with PFML laws, but the detailed policies of these localities go beyond the scope of this Note. See 
Nelson, supra note 27, at 645–55 (providing a comprehensive list of state and municipal PFML laws). 
 132 See NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMS., supra note 131, at 1 (listing the states with PFML 
laws). See generally S.B. 83, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (enacted); A. 3975, 218th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2019); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-41-35(h) (2021); S. 6406C, Part SS, 239th Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (N.Y. 2016) (enacted); D.C. CODE § 32-541.03 (2021); S.B. 5975, 65th Leg., 3d Special Sess. 
(Wash. 2017) (enacted); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175M, § 6(d) (2018); 2019 Conn. Pub. Acts. No. 19-
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different eligibility requirements to qualify for leave and different amounts of 
time for leave, among other variations.133 Some states offer some form of ex-
ception to the PFML mandate for small businesses.134 Otherwise, private em-
ployers in PFML states must prove that their leave benefits are at least as gen-
erous as the mandated state standard or participate in the state-run program.135 
Consequently, the overlap of FMLA and state-level PFML laws weaves a 
complicated web of policies for employers and employees to navigate.136 Em-
                                                                                                                           
25 1; H.B. 2005 § 63, 80th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2019) (enacted); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 8-
13.3-501–524 (reflecting the most recent legislative activity for the above PFML states). States usual-
ly fund PFML programs through payroll taxes. See NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMS., supra note 
131, at 8 (outlining the funding mechanisms for each state’s PFML program). Although the level of pay 
in each state varies, some states provide employees with as much as 100% of their regular wage during 
family and medical leave. See id. at 11–12 (showing that the benefit rate in Oregon is one hundred per-
cent for low-wage employees). Weekly cap limits often determine the amount of wage compensations for 
paid leave at the state level. Family Medical Leave, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES, https://www.
ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/state-family-and-medical-leave-laws.aspx [https://perma.
cc/VT4Q-A9CS]. For example, New Jersey guarantees paid leave for as much as two-thirds of an 
employee’s wage capped at $524 per week for six weeks. Id. 
 133 See generally NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMS., supra note 131 (outlining all of the differ-
ences in PFML policies among nine states and the District of Columbia). For example, some states 
offer as few as four weeks of family leave while others offer as many as twelve weeks. Compare R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 28-41-35(d)(1) (providing four weeks of family leave in Rhode Island), with COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 8-13.3-505 (providing twelve weeks of family leave in Colorado). Additionally, Massa-
chusetts exempts small businesses from coverage. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175M, § 6(d) 
(providing an exception for employees with fewer than twenty-five employees from paying into the 
state PFML program); see also NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMS., supra note 131, at 10–11 (show-
ing the types of employers exempted from state PFML programs). 
 134 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175M, § 6(d) (providing an exception for employees with 
fewer than twenty-five employees from paying into the state PFML program); see also NAT’L P’SHIP 
FOR WOMEN & FAMS., supra note 131, at 10–11 (clarifying which employees do not fall within the 
state PFML mandates). 
 135 See, e.g., Benefit Requirements for Private Paid Leave Plan Exemptions, MASS.GOV, https://
www.mass.gov/info-details/benefit-requirements-for-private-paid-leave-plan-exemptions [https://
perma.cc/K57R-HVEK] (noting the exemption policy for employers in Massachusetts); Voluntary 
Plans, WASH. PAID FAM. & MED. LEAVE, https://paidleave.wa.gov/voluntary-plans/ [https://paid
leave.wa.gov/voluntary-plans/] (allowing employers to adopt their own plans for family and medical 
leave by application to prove that their coverage is as good or better than the state mandate). Today, 
state PFML laws are commonplace, making studies about their effectiveness widely available. See 
generally EILEEN APPELBAUM & RUTH MILKMAN, LEAVES THAT PAY: EMPLOYER AND WORKER 
EXPERIENCES WITH PAID FAMILY LEAVE IN CALIFORNIA 4 (2011) (analyzing the impact of Califor-
nia’s PFML laws); NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMS., PAID LEAVE WORKS: EVIDENCE FROM STATE 
PROGRAMS 2 (2019), https://www.nationalpartnership.org/our-work/resources/economic-justice/paid-
leave/paid-leave-works-evidence-from-state-programs.pdf [https://perma.cc/TRQ4-5M4L] (surveying 
PFML laws implemented in states across the country). 
 136 See Lisa Nagele-Piazza, How Can Employers Navigate Multiple Leave Laws?, SOC’Y FOR 
HUMAN RES. MGMT (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/legal-and-compliance/
state-and-local-updates/pages/navigating-multiple-family-leave-and-sick-leave-laws.aspx [https://
perma.cc/PS6T-HXN4] (acknowledging the complexity of complying with leave benefits laws). The 
FMLA permits employers to run unpaid FMLA leave concurrently with any other state paid leave, 
paid sick leave, or other paid leave the employee may have accrued. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.207(a) 
(2021) (explaining the term “substitute,” as meaning any paid time off granted by an employer “will 
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ployers operating in multiple jurisdictions often face the challenge of adhering 
to numerous state PFML standards, which translates to steep compliance 
costs.137 Employers not bound by individual state PFML policies may elect to 
go above and beyond the minimum standard imposed by the FMLA, but few 
do.138 In 2002, in Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., the Supreme Court 
noted that generous leave policies tend to make employers’ compliance obliga-
tions more complicated and expensive.139 The Court reasoned that employers 
have little incentive to stray from the FMLA standard, which establishes clear 
guidelines and, as a result, simpler compliance.140 As the Court predicted, data 
                                                                                                                           
run concurrently with the unpaid FMLA leave”). Additionally, neither an employer nor an employee 
may elect to forego FMLA leave if the reason for leaving qualifies as an FMLA absence. See U.S. 
Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter 2 (Mar. 14, 2019) (quoting Strickland v. Water 
Works & Sewer Bd. of Birmingham, 239 F.3d 1199, 1204–06 (11th Cir. 2001)) (clarifying that em-
ployers cannot decide to deny FMLA leave to absences that warrant protection under the law). Essen-
tially, employers cannot grant employees a free pass by choosing not to designate leave as “FMLA” 
so that the employee can preserve their twelve-weeks for a later time. See id.at 2 n.3 (citing Escriba v. 
Foster Poultry Farms, Inc., 743 F.3d 1236, 1244 (9th Cir. 2014)) (rejecting a ruling from the Ninth 
Circuit that allowed an employer to give its employees more than twelve weeks of FMLA-qualifying 
leave by failing to designate some of the absences as “FMLA”). In 2002, in Ragsdale v. Wolverine 
World Wide, Inc., the Supreme Court reasoned that Congress deliberately assigned twelve weeks of 
leave for FMLA purposes, and thus regulations of the law must respect that time limit. 535 U.S. 81, 
94 (2002) (holding a DoL regulation allowing employers to delay designation of FMLA leave to be 
invalid). Although the DoL requires employers to be as generous as possible under the constraints of 
the FMLA, they cannot go beyond the scope of the law. See Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., su-
pra, at 3 (explaining that while employers may provide paid leave policies to compensate for the un-
paid portion of FMLA leave, the amount of time taken off by an employee for an FMLA-qualifying 
reason can still not exceed twelve-weeks). As a result, employees working in states that have PFML 
programs do not get the twelve-week FMLA leave entitlement in addition to the state’s provision for 
PFML. Id. at 2. 
 137 See Nelson, supra note 27, at 675. Multijurisdictional employers struggle with compliance 
because they must adhere to different PFML laws in each place where their employees operate. See id. 
(enumerating the unique challenges that a variety of PFML laws present to multijurisdictional em-
ployers). 
 138 See 28 U.S.C. § 2653 (1993) (noting that Congress did not intend any provision of the FMLA 
“to discourage employers from adopting or retaining leave policies more generous than any” required 
by the FMLA); 29 C.F.R. § 825.700 (clarifying that the FMLA does not bar employers from offering 
greater benefits than those included in the law); see also Ragsdale, 535 U.S. at 95 (observing that 
Congress wanted the FMLA to “pull certain employers up to the minimum standard,” knowing that “it 
might push more generous employers down”); cf. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 
390, 396 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that Congress designed the PDA to “construct a floor beneath which 
. . . benefits may not drop––not a ceiling above which they may not rise”), rev’g No. 83-4927R, 1984 
WL 943 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 1984), aff’d 479 U.S. 272, 292 (1987). 
 139 See Ragsdale, 535 U.S. at 96 (reasoning that generous employers risk penalization from the 
DoL for “erroneous characterization of an absence as non-FMLA leave”). As a result, the Court rea-
soned, employers may find “the simpler, less generous route is the preferable one.” Id. 
 140 See id. at 95 (suggesting that “unforeseen liabilities” would “discourage employers from 
adopting policies that varied much from the basic federal requirements”). That said, some employers 
do voluntarily offer paid leave benefits that far exceed FMLA requirements. See Stacy Pollack, 6 
Companies Redefining Parental Leave, NBC: KNOW YOUR VALUE (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.
nbcnews.com/know-your-value/feature/6-companies-redefining-parental-leave-ncna984946 [https://
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shows that most employers follow the minimum FMLA requirements.141 Be-
cause most American employees work under FMLA-compliant policies, only 
nineteen percent of employees have access to PFML from supplementary state-
level laws.142 
                                                                                                                           
perma.cc/FRL4-AQZR] (listing private companies with generous paid parental leave including Mi-
crosoft Corp., Deloitte LLP, and KPMG International Ltd.). For example, in 2018 Netflix offered its 
employees up to one year of fully paid leave after the birth or adoption of a child. Rani Molla, Netflix 
Parents Get a Paid Year Off and Amazon Pays for Spouses’ Parental Leave, VOX (Jan. 31, 2018), 
https://www.vox.com/2018/1/31/16944976/new-parents-tech-companies-google-hp-facebook-twitter-
netflix [https://perma.cc/J9BU-67D3]. 
 141 Compare Kathryn Mayer, Large Employers Set Sights on Paid Leave, HUM. RES. EXEC. (Feb. 
18, 2020), https://hrexecutive.com/large-employers-set-sights-on-paid-leave/ [https://perma.cc/T6GG-
SZ68] (reporting that 39% of big businesses tried to expand their paid leave benefits in 2019), with 
U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., supra note 12, at 120 (showing that 72% of employees working at compa-
nies with more than five hundred employees did not have access to paid family leave as of March 
2019). 
 142 See Ragsdale, 535 U.S. at 96 (reasoning that employers receive greater benefit by providing 
only the minimum benefits due to compliance issues); see also U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., supra note 
12, at 119 (showing that 81% of American employees currently do not receive paid family leave bene-
fits from their employers). Despite paid sick leave becoming fairly common, PFML remains uncom-
mon. Compare NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMS., supra note 131, at 1 (comparing the family and 
medical leave laws among nine states plus the District of Columbia), with NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN 
& FAMS., PAID SICK DAYS STATUTES 2–4, 20–23 (2021), https://www.nationalpartnership.org/our-
work/resources/economic-justice/paid-sick-days/paid-sick-days-statutes.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YVF-
BPY3] (comparing the sick leave laws of fourteen states plus the District of Columbia to the laws of 
over a dozen cities and counties). About 76% of Americans have access to some form of paid sick 
leave through their employer. See Isabel V. Sawhill & Morgan Welch, Reopening America: We 
Shouldn’t Reopen the Economy Without Paid Sick and Family Leave, BROOKINGS INST. (July 2, 
2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/07/02/reopening-america-we-shouldnt-reopen-
the-economy-without-paid-sick-and-family-leave/ [https://perma.cc/8D2M-EKWS] (representing data 
from all American workers, public and private). Additionally, in 2015, President Barack Obama 
passed Executive Order 13706, which mandated paid sick leave for federal contractors. Exec. Order 
No. 13706, 3 C.F.R. § 13706 (2016); see Executive Order 13706, Establishing Paid Sick Leave for 
Federal Contractors, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/government-contracts/sick-
leave [https://perma.cc/XX9R-FHFR]. This was the closest policy to a national mandate for paid sick 
leave before the emergency reforms enacted during COVID-19. See infra note 145 and accompanying 
text (introducing the temporary laws enacted in response to the Pandemic). Consequently, this Note 
does not intend to suggest that the portion of the American population without sick leave is insignifi-
cant. See Alex Zhang, Note, Pandemics, Paid Sick Leaves, and Tax Institutions, 52 LOY. CHI. L.J. 
383, 385 (2021) (discussing the lack of a nationally mandated paid sick leave). The percentage of 
Americans without sick leave translates to approximately 30 million people. Id. This Note focuses on 
paid leave benefits available in the private sector; unless specified otherwise, statistics and data cited 
for the remainder of this Note represent only private employees. See, e.g., U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., 
supra note 12, at 119 (providing employment data for both private and public sector American em-
ployees). 
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D. Temporary PFML During the Pandemic 
Federal family and medical leave policy in the United States remained 
unchanged until the Pandemic hit in March 2020.143 Then, due to the cata-
strophic impact of COVID-19, the prospect of a national PFML shifted from a 
policy dream to a public health imperative.144 Congress passed the Families 
First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA), which included an expansion of the 
FMLA (the EFMLA).145 Although the Pandemic-relief legislation expired, the 
Act and its critical measures rekindled the paid leave conversation.146 
                                                                                                                           
 143 See Zhang, supra note 142, at 387 (describing the legislative reforms to family and medical 
leave that Congress implemented in response to the Pandemic). In the absence of a national paid sick 
leave statute, most of the pre-COVID-19 policy in this subgenre of employee benefits law exists at the 
“state and local level.” Id. at 391. This Note is focused on federal regulation and policy of paid leave, 
and therefore will not go into the specific state and municipal sick leave statutes. See, e.g., Dylan 
Karstadt, Note, Too Sick to Work? Defending the Paid Sick Leave Movement and the New Jersey Paid 
Sick Leave Act, 44 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 145, 149 (2020) (analyzing state-level ramifications to the 
New Jersey Paid Sick Leave Act enacted in 2018). 
 144 See Claire Cain Miller, Coronavirus Brings a New Legislative Push for Paid Sick Leave, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/10/upshot/coronavirus-paid-sick-leave.
html [https://perma.cc/F36F-2YKC] (describing the struggle for many Americans to abide by stay-at-
home orders because they cannot afford to go without pay). There was major concern in the early 
months of the virus in 2020 that employees were reporting to work sick, perpetuating the spread of 
COVID-19. Id. Social economists label this phenomenon as “contagious presenteeism,” a behavioral 
tendency to report to work sick and spread infectious illnesses. Stefan Pichler & Nicolas R. Ziebarth, 
The Pros and Cons of Sick Pay Schemes: Testing for Contagious Presenteeism and Noncontagious 
Absenteeism Behavior 33 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 22530, 2016). Some 
scholars find that the existence of a paid sick leave social safety-net statistically reduces the occur-
rence of contagious presenteeism and, as a result, helps contain the spread of infectious disease. See 
id. (explaining the correlation between market incentives for providing sick leave and the positive 
outcomes of more sick workers staying home). 
 145 Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA), Pub. L. No. 116-127, 134 Stat. 178 
(2020). The FFCRA contained two provisions related to leave: (1) the Expansion of the Family and 
Medical Leave Act (EFMLA); and (2) the Emergency Paid Sick Leave Act (EPSLA). See Families 
First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA), 116th Congress §§ 3101–3106 (2020) (enacted) (creating 
the Expansion of FMLA, an extension of the existing FMLA); id. §§ 5101–5111 (enacting the 
EPSLA, an entirely new policy providing national paid sick leave). The key difference between these 
two policies is that the EFMLA builds upon the existing foundation of the FMLA, whereas the 
EPSLA is a wholly new policy for paid sick leave. See Hiba Hafiz, Shu-Yi Oei, Diane Ring & Natalya 
Shnitser, Regulating in Pandemic: Evaluating Economic and Financial Policy Responses to the Coro-
navirus Crisis 35 (Bos. Coll. L. Sch. Legal Stud., Research Paper No. 527, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3555980 [https://perma.cc/64UB-VCTG] (calling the EPSLA “an 
entirely new regime” as compared to the EFMLA). The EPSLA mandates that qualifying employers 
provide employees with paid sick time for the following reasons: (1) sickness or quarantine from 
COVID-19; (2) order from a health care professional to self-isolate due to the virus; (3) experience of 
COVID-19 symptoms pending a diagnosis; (4) caring for an individual with or in quarantine from 
COVID-19; (5) watching a child sent home from school as a result of the virus; or (6) a reason similar 
to those listed above as specified by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. H.R. 6201 
§ 5102(a)(1)–(6) (listing the qualifying reasons for paid sick leave under the COVID-19 emergency 
measure). Depending on which reason an employee records for leave, the benefits vary. Id. 
§ 5110(a)(5)(A) (outlining the law’s compensation scheme for paid sick time). The EPSLA leave 
substantively amounts to two weeks of paid sick time off. Id. § 5102(b)(2). Similarly to the EFMLA, 
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The EFMLA broadened the existing eligibility requirements of the FMLA 
to encompass COVID-19-related absences.147 For example, the EFMLA cov-
ered working parents requiring time off from work due to emergency school 
closures.148 Most importantly, however, the EFMLA required employers to pay 
qualifying employees no less than two-thirds of their regular wage during 
leave.149 This provision made the EFMLA the first ever federal PFML policy 
in the United States.150 Although the EFMLA largely followed existing FMLA 
requirements, the new law increased the FMLA’s fifty-employee threshold to a 
five-hundred-employee threshold, essentially eliminating all large corporations 
from its coverage.151 Additionally, the new law allowed businesses with fewer 
than fifty employees to apply for an exemption from the new paid leave man-
                                                                                                                           
this policy contains a five-hundred-employee threshold and permits an exemption for businesses with 
fewer than fifty employees. Id. § 5110(2)(b)(i), § 5111(2). Of note, the funding for the EFMLA and 
the EPSLA programs comes through another provision of the FFCRA, which grants tax credits to 
employers for complying with the new leave requirements. Id. § 7001. Essentially, employers pay for 
both programs upfront and then later receive reimbursement from the government. Id. Therefore, as 
enacted, the government fully subsidizes the EFMLA and EPSLA programs. Id. 
 146 Temporary Rule: Paid Leave Under the Families First Coronavirus Response Act, U.S. DEP’T 
LAB., https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/ffcra [https://perma.cc/8VRX-VJX5] (stating that the 
FFCRA requirements expired on December 31, 2020); see also infra note 155 and accompanying text 
(expanding on the paid leave policies and initiates that have spouted from the FFCRA). 
 147 See H.R. 6201 § 110(a)(1)(A) (redefining “eligible employee”); id. § 110(a)(2) (adding “quali-
fying need related to public health emergency” and “public health emergency” definitions to include 
any COVID-19 related emergency as a valid reason to request FMLA leave). 
 148 Id. § 110(a)(2)(A). 
 149 Id. § 110(b)(1). The legislation stipulates that the first ten days of an employee’s FMLA leave 
is to be unpaid, and then for the remainder of the twelve-week period the employee shall receive no 
less than two-thirds of their regular wage. Id. The amended FMLA leave also caps the employee’s pay 
to $200 per day and $10,000 overall, regardless of their typical pay rate. Id. § 110(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
 150 See id. § 110(b) (providing paid leave). 
 151 Id. § 110(a)(1)(B) (amending the FMLA’s original fifty-employee threshold to a five-hundred-
employee threshold); see also Technical Corrections to H.R. 6201 § 110(a)(1)(B) (Mar. 16, 2020), 
http://www.majorityleader.gov/sites/democraticwhip.house.gov/files/COVID-19%20Amendment
%20Language%2003162020%20741%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/UH5C-XYZT] (amending the 
employer threshold from employers with more than fifty employees to those with fewer than five 
hundred employees). Hafiz et al., supra note 145, at 31 (noting that Congress implemented the Tech-
nical Corrections immediately before passing the FFCRA because of an outcry from the business 
community over the scope of the law). The Technical Corrections change to the employer threshold 
resulted from a concerted lobbying effort from entities such as the United States Chamber of Com-
merce and the National Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIB). See Letter from Thomas J. 
Donohue, Chief Exec. Officer, U.S. Chamber Com., to The President, Hon. Nancy Pelosi, Speaker 
House Representatives, & Hon. McConnell, Majority Leader 2–3 (Mar. 16, 2020) (on file with Cham-
ber Comm.) (demonstrating the argument from business groups that the original employer threshold in 
the COVID-19 relief bill would harm companies with more than five hundred employees); Ilma Hasan 
& Tatyana Monnay, Business Associations Lobby Trump, Congress to Ease Paid Sick Leave Re-
quirements, OPENSECRETS (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2020/03/business-
associations-lobby-trump-sick-leave/ [https://perma.cc/J27S-7L7W] (indicating a compromise be-
tween House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin to change the employer 
eligibility requirements of the FFCRA). Business lobbying groups spent approximately $121 million 
on advocating for desired changes to the FFCRA. Id. 
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date.152 As a result, the law contained a fairly sizeable carveout for the smallest 
and largest employers.153 Nonetheless, the FFCRA expired at the end of the 2020 
legislative session, and Congress has yet to renew it.154 Despite being short-
lived, the temporary COVID-19 measures revived the debate for making PFML 
permanent.155 
                                                                                                                           
 152 H.R. 6201 § 110(a)(3)(B). The DoL issued regulations clarifying the standard for granting the 
small employer exemption. See Paid Leave Under Families First Coronavirus Response Act, 85 Fed. 
Reg. 19,336 (Apr. 6, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 826) (explaining the need for further clari-
fication on the exemptions included in the FFCRA). To qualify, employers must have fewer than fifty 
employees and meet at least one of three criteria: (1) the business does not have the budget to support 
the cost of paid leave; (2) the employee requesting leave has irreplaceable value to the business; (3) 
the businesses do not have adequate labor available to compensate for the absence of the employee 
requesting leave. Id. Thus, the FFCRA does not automatically exempt employers with fewer than fifty 
employees. See Kofler v. Sayde Steeves Cleaning Serv. Inc., No. 8:20-cv-1460, 2020 WL 5016902, at 
*3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2020) (rejecting an employer’s argument that because it employs fewer than 
fifty people it automatically qualified for the FFCRA exemption). 
 153 See Hafiz et al., supra note 145, at 34 (explaining that 96% of the employers with fewer than 
five hundred employees actually have fewer than fifty employees). Therefore, the majority of the 
employers that fell within the FFCRA’s scope were eligible for an exemption. Id. 
 154 See H.R. 6201 § 3102(a)(1) (setting the expiration for the EFMLA on December 31, 2020); id. 
§ 5109 (same); see also Press Release, Wage & Hour Div., U.S. Dep’t Lab. Publishes Guidance on 
Expiration Paid Sick Leave & Expanded Fam. & Med. Leave for Coronavirus (Dec. 31, 2020), https://
www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/whd/whd20201231-1 [https://perma.cc/T7Y8-G2UE] (announcing 
the expiration of the EFMLA). The looming December deadline forced Congress to revisit a COVID-
19 relief package and potential extension of benefits at the end of 2020. See Rachel Siegel, Jeff Stein 
& Mike DeBonis, Here’s What’s in the $900 Billion Stimulus Package, WASH. POST (Dec. 27, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/12/20/stimulus-package-details/ [https://perma.cc/
J4YM-JRDS] (detailing the contents of the relief package passed by Congress at the end of December 
2020). In time for the new year, Congress renewed many of the COVID-19 support programs, but 
elected not to extend the FFCRA. Emily G. Massey, Grant B. Osborne & Hayley R. Wells, COVID-19 
Paid Leave in 2021: The Impact of New Federal Relief Bill on Employers, WARD & SMITH, P.A. (Jan. 
5, 2021), https://www.wardandsmith.com/articles/covid-19-paid-leave-in-2021-the-impact-of-new-
federal-relief-bill-on-employers [https://perma.cc/F2HD-CXS9]. Congress only extended the FFCRA 
tax credits through March 2021 for employers who chose to continue providing paid leave on a volun-
tary basis. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, H.R. 133 § 286 (2020) (enacted). 
 155 See McCloskey & Rachidi, supra note 18 (cautioning that permanent leave policies should not 
necessarily mimic emergency COVID-19 measures). As policy experts begin to visualize what a per-
manent paid leave scheme in the United States might look like, a major consideration is how paid 
leave actually benefits employers despite the additional costs. See Joan Michelson, How Small Com-
panies Can Offer Great Paid-Leave Programs, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 7, 2021), https://hbr.org/2021/
01/how-small-companies-can-offer-great-paid-leave-programs [https://perma.cc/FK8M-GJ38] (explain-
ing that generous paid leave policies can help employers attract top talent). At the time of this writing, the 
Biden Administration is proposing a COVID-19 relief plan called the American Rescue Plan, that in-
cludes PFML. See Press Release, The White House Briefing Room, President Biden Announces Ameri-
can Rescue Plan (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/legislation/2021/01/20/
president-biden-announces-american-rescue-plan/ [https://perma.cc/E3XL-L2AY] (calling for an 
expanded PFML policy). President Biden’s plan proposes more extensive family and medical leave 
than the FFCRA and expands the policy to cover employers with more than five hundred employees. 
Id. The Biden plan suggests extending the number of weeks for paid leave from ten to fourteen and 
purportedly covers 106 million more employees than the FFCRA. Id. 
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II. LET’S DO THE TIME WARP AGAIN: THE POLITICAL  
ECONOMIES OF 1980S VS. 2020S AMERICA 
The Pandemic prompted a renewed interest in PFML among the general 
public while the private sector resisted the possibility, just as it did for the 
FMLA.156 During the early stages of the FMLA, the business community wor-
ried that the law would be too costly and harm employers, particularly small 
businesses.157 Business-based arguments against federally regulated leave ben-
efits must be framed in their appropriate political and economic contexts to 
shed light on their validities and misgivings.158 
Section A of this Part discusses the context in which Congress debated, 
amended, and finally enacted the FMLA throughout the 1980s and early 
1990s.159 Section B then reviews the current political and economic climate 
surrounding PFML policy conversations, encompassing factors related and 
unrelated to COVID-19.160 
A. 1980 to 1993: An Era for Conservativism & Corporations 
In the early 1980s, the American economy was in a recession.161 Under 
President Carter, inflation skyrocketed causing businesses to suffer.162 Federal 
                                                                                                                           
 156 See Usha Ranji, Michelle Long & Alina Salganicoff, Coronavirus Puts a Spotlight on Paid 
Leave Policies, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 1 (Dec. 14, 2020), https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/
issue-brief/coronavirus-puts-a-spotlight-on-paid-leave-policies/ [https://perma.cc/EPM2-DCPQ] (not-
ing the sense of public urgency for the institution of federal paid leave in light of the Pandemic). The 
FMLA faced opposition from business groups early on. See WISENSALE, supra note 85, at 144 (rec-
ognizing the large anti-FMLA coalition of forty-three business groups assembled by the late 1980s); 
see also LENHOFF & BELL, supra note 30, at 8 (discussing the context and outside factors that impact-
ed leave benefits legislation). The pushback from business lobbyists particularly affected the progres-
sion of the FMLA because the resistance from corporate actors forced policy-makers to make com-
promises in the bill. Id. at 9. 
 157 See Dawn Gunsch, The Family Leave Act: A Financial Burden?, 72 PERS. J. 48, 49 (1993) 
(discussing the overall impression among the business community that the newly enacted FMLA 
harms companies financially). For example, the Small Business Administration projected that six 
months of some FMLA policy provisions would cost about $612 million annually. Id. 
 158 See Tharpe, supra note 32, at 395 (indicating that a proper understanding of the FMLA re-
quires an appreciation for the political intricacies that defined Congress during the law’s enactment). 
The various social interests and political pressures surrounding a piece of legislation informs its evo-
lution and offers a fuller understanding of its ultimate impact. Cf. id. at 397 (using the impact that the 
1992 presidential election had on the final passage of the FMLA as an example). 
 159 See infra notes 161–193 and accompanying text. 
 160 See infra notes 194–249 and accompanying text. 
 161 See 1980–82 Early 1980s Recession, BANCROFT LIB. UNIV. CAL. BERKELEY: SLAYING 
DRAGON DEBT, https://bancroft.berkeley.edu/ROHO/projects/debt/1980srecession.html [https://
perma.cc/E4TU-ZHP3] (discussing the United States economy between 1980 and 1982). 
 162 See John Hogan, Economic Crises & Policy Change in the Early 1980s: A Four Country 
Comparison, 65 J. AUSTL. POL. ECON. 106, 109 (2010) (describing the extreme inflation during the 
Carter Administration); see also Lois M. Plunkert, U.S. Bureau Lab. Stat., The 1980’s: A Decade of 
Job Growth & Industry Shifts, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Sept. 1990, at 3, https://www.bls.gov/opub/
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regulation of the private sector also increased exponentially.163 By the end of 
the decade, businesses grew tired of President Carter’s approach, which they 
felt was hindering growth and prolonging the economic decline.164 
To combat the government oversight that many felt defined the Carter 
Administration, corporate American began to consolidate.165 New advocacy 
groups like the Business Roundtable formed during this time, and existing or-
ganizations like the United States Chamber of Commerce acquired newfound 
political power.166 In 1972, Congress enacted campaign finance legislation cre-
ating political action committees (PACs), that created an avenue for corpora-
                                                                                                                           
mlr/1990/09/Art1full.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5TT-3XAG] (mapping the different levels of impact that 
the recession had on different industries within the American economy). 
 163 See Michael Useem, Business and Politics in the United States and United Kingdom: The 
Origins of Heightened Political Activity of Large Corporations During the 1970s and Early 1980s, 12 
THEORY & SOC’Y 281, 295 (1983) (remarking on the augmented regulatory schemes of the 1970s, 
particularly in certain industries). Throughout the 1970s, Congress established the Occupational Safe-
ty and Health Administration (OSHA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and other enti-
ties to augment federal oversight of private companies. See id. (listing the most influential government 
programs implemented during the Carter Administration). The cost of complying with the regulations 
promulgated from these agencies exacerbated the existing fiscal challenges for businesses in a lan-
guishing market. See id. (acknowledging the impact of increased federal regulations for American 
companies); Lee Drutman, How Corporate Lobbyists Conquered American Democracy, THE ATLAN-
TIC (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/04/how-corporate-lobbyists-
conquered-american-democracy/390822/ [https://perma.cc/2VPN-C6G7] (discussing the compliance 
burdens that came with more federal oversight in the 1970s). As the United States slid into a recession 
at the end of the 1970s, the answer from the Carter Administration was to tighten its monetary policy 
even more. See Hogan, supra note 162, at 109 (describing President Carter’s strategy to intensify 
federal regulation of the private sector in response to rising inflation). 
 164 See Drutman, supra note 163 (suggesting that corporations felt their very existence was at 
stake under the regulatory regime of the 1970s). 
 165 See Useem, supra note 163, at 300 (explaining the desire among business actors to organize as 
a defense against government overreach). 
 166 See Drutman, supra note 163 (reviewing the history of the burgeoning lobbying industry dur-
ing the 1980s); see also History, BUS. ROUNDTABLE, https://s3.amazonaws.com/brt.org/archive/
legacy/uploads/studies-reports/downloads/BRT_History_1172011.pdf [https://perma.cc/J79U-WPZG] 
(stating that a collective of chief executive officers founded the Business Roundtable in 1972 to advo-
cate for advantageous business policies). At the start of the 1980s, the United States was still grap-
pling with what the implications of political action committees (PACs) would be and the role of pri-
vate business in political elections. See David E. Rosenbaum, Politics: Business Antes Up, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 13, 1980), https://www.nytimes.com/1980/01/13/archives/politics-business-antes-up-the-
1980-campaign-business-could.html [https://perma.cc/8EFV-2TBP] (dissecting the legal and political 
ramifications of rising corporate contributions through PACs). After corporate PAC spending became 
ubiquitous throughout the 1980s, the United States Chamber of Commerce became one of the top 
spenders and powerhouses in the political sphere. See Alex Gangitano, US Chamber of Commerce 
Nudged Out of Top Lobbying Spender Spot for First Time in 20 Years, THE HILL (Jan. 27, 2021), 
https://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/536082-us-chamber-nudged-out-of-top-lobbying-spender-
spot-for-first-time-in-20 [https://perma.cc/7HGL-42NA] (mentioning the long-term preeminence of 
the Chamber of Commerce PAC). See generally About the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. CHAM-
BER COM., https://www.uschamber.com/about/about-the-us-chamber-of-commerce [https://perma.cc/
72QR-RUF5] (stating the mission and membership of the United States Chamber of Commerce). 
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tions to donate political contributions.167 By the 1980s, the business communi-
ty savvily harnessed their spending power to influence policy in Washing-
ton.168 Private businesses used political spending to amplify their advocacy for 
free market principles and to block the draconian regulations of the Carter 
Administration.169 
To further these goals, pro-business groups of the 1980s tended to support 
Republican candidates over Democratic candidates.170 Corporations wanted 
lower taxes and looser federal regulations, policies that the Republican Party 
platform explicitly endorsed.171 Consequently, corporate America helped elect 
Ronald Reagan in 1980 and won Republicans the majority in both chambers of 
                                                                                                                           
 167 See Federal Election Campaign Act, 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101–30126 (1972) (creating the Federal 
Election Commission (FEC) and implementing other policies regulating contributions to political 
campaigns). After the campaign finance reform of the 1970s, contributions from corporations to polit-
ical campaigns increased rapidly. See Ruth S. Jones & Warren E. Miller, Financing Campaigns: Mac-
ro Level Innovation and Micro Level Response, 38 W. POL. Q 187, 188 (1985) (observing that be-
tween 1974 and 1984 the number of corporate PACs registered with the FEC jumped from less than 
five hundred to over 3,500). Through PACs, private companies outpaced the influence of other enti-
ties such as labor unions because they began spending more money on elections. See Useem, supra 
note 163, at 298 (reporting that, by the late 1970s, business PACs spent more than $17 million in 
contributions to political candidates while labor unions spent $10 million). 
 168 See Useem, supra note 163, at 297 (noting that PACs offered businesses an avenue to assert their 
influence in the political process). Michael C. Jensen, The New Corporate Presence in Politics, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 14, 1975), https://www.nytimes.com/1975/12/14/archives/the-new-corporate-presence-in-
politics-the-rush-is-on-to-develop-in.html [https://perma.cc/G2SX-NP2M] (providing background 
about the FEC’s ruling on the Sun Oil Co.’s ability to financially support political candidates). Politi-
cal spending continues today, although federal law limits the amount of money corporations may 
donate to the official campaign funds of political candidates. See, e.g., National Federation of Inde-
pendent Business Federal Political Action Committee, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/
data/committee/C00101105/?cycle=2020 [https://perma.cc/725P-N692] (documenting total disburse-
ments of political contributions for the 2020 election cycle); Chamber of Commerce of the United States 
of America PAC (US Chamber PAC), FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/data/committee/
C00082040/?cycle=2020 [https://perma.cc/4F5X-YVL9] (same); see also Making Disbursements as a 
PAC, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/making-
disbursements-pac/ [https://perma.cc/Y3G8-RXFU] (explaining the different rules for political contri-
butions depending on the type of entity). 
 169 See Useem, supra note 163, at 295 (calling the consolidation of corporate political power “a 
joint counteroffensive” against federal regulations); Tharpe, supra note 32, at 396 (observing that the 
FMLA was divided along ideological lines, with Republicans denouncing the bill and Democrats 
supporting it). 
 170 See Curtlyn Kramer, Vital Stats: The Widening Gap Between Corporate and Labor PAC 
Spending, BROOKINGS INST. (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2017/03/31/
vital-stats-corporate-and-labor-pac-spending/ [https://perma.cc/SQ3D-4ZBX] (noting that corporate 
PACs give more indiscriminately to Republican candidates compared to the targeted spending strate-
gy of labor unions, typically on Democratic candidates). 
 171 See Republican Party Platform of 1980, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (July 15, 1980), https://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/republican-party-platform-1980 [https://perma.cc/EQ39-M84R] 
(calling for “tax rate reductions, spending restraints, and regulatory reforms” during the 1980 Repub-
lican National Convention). 
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Congress.172 The Republican resurgence curated an atmosphere in Washington, 
D.C. that was generally friendly to corporate interests and adverse to expand-
ing government power.173 
Unfortunately for Democrats, this environment was not conducive to en-
acting progressive reforms, such as national parental and disability leave bene-
fits.174 In the wake of the Carter presidency, businesses wanted less regulation, 
not more.175 The general resistance to government oversight during the 1980s 
explains why paid leave was a nonstarter for conservatives in Congress, and 
why even unpaid leave saw notable backlash.176 Conservatives acknowledged 
that the number of working parents, especially women, in the workforce pre-
sented a growing problem.177 Despite that recognition, groups like the United 
States Chamber of Commerce emphatically opposed any sort of federal man-
date.178 
                                                                                                                           
 172 See Lou Cannon, Ronald Reagan: Campaigns and Elections, UNIV. VA.: MILLER CTR., 
https://millercenter.org/president/reagan/campaigns-and-elections [https://perma.cc/XUX8-LHMJ] 
(describing the resistance from the “rank-and-file” Republicans to the expanding role of federal regu-
lators under the Carter Administration and, subsequently, President Reagan’s promise to loosen the 
grip of federal oversight during his administration). The Republicans had not controlled the majority 
in both chambers of Congress since 1954. Id. The Reagan presidency did usher in modest economic 
recovery, although scholars dispute the specific causes and ramifications. See 1980–82 Early 1980s 
Recession, supra note 161 (calling the economic recovery of the 1980s a “source of considerable dis-
pute”); see also James Pethokoukis, Again, the 1980s Boom Was About More Than Just the Reagan 
Tax Cuts, AEI: AEIDEAS (May 4, 2015), https://www.aei.org/economics/again-the-1980s-boom-was-
about-more-than-just-the-reagan-tax-cuts/ [https://perma.cc/AEG3-RXJL] (weighing the impact of 
the Reagan era tax reductions). The economic resurgence of the 1980s was not uniform, and some 
sectors like the service industry recovered better than others. See Plunkert, supra note 162, at 3, 13 
(distinguishing between service and retail industries, which flourished in the 1980s, and manufactur-
ing and mining trades, which experienced significant job loss). President Reagan enacted the tax cuts 
that corporations longed for and embraced free market principles over government regulation. See 
Hogan, supra note 162, at 113 (describing the “Reaganomics” policy as one defined by lower taxes, 
fewer government regulations, and cuts to public spending). 
 173 See Hogan, supra note 162, at 114 (explaining how President Reagan’s novel economic re-
forms destabilized the policy landscape in Washington, D.C.). 
 174 See WISENSALE, supra note 85, at 138 (contextualizing the political landscape in 1984 as 
inhospitable for fostering progressive policy reforms, such as family and medical leave). 
 175 See Useem, supra note 163, at 303 (observing that during the 1970s and 1980s corporate 
America focused considerable energy on stemming the tide of expanding government power). 
 176 See WISENSALE, supra note 85, at 138 (explaining that pro-business entities, like the United 
States Chamber of Commerce, were not at all open to considering a paid leave policy in the 1980s). 
 177 See House Hearing Educ. & Lab. 1986, supra note 93, at 63 (statement of Susan Hager, repre-
senting the United States Chamber of Commerce) (proposing parental leave to address the increase in 
the number of parents returning to the workforce after starting families); see also 132 CONG. REC. 
30,426 (1986) (statement of Rep. David Dreier) (acknowledging that Congress needed to address the 
growing problem of access to child care). 
 178 See House Hearing Educ. & Lab. 1986, supra note 93, at 63 (criticizing a federal mandate and 
advocating for business flexibility); WISENSALE, supra note 85, at 143 (noting the strong opposition 
from the National Association of Manufacturers, the NFIB, and the United States Chamber of Com-
merce to an early version of the FMLA bill). 
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The business community presented two main points against the pro-
posal.179 First, and most importantly, interest groups stressed the damage that a 
federal mandate would inflict upon small businesses.180 Small businesses cited 
their strained budgets and limited workforces to explain why guaranteeing 
long-term leave would be overly burdensome.181 Second, business leaders con-
tended that greater flexibility to contract benefits advantages businesses and 
employees.182 Opponents of the bill argued that the costs of a federal mandate 
would inhibit employers’ ability to contract.183 Conservatives expressed con-
cern that the added burden of paying for leave benefits would hamper employ-
ers’ ability to offer other benefits, such as healthcare, that employees may pre-
fer.184 Further, opponents argued that free market competition would create 
natural incentives for those businesses able to afford more generous leave to 
provide it voluntarily, making a federal mandate unnecessary.185 
Republican lawmakers fought vigorously against a federal mandate.186 
The law embodied precisely the type of federal oversight conservatives hoped 
                                                                                                                           
 179 See infra notes 182–189 and accompanying text. 
 180 See House Hearing Educ. & Lab. 1986, supra note 93, at 71 (statement of Frank S. Swain, 
Chief Counsel for Advocacy, Small Business Administration ) (calling the carveout in the FMLA bill 
for small businesses insufficient and categorically dismissing the potential of any paid leave provi-
sion); Senate Hearing 1987, supra note 95, at 97 (statement of Frances Shaine, representing the Unit-
ed States Chamber of Commerce) (expressing concern as a small business owner that a federally 
mandated parental leave would deprive businesses of needed flexibility). 
 181 See House Hearing Educ. & Lab. 1986, supra note 93, at 70, 72 (statement of Frank S. Swain, 
Chief Counsel for Advocacy, Small Business Administration) (explaining the prohibitive costs of 
providing employee leave on top of health benefits). Further, the Small Business Administration as-
serted that a federal mandate would discourage small businesses from hiring workers of child-bearing 
age to avoid granting long-term parental leave. Id. at 73. 
 182 See Senate Hearing 1987, supra note 95, at 8 (statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond, Member, S. 
Comm. on Lab. & Human Res.) (acknowledging that many employers offer parental leave to employ-
ees already). 
 183 See DEBORAH WALKER, CATO INST., POL’Y ANALYSIS NO. 108, MANDATORY FAMILY-
LEAVE LEGISLATION: THE HIDDEN COSTS 1, 5 (1988), https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/
pdf/pa108.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YU9-9GUN] (discussing various cost estimates for the FMLA from 
the United States Chamber of Commerce and the General Accounting Office (GAO)). In 1987, the 
Chamber of Commerce estimated that at worst, the FMLA proposal would cost $16.2 billion, mean-
while the GAO projected a total expense of less than $500 million. Id. 
 184 See House Hearing 1987, supra note 95, at 100, 104 (testimony of Virginia Lamp, Labor 
Relations Attorney, United States Chamber of Commerce) (observing scholars’ concern that employ-
ers forced to internalize higher taxes to fund a federal leave program would lay off employees, partic-
ularly women of child-bearing age, and reduce other workers’ benefits). The United States Chamber 
of Commerce maintained that the existing benefits system, allowing private businesses to contract 
with employees outside of government oversight, “[was] already pretty responsive to the needs and 
capabilities of both employers and employees.” Id. at 99–100. 
 185 See id. at 99, 100 (testimony of Virginia Lamp, Labor Relations Attorney, United States 
Chamber of Commerce) (arguing that “flexibility . . . is the most appropriate answer” and “mandated 
benefits are not cost-free”). 
 186 See, e.g., House Hearing Educ. & Lab. 1986, supra note 93, at 2 (statement of Rep. Marge 
Roukema, Member, H. Comm. on Educ. & Lab.) (expressing concern about the “length and breadth” 
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to eliminate.187 Pro-business advocates in Congress pressed for high eligibility 
requirements and higher employer thresholds to narrow the legislation’s cover-
age.188 Despite vehement opposition from the business community, bipartisan 
compromise on the specific terms of coverage gained enough Republican votes 
to pass the law.189 Although Republicans did not get everything on their wish 
list, the final version of the FMLA that President Clinton signed in 1993 re-
flected immense political pressure from the business community.190 Not only 
did the final FMLA not include paid leave, an express demand from pro-
business groups, but the employer threshold was raised from businesses with 
fifteen employees or more to businesses with fifty employees or more.191 
These changes immediately excluded nearly thirty-two percent of employers 
from the FMLA’s scope.192 The move to raise the employer threshold signaled 
that, from the beginning, the private sector sought to escape federal regulation 
of family and medical leave benefits.193 
B. 2020 and the New Pandemic Reality: A Nation Ready for Reform 
As COVID-19 notably shifted the response to PFML among corporations 
and politicians, this Note presents the pre-Pandemic and ongoing-Pandemic 
landscapes separately.194 Subsection 1 of this Section describes the state of the 
                                                                                                                           
of the leave policy needed to cover most private employers uniformly); cf. Senate Hearing 1987, su-
pra note 95, at 29 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch, Member, Senate Comm. on Lab. & Human Res.) 
(criticizing that the pending FMLA bill would make leave benefits mandatory for businesses). 
 187 See Useem, supra note 163, at 295 (describing the fight against federal regulation in the 
1980s). 
 188 See WISENSALE, supra note 85, at 142 (describing the initiative led by Rep. Roukema to 
amend the early FMLA bill versions to exclude more employers and raise the qualifications for em-
ployees to receive benefits). 
 189 See id. at 148 (indicating that the Republican commitment to family values swayed enough 
lawmakers to support the FMLA). Beside the fifty-employee threshold, other compromises included 
lowering the length of the leave period to twelve weeks and limiting which eligible family members 
the FMLA covered. LENHOFF & BELL, supra note 30, at 9. 
 190 See WISENSALE, supra note 85, at 142 (noting that Congress implemented most of Roukema’s 
requests were implemented in the version of the FMLA that President Clinton signed in 1993). 
 191 See id. (noting the increase in the employer threshold). When the FMLA was enacted, the 
fifty-employee threshold exempted roughly 32% of employers in the United States from the law’s 
regulations. See Table F. Distribution of Private Sector Employment by Firm Size, U.S. BUREAU LAB. 
STAT., https://www.bls.gov/web/cewbd/table_f.txt [https://perma.cc/NZ2R-U6X6] (providing data on 
the breakdown of employer sizes in 1993). 
 192 See Table F. Distribution of Private Sector Employment by Firm Size, supra note 191 (show-
ing that employers with less than fifty employees comprised 31.77% of the United States economy in 
1993). 
 193 See WISENSALE, supra note 85, at 142 (explaining the private sector’s and conservative politi-
cians’ disinterest in broader coverage for the FMLA). 
 194 See generally Bellware, supra note 13 (highlighting the impact of COVID-19 on PFML re-
form). 
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nation regarding PFML prior to the Pandemic.195 Subsection 2 illustrates 
Americans’ changing attitudes toward PFML after COVID-19 struck, and as it 
continues to impact our nation and the globe.196 
1. Before the Pandemic 
In 2017, three years before COVID-19 hit, the American public over-
whelmingly supported PFML.197 Both sides of the political aisle held positive 
views of PFML as well.198 After several decades under the FMLA, lawmakers 
understood that the FMLA’s failure to cover nearly half of American employ-
ees was obviously problematic.199 Although lawmakers agreed about the prob-
lem, the proposed solutions to address this gap differed drastically.200 
                                                                                                                           
 195 See infra notes 197–217 and accompanying text. 
 196 See infra notes 218–249 and accompanying text. As of August 2021, the Pandemic continues 
to inflict harm upon the American population. See Delta Variant, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (Aug. 26, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/variants/delta-variant.
html [https://perma.cc/7E9Y-E3PZ] (explaining the ongoing effects of the “Delta variant,” the latest 
strain of COVID-19). The Biden Administration continues to announce new policies to address the 
evolving crisis, with particular implications for paid leave. See, e.g., Press Release, The White House 
Briefing Room, FACT SHEET: President Biden to Announce New Actions to Get More Americans 
Vaccinated and Slow the Spread of the Delta Variant (July 29, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/07/29/fact-sheet-president-biden-to-announce-new-actions-to-
get-more-americans-vaccinated-and-slow-the-spread-of-the-delta-variant/ [https://perma.cc/7KBX-
BWF2] (announcing the federal government’s plans to subsidize medium- to small-sized businesses 
for employees’ time off to get themselves, and their family members, vaccinated from COVID-19). 
 197 See JULIANA HOROWITZ, KIM PARKER, NIKKI GRAF & GRETCHEN LIVINGSTON, PEW RSCH. 
CTR., AMERICANS WIDELY SUPPORT PAID FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE, BUT DIFFER OVER SPECIF-
IC POLICIES 4 (2017), https://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2017/03/22152556/
Paid-Leave-Report-3-17-17-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/JQ3E-KDNY] (reporting that 85% Ameri-
cans believe workers should receive paid medical leave, 67% think workers should get paid family 
leave to care for a family member with an illness, and 82% believe in access to paid maternity leave). 
In the same survey, approximately 62% of Americans polled said they had a need for PFML. Id. at 6. 
Yet, the data showed disagreement over specific provisions of paid leave. See id. at 9 (displaying the 
divergence in public opinion over who should fund pay leave––employers or the government); see 
also NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMS., VOTERS’ VIEWS ON PAID FAMILY + MEDICAL LEAVE: 
FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY 24 (2018), https://www.nationalpartnership.org/our-work/
resources/economic-justice/paid-leave/voters-views-on-paid-family-medical-leave-survey-findings-
august-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5T9-47RK] (finding that 29% of Democrats would be willing to 
receive paid leave through a federally funded program despite tax increases, as opposed to 11% of 
Republicans). 
 198 See Yuki Noguchi, Lawmakers Agree on Paid Family Leave, but Not the Details, NPR (Feb. 
27, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/02/27/585133064/lawmakers-agree-on-paid-family-leave-but-
not-the-details [https://perma.cc/ZAE5-5NSM] (noting that Democrats and Republicans diverge on 
the particulars of paid leave programs, but agree that American employees would benefit from overall 
policy reform). 
 199 See BROWN ET AL., supra note 126, at 21 (discovering that just under 60% of the American 
workforce qualified for FMLA leave in 2012). 
 200 Compare S. 920, 116th Cong. (2019) (proposing paid parental leave for parents only after 
adopting or giving birth to a child), with H.R. 1185, 116th Cong. § 5(j) (2019) (proposing paid leave 
for most family and personal medical reasons); see also Megan Sholar, Yes, Gillibrand and DeLauro 
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For Democrats, PFML is not a new policy initiative; the party’s advocacy 
dates back to the early 1980s.201 In 2019, Democrats introduced their hallmark 
PFML policy: the FAMILY Act.202 The legislation provides twelve weeks of 
PFML, covers employers of all sizes, and contains a payroll tax––split between 
the employer and employees––to fund the paid leave program.203 The drafters 
of the FAMILY Act designed the bill to follow the payroll tax model of state 
PFML programs.204 
In recent years, Republicans also adopted support for paid leave.205 Alt-
hough Republicans introduced several bills in the last several years, most of 
                                                                                                                           
Introduced a Family Leave Bill. More Important, Republicans Are Introducing Paid Leave Bills, Too., 
WASH. POST (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/02/20/yes-gillibrand-
delauro-introduced-family-leave-bill-more-important-republicans-are-introducing-paid-leave-bills-
too/ [https://perma.cc/WNZ6-4LSR] (describing the bills introduced by Democrats and Republicans to 
address paid leave). 
 201 See Sholar, supra note 29 (remarking that FMLA policy-makers originally hoped to make 
family and medical leave paid when they first proposed the policy). PFML is a lingering policy point 
on the Democratic Party platform. See, e.g., Paid Family and Medical Leave, OFF. HILLARY RODHAM 
CLINTON, https://www.hillaryclinton.com/issues/paid-leave/ [https://perma.cc/7PQT-TRSY] (intro-
ducing PFML to Hillary Clinton’s platform for President in the 2016 election). Hillary Clinton’s PFML 
plan proposed that the top earners in the United States should shoulder the tax financing the policy, as 
opposed to businesses through payroll taxation. Claire Cain Miller, Hillary Clinton’s Twist on Paid 
Leave: She Plans to Tax Wealthiest, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/09/
upshot/hillary-clintons-twist-on-paid-leave-she-plans-to-tax-wealthiest.html [https://perma.cc/X2K9-
7FG3]. 
 202 H.R. 1185; FAMILY Act, S. 463, 116th Cong. (2019); see also NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & 
FAMS., FACT SHEET: THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL INSURANCE LEAVE (FAMILY) ACT, 1, 2 (2021), 
https://www.nationalpartnership.org/our-work/resources/economic-justice/paid-leave/family-act-fact-
sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/DNC9-HSAP] (reviewing the provisions of the proposed FAMILY Act 
and potential benefits for American families). Another Democratic proposal is the Providing Ameri-
cans Insured Days of Leave Act (PAID) Act, introduced by Senator Patty Murray in March 2020. 
PAID Act, S. 3513, 116th Cong. (2020), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/
3513 [https://perma.cc/6DVX-LXNM]. 
 203 See S. 463 § 7(c) (laying out the tax structure funding the bill). 
 204 See NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMS., supra note 202, at 3 (showing that most states fund 
their PFML programs through payroll taxes and state-run insurance programs). Although the legisla-
tors designed the bill to be self-financing through payroll taxes, some data analysts question whether 
the financing scheme of the bill is fiscally sound. See, e.g., Ben Gitis, The Fiscal Implication of the 
FAMILY Act: How New Paid Leave Benefits Increase Leave-Taking and Drive up Estimated Program 
Costs, AM. ACTION F. (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/the-fiscal-
implications-of-the-family-act-how-new-paid-leave-benefits-increase-leave-taking-and-drive-up-
estimated-program-costs/ [https://perma.cc/BA8Y-HZCE] (questioning the adequacy of the payroll 
tax scheme to fully fund the benefits promised under the FAMILY Act). 
 205 See Noguchi, supra note 198 (showing that President Trump planted the seed for paid family 
leave as a Republican Party issue in his 2018 State of the Union address); see also Donald J. Trump, 
President U.S., Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 30 
2018), in 2018 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 64, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-2018
00064/pdf/DCPD-201800064.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LT7-6TGM] (calling for Congress to enact paid 
family leave). See generally Steven Kull, The Coronavirus May Be Boosting Republican Support for 
Family and Medical Leave, WASH. POST (May 14, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
2020/05/14/coronavirus-may-be-boosting-republican-support-family-medical-leave/ [https://perma.cc/
2552 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:2515 
their policies focus on parental leave over medical leave.206 Further, Republi-
can PFML policies tend to propose financing structures that do not raise pay-
roll taxes.207 Most conservative PFML bills propose to fund paid leave either 
through tax credit incentives or by allowing employees to prematurely with-
draw future, promised benefits—like Social Security payments or child tax 
credits.208 
Neither of the Republican nor Democratic bills made it out of committee 
before the Pandemic hit.209 The only notable progress on paid leave pre-
                                                                                                                           
R5RY-LR2G] (reporting that more Republicans, especially elderly people, support PFML policies in 
light of the Pandemic). 
 206 See Sholar, supra note 200 (describing the policies introduced by Republican members of 
Congress, which focus on family leave). One of the leading bills among Republicans before the Pan-
demic, the New Parents Act, would have created national parental leave. S. 920, 116th Cong. § 219(b) 
(2019) (allowing new parents to allocate three months of benefits from their Social Security fund to 
finance paid parental leave). 
 207 Sholar, supra note 200. The Republican aversion to raising taxes to finance leave benefits 
dates back to the policy President Bush proposed during the 1992 presidential election. See supra 
notes 114–117 and accompanying text (introducing President Bush’s paid leave proposal, funded by 
tax incentives and limited to employers with fewer than five hundred employees). 
 208 See, e.g., S. 920 § 219(f) (deducting an employee’s present parental leave payments from their 
future Social Security benefits); Press Release, Joni Ernst, U.S. Sen., Ernst, Lee Put Forward Paid 
Parental Leave Plan That Is Budget Neutral and Flexible for Parents (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.
ernst.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=BBE412DC-1656-46E8-9D42-1D00A902A63C 
[https://perma.cc/9FHK-7EZ2] (introducing a plan to receive up to three months of Social Security 
benefits to fund paid parental leave); SENATOR BILL CASSIDY & SENATOR KYRSTEN SINEMA, A BI-
PARTISAN SOLUTION TO HELP WORKING FAMILIES 1 (2021), https://www.sinema.senate.gov/sites/
default/files/2019-07/Cassidy%20Sinema%20Proposal%20One-Pager.pdf [https://perma.cc/BS2U-
BT6J] (describing a plan to allow working parents to advance as much as $5,000 of their Child Tax 
Credit). These plans appeal to businesses because they shift the onus of funding paid leave onto exist-
ing government programs and away from the employer’s bottom line. See McDonald Garrison et al., 
supra note 27, at 359 (discussing the benefits of the New Parents Act for employers). In 2020, then-
President Trump proposed a family leave policy funded by money from future earned child tax cred-
its. Claire Cain Miller, Trump Called for Paid Family Leave. Here’s Why Few Democrats Clapped., 
N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/05/upshot/paid-leave-
trump.html [https://perma.cc/JHF7-A2V9]. 
 209 See, e.g., H.R. 1185—FAMILY Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-
congress/house-bill/1185 [https://perma.cc/3LWH-2ZK2] (showing that the House most recently 
referred the bill to the Subcommittee on Worker and Family Support on the House Ways and Means 
Committee in February 2019); S.463—FAMILY Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/
116th-congress/senate-bill/463/cosponsors?searchResultViewType=expanded [https://perma.cc/
EH6C-59QJ] (showing that in the Senate the bill was last read and referred to the Committee on Fi-
nance in February 2019); S.920—New Parents Act of 2019, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.
gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/920/text?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22New+Parents+Act
%22%5D%7D&r=2 [https://perma.cc/7VGL-TUGL] (showing that the Senate most recently referred 
the bill to the Senate Committee on Finance in March 2019). Before the Pandemic, Congress held a 
hearing on the possibility of paid family leave, opening the conversation to various proposals. See 
generally Senate Hearing 2018, supra note 24, at 1 (denoting the purpose of the hearing was for paid 
family leave in the United States). The hearing presented a range of policy proposals. Id. at 7–8. These 
proposals ranged from Democratic Senator Kirsten Gillibrand’s FAMILY Act, focusing on a payroll 
tax-based plan, to a Republican-led policy containing zero tax increases. Compare id. at 7 (statement 
of Sen. Joni Ernst) (allowing citizens to draw forward Social Security funds to cover parental leave), 
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pandemic was the expansion of paid sick and parental leave for federal work-
ers.210 Still, Washington insiders expressed cautious optimism that paid leave 
legislation was on the horizon.211 
Business interest groups also seemed less averse to PFML before 
COVID-19.212 In January 2020, one investigative report published by the Unit-
ed States Chamber of Commerce actually recommended that Congress create a 
national standard for paid leave.213 The variety among state PFML laws today 
burdens multi-state employers with hefty compliance costs, making a con-
sistent, national standard more appealing.214 Additionally, some employers be-
gan expanding paid leave coverage simply because it was good for business.215 
In 2017, businesses with paid leave policies reported improved retention, in-
                                                                                                                           
with id. at 8 (statement of Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand) (proposing a state-based model of payroll tax-
funded leave). 
 210 See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. § 630 (2020) (providing twelve weeks of paid parental leave to federally 
employed workers covered by the FMLA); 29 C.F.R. § 13 (2020) (establishing seven-day paid sick 
leave for all federally employed contractors through Executive Order 13706, signed by President 
Obama). In June 2021, Representative Janice Schakowsky introduced a bill that requires corporations 
to offer their employees seven days of PFML to be eligible for Department of Defense contracts. See 
Patriotic Corporations of America Act of 2021, H.R. 4186, 117th Cong. § 2(a) (2021) (proposing an 
amendment to add a new § 4715 to the current United States Code, see 41 U.S.C. §§ 4701–4714, 
mandating private sector defense contractors to provide PFML). This new bill attempts to impose a 
federal PFML mandate through coveted defense contracts, but the bill lacks bipartisan support and its 
viability is uncertain. See id. (displaying only Democratic co-sponsors on the House bill). 
 211 See Naomi Jagoda & Niv Elis, New Push to Break Deadlock on Family Leave, The HILL (July 
11, 2018), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/396396-new-push-to-break-deadlock-on-paid-family-
leave?rl=1 [https://perma.cc/844M-RXSN] (noting that both Democrats and Republicans support a 
form of paid leave for families). 
 212 See JULIA ISAACS, OLIVIA HEALY & H. ELIZABETH PETERS, URBAN INST., PAID FAMILY 
LEAVE IN THE UNITED STATES: TIME FOR A NEW NATIONAL POLICY 6 (2017), https://www.urban.
org/sites/default/files/publication/90201/paid_family_leave_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/35XW-4ZHY] 
(finding that in states with PFML laws, businesses were more likely to report positive or neutral out-
comes on the policy than negative outcomes); see also U.S. CHAMBER COM., supra note 41, at 55 
(recommending the United States adopt a national PFML policy). In 2014, PFML became more palat-
able to the business community because of its demonstrated benefits. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVI-
SORS, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, THE ECONOMICS OF PAID AND UNPAID LEAVE 17 (2014), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/leave_report_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/
64LY-VBC8] (discussing the positive outcomes on profits, work environment, and recruitment re-
ported by businesses with paid family leave). Some businesses, however, remained defiant because 
the long-term ramifications of paid family leave were too uncertain. See id. at 18 (explaining that 
many businesses prioritize short-term “cost-saving measures” over “long-run benefits” when it comes 
to paid family leave policy). 
 213 U.S. CHAMBER COM., supra note 41, at 55. 
 214 See id. (expressing the difficulty employers face when complying with ten different paid leave 
programs). 
 215 See Mayer, supra note 141 (showing that four of the ten largest employers, or 39%, were 
broadening paid leave benefits for employees in 2019). Companies expanding leave benefits reported 
a range of motivations, including improving worker productivity and reflecting positive company 
values. Id. 
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creased productivity, and positive media attention.216 Greater awareness of 
these benefits caused support for PFML to bloom in the business community, 
challenging their traditional resistance to the policy.217 
2. The Pandemic––Now and Beyond 
The Pandemic continues to shine a national spotlight on the struggle of 
many Americans to balance health, work, and familial demands.218 Conse-
quently, many policy-makers and businesses are more attuned to the need for 
national PFML now than ever before.219 Although the FFCRA helped many 
families during the Pandemic, it was only a temporary fix.220 The response of 
political and business actors to the FFCRA’s paid leave mandate indicates how 
permanent PFML conversations might unfold in the future.221 
Even though corporations indicated support for PFML before 2020, 
COVID-19 changed their tune.222 As the Pandemic worsened in the spring of 
2020, pro-business interest groups made their views clear: they did not support 
a uniform, nationally mandated PFML policy.223 This shift in public messaging 
                                                                                                                           
 216 See Trish Stroman, Wendy Woods, Gabrielle Fitzgerald, Shalini Unnikrishnan & Liz Bird, Why 
Paid Family Leave Is Good Business, BOS. CONSULTING GRP. (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.bcg.com/
publications/2017/human-resources-people-organization-why-paid-family-leave-is-good-business 
[https://perma.cc/H5CK-CARE] (listing the reasons why businesses augmented leave benefits for 
their employees, even before the Pandemic). Although many of these benefits are intangible, some 
statistical studies show that implementing paid leave is not financially detrimental to companies. See 
id. (finding that 92% of businesses that offer paid family leave experience either beneficial outcomes 
or no discernable effect on their profits). 
 217 See Jagoda & Elis, supra note 211 (noting the rare bipartisanship in Washington D.C. over 
paid leave). 
 218 See Bennett, supra note 1 (reporting the stories of working mothers struggling in the Pandemic). 
 219 See, e.g., Akayla Gardner, Pandemic Drives Business Support for Paid Leave, Study Finds, 
BLOOMBERG: BUS. (Jan. 26, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-26/covid-19-
pandemic-drives-up-support-for-u-s-national-paid-leave [https://perma.cc/E5NL-CJJW] (describing 
the lack of paid leave during COVID-19 as a crisis for American businesses). 
 220 See Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA), H.R. 6201, 116th Cong § 3102 (2020) 
(enacted) (enacting a temporary expansion of the FMLA that expired on December 31, 2020). 
 221 See infra notes 223–242 and accompanying text. 
 222 See Letter from Ginni Rometty, Chair, Educ. & Workforce Comm., Bus. Roundtable, to The 
President (Dec. 11, 2019) (on file with Bus. Roundtable) (emphasizing the need for businesses to be 
open-minded to future federal paid leave proposals). 
 223 See Letter from Neil Bradley, Exec. Vice President & Chief Pol’y Officer, U.S. Chamber of 
Com., to Members U.S. Congress (Mar. 12, 2020) (on file with U.S. Chamber Com.), https://www.
uschamber.com/sites/default/files/200312_coronaviruslegislation_congress.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3XXS-PWXE] [hereinafter Chamber of Commerce Letter 2020] (insisting that the Pandemic is not an 
opportunity to impose permanent paid leave legislation on employers); Letter from Neil Bradley, 
Exec. Vice President & Chief Pol’y Officer, U.S. Chamber Com., to Members U.S. Congress (Feb. 2, 
2021) (on file with U.S. Chamber Com.), https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/210202_
americanrescueplanresponse_potus_congress.pdf [hereinafter Chamber of Commerce Letter 2021] 
(endorsing the FFCRA solely as a Pandemic-induced policy aimed at small business relief). Small 
businesses strongly opposed federally mandated PFML during the Pandemic as well. See Press Re-
lease, Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus., NFIB Urges Congress Not to Harm Small Bus. Recovery (Jan. 15, 
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and political advocacy confused the support businesses expressed before the 
Pandemic.224 To shield themselves from the COVID-19 paid leave mandate, 
corporations harnessed their financial power and lobbied Congress to alter the 
employer threshold of the FFCRA to exclude employers with more than five 
hundred employees.225 Even though corporations expressed interest in PFML 
before the Pandemic, when the moment arrived for Congress to enact a PFML 
law, they lobbied for an exemption.226 This exemption––the five-hundred-
employee threshold––immediately excluded sixty million Americans from the 
law’s coverage by excluding large employers from the law’s paid leave man-
date.227 
Big businesses argued two principal points against PFML during the Pan-
demic.228 First, a PFML mandate would damage small businesses already suf-
fering during COVID-19.229 Small business owners expressed concerns about 
compensating for the extra work during employees’ absences.230 Second, a 
federal mandate would be doubly ineffectual because it both imposes hefty 
costs on companies unable to provide paid leave and unnecessarily regulates 
                                                                                                                           
2021), https://www.nfib.com/content/press-release/economy/nfib-to-congress-focus-on-small-business-
recovery/ [https://perma.cc/PN5N-B3MF] [hereinafter NFIB Press Release Jan. 15] (resisting the paid 
leave mandates introduced by the Biden Administration as harmful to small businesses). 
 224 Compare U.S. CHAMBER COM., supra note 41, at 55 (observing the Chamber of Commerce’s 
support for a national PFML law before the Pandemic), with Chamber of Commerce Letter 2020, 
supra note 223 (indicating the Chamber of Commerce’s opposition to a federal PFML policy during 
the Pandemic). 
 225 See Hasan & Monnay, supra note 151 (reporting that business associations spent $121 million 
on lobbying during 2019). 
 226 See Siobhan Hughes, Natalie Andrews & Kate Davidson, House Democrats Scale Back Paid-
Leave Program in Coronavirus-Aid Bill, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/house-democrats-scale-back-paid-leave-program-in-coronavirus-aid-bill-11584424805 
[https://perma.cc/BBG8-S4KY] (describing the pressure that corporations applied against legislators 
to revise the COVID-19 relief package to exempt certain employers). 
 227 Steven Findlay, Congress Left Big Gaps in the Paid Sick Days and Paid Leave Provisions of 
the Coronavirus Emergency Legislation, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.health
affairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200424.223002/full/#:~:text=Workers%20would%20have%20to%20
use,than%20fivehundred%20workers%20are%20eligible [https://perma.cc/7DG6-7FVK]. 
 228 See infra notes 229–232 and accompanying text. 
 229 See Press Release, Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus., Renewed Efforts to Mandate Paid Sick Leave 
(Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.nfib.com/content/news/virginia/renewed-efforts-to-mandate-paid-sick-
leave/ [https://perma.cc/3UFN-VML8] [hereinafter NFIB Press Release Jan. 6] (denouncing the 
“cookie cutter approach” to paid leave laws); see also Chamber of Commerce Letter 2020, supra note 
223 (discouraging Congress from enacting policies that “would hamper . . . workplace flexibility on 
Main Street”). 
 230 See, e.g., Jon Chesto, Small Businesses Face New Challenges as State’s Paid Leave Program 
Kicks In, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 31, 2020), https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/12/31/business/small-
businesses-face-new-challenges-states-paid-leave-program-kicks/ [https://perma.cc/WB6T-J9ZN] 
(reporting on the impact of Massachusetts’s new PFML benefits, activated during COVID-19, on 
small businesses ). 
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companies with existing paid leave policies.231 Mid-sized to large employers 
also assert that the freedom to contract their own employee benefits plans al-
lows them to attract top talent and create new solutions for paid leave that best 
suit their employees.232 
It is true that some companies over the five-hundred-employee threshold 
voluntarily increased paid leave benefits to employees during COVID-19.233 
Other companies, however, failed to provide adequate leave benefits to em-
ployees and furloughed workers, while issuing stock dividends and augment-
ing executive compensation packages.234 For example, Amazon.com, Inc. (Am-
azon) expanded paid leave during the Pandemic, but required documentation of 
                                                                                                                           
 231 See U.S. CHAMBER COM., supra note 41, at 55 (acknowledging that many employers al-
ready have corporate policies for paid leave). When lobbying for the five hundred employee ex-
emption, then-Treasury Secretary Mnuchin raised the key point that most large corporations have 
existing paid leave. See Jaclyn Diaz, Big Business Covid-19 Paid Leave Exemption May Get An-
other Look, BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 31, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/big-
business-covid-19-paid-leave-exemption-may-get-another-look?context=article-related [https://perma.
cc/66T8-GAWQ] (describing the Republican belief that excluding large corporations from Speaker 
Pelosi’s bill would preserve economic resources). One article notes that 89% of big businesses offer 
some type of paid sick leave, but that is not the same as PFML. See Greg Rosalsky, Paid Leave vs. the 
Pandemic, NPR (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2020/03/17/816849671/paid-
leave-vs-the-pandemic [https://perma.cc/KAM4-P8YB] (including data from the U.S. Bureau of La-
bor Statistics). 
 232 See, e.g., Stroman et al., supra note 216 (citing a survey from one company that reported 77% 
of its employees were persuaded to join the company based on the generous leave benefits). Mid-size 
employers communicated concerns to the Biden Administration that expanded paid leave mandates 
would be underfunded and risk the vitality of their businesses. See Chamber of Commerce Letter 
2021, supra note 223 (indicating the opposition from mid-sized employers to the new paid leave man-
date proposed by President Biden). Small businesses also argued that paid leave benefits can set them 
apart from their competitors. See Ali C.M. Watkins, Boulder County, Front Range Businesses Weigh 
Impact of Paid Family Leave, DAILY CAMERA (Nov. 29, 2020), https://www.dailycamera.com/2020/
11/29/boulder-county-front-range-businesses-weigh-impact-of-paid-family-leave/ [https://perma.cc/
8STQ-6P4C] (conveying a counterargument that paid leave benefits can help small businesses draw 
the employees they need, especially in industries with limited human capital). 
 233 See, e.g., Press Release, MetLife, Inc., MetLife Offers Paid Leave to Qualified Workers Who 
Want to Fight COVID (May 11, 2020), https://insurancenewsnet.com/innarticle/metlife-offers-paid-
leave-to-qualified-workers-who-want-to-fight-covid#.Xr1J-BNKiqA [https://perma.cc/HA58-SZPS] 
(providing incentive for healthcare workers to take leave to assist the COVID-19 effort); Press Re-
lease, Apple Inc., Apple’s COVID-19 Response (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.apple.com/newsroom/
2020/03/apples-covid-19-response/ [https://perma.cc/23M9-W55N] (vowing to increase leave benefits 
during COVID-19); cf. Statement, Mary Barra, Chairman & CEO Gen. Motors & Chair of the Bus. 
Roundtable Educ. & Workforce Comm. & Chair Racial Equity & Just. Subcomm. Educ. & Work-
force, Bus. Roundtable (July 21, 2020), https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-
ceos-paid-time-off-and-flexibility-for-voting-are-best-practices [https://perma.cc/UFH4-BBV4] (en-
couraging employers to give employees better paid leave and time off benefits, specifically for the 
purpose of voting in the 2020 elections). 
 234 See, e.g., Peter S. Goodman, Big Business Pledged Gentler Capitalism. It’s Not Happening in 
a Pandemic., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/13/business/business-
roundtable-coronavirus.html?searchResultPosition=4 [https://perma.cc/UT7F-ZPHD] (using Marriot 
International as an example of a company backtracking on its promises by prioritizing stockholders 
and executives over its employees during the Pandemic). 
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testing results that were either impractical or unattainable before workers could 
actually receive their benefits.235 Stories like this cast doubt upon the curated 
media images of benevolent corporations opening their coffers to struggling em-
ployees.236 
Moreover, government actors played an active role prodding large com-
panies, like Amazon, to expand their paid leave benefits.237 In March 2020, 
Massachusetts Attorney General Maura Healey wrote a letter to Whole Foods 
Market, Inc. (Whole Foods) and Amazon, co-signed by thirteen other state at-
torneys general, urging the companies to implement more generous paid leave 
policies.238 The letter from the Attorneys General noted that the policies prom-
                                                                                                                           
 235 See Annie Palmer, ‘Amazon Is Not Taking Care of Us’: Warehouse Workers Say They’re 
Struggling to Get Paid Despite Sick Leave Policy, CNBC (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/
04/08/amazon-warehouse-workers-say-they-struggle-to-get-paid-despite-sick-leave-policy.html 
[https://perma.cc/VQ5N-SLB2] (detailing a first-hand account of Amazon.com Inc. (Amazon)’s fail-
ure to provide promised leave benefits to an employee). Amazon initially announced unlimited paid 
leave for its employees, but workers found it difficult to take advantage of this promise due to admin-
istrative hurdles that the company imposed. Karen Weise & Kate Conger, Gaps in Amazon’s Re-
sponse as Virus Spreads to More Than 50 Warehouses, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.
nytimes.com/2020/04/05/technology/coronavirus-amazon-workers.html [https://perma.cc/JHG6-7EB6]. 
In one case, Amazon simply told the employee to use her unpaid leave instead. Id. 
 236 See, e.g., Weise & Conger, supra note 235 (implying that Amazon’s promise of paid leave did 
not pan out for many employees); Goodman, supra note 234 (revealing that Marriot International 
prioritized executives and stockholders over employees during the Pandemic). 
 237 See Letter from Maura Healey, Attorney Gen., Commonwealth Mass. Off. Attorney Gen., to 
John Mackey, Chief Exec. Officer, Whole Foods Mkt., Inc. & Jeffrey P. Bezos, President, Ama-
zon.com, Inc. 1 (Mar. 25, 2020) (urging Amazon and Whole Foods Market, Inc. (Whole Foods) to 
expand their COVID-19 benefits). 
 238 Id. Two days after Attorney General Maura Healey sent the letter to Amazon and Whole 
Foods, Amazon informed Representative Ilhan Omar that the company was expanding its paid leave 
policies even further. See id. (showing the letter dated March 25, 2020); Letter from Brian Huseman, 
Vice President, Pub. Pol’y, Amazon.com Inc., to Rep. Ilhan Omar (Mar. 27, 2020). State attorneys 
general have played an important, active role in protecting workers’ rights in recent years, and the 
COVID-19 crisis has proved no exception. See TERRI GERSTEIN, ECON. POL’Y INST., WORKERS’ 
RIGHTS PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT BY STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 1 (2020), https://www.
epi.org/publication/state-ag-labor-rights-activities-2018-to-2020/ [https://perma.cc/6RWM-UCAJ] 
(detailing greater efforts from state attorneys general’s offices to better advocate for workers’ rights). 
For example, in April 2020, in New York v. United States Department of Labor, New York State At-
torney General Letitia James challenged the DoL regulations curtailing the FFCRA’s eligibility re-
quirements as exceeding the scope of the DoL’s authority. 477 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6 (S.D.N.Y. 2020); see 
29 C.F.R. § 826 (2020) (limiting the reach of the FFCRA); see also Hafiz et al., supra note 145, at 32 
(commenting that the regulations enacted by the DoL spawned confusion over the interpretation of the 
new law); Eric W. Leonard & Nicole E. Giles, Paid Leave During COVID-19: Complying with a 
Moving Target, COVID-19 RSCH. CTR. (Wiley Rein LLP, New York, N.Y.), Oct. 2020, at 1, https://
www.wiley.law/newsletter-Paid-Leave-During-COVID-19-Complying-with-a-Moving-Target [https://
perma.cc/8QD4-EY43] (tracking the evolving changes to paid leave throughout the Pandemic as a 
result of DoL efforts to alter the language passed by Congress). The court found that the DoL sur-
passed its authority by limiting the scope of the FFCRA, and thus overturned some of the new regula-
tions. See New York v. Dep’t of Lab., 477 F. Supp. 3d at 18 (reasoning that the DoL “jumped the rail” 
by enacting regulations beyond its purview). The court invalidated three of the regulations implement-
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ulgated by Amazon and Whole Foods did not comply with the FFCRA stand-
ard binding smaller employers.239 This concern from the Attorneys General 
exemplifies a common criticism over the FFCRA’s exemption for employers 
with more than five hundred employees.240 
Meanwhile, the political attitude toward PFML remained enthusiastic 
among progressives and lukewarm among conservatives.241 On the one hand, 
Republican lawmakers urged caution and stated a desire to delay any perma-
nent PFML measures in the interest of immediate COVID-19 relief.242 On the 
other hand, Democrats seemed eager to use the Pandemic as a springboard for 
permanent leave policy.243 In particular, progressives pushing for permanent 
PFML want to avoid any future exemptions for large employers like the five-
hundred-employee threshold in the FFCRA.244 Employers with over five hun-
dred employees provided jobs for approximately forty-eight percent of Ameri-
can employees in 2020.245 Many of these large corporations employ the same 
                                                                                                                           
ed by the DoL: (1) a new work-availability requirement, (2) the altered definition to “health care pro-
vider,” and (3) the new time and documentation requirements. Id. 
 239 Letter from Maura Healey, supra note 237, at 3 (“[W]e ask [Amazon and Whole Foods] to 
provide their employees with what smaller employers are required to provide under the [FFCRA] 
. . . .”). 
 240 See Findlay, supra note 227 (noting that the carveout for large employers results in the exclu-
sion of roughly sixty million American workers, constituting about half of the country’s full time labor 
force, from the FFCRA’s coverage); Editorial, There’s a Giant Hole in Pelosi’s Coronavirus Bill, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/14/opinion/coronavirus-pelosi-sick-
leave.html [https://perma.cc/W32Y-MNZL] (criticizing the FFCRA for excluding companies with 
more than five hundred employees, when these businesses employ approximately 54% of the Ameri-
can workforce). 
 241 Compare Sawhill & Welch, supra note 142 (showcasing the progressive view that the econo-
my should not reopen unless Congress makes paid leave reform permanent), with Barbara Sprunt, 
Meeting with Republicans on COVID-19 Relief, White House Says Biden ‘Will Not Settle,’ NPR (Jan. 
31, 2021), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2021/01/31/962554923/10-senate-
republicans-plan-to-detail-slimmed-down-covid-19-counteroffer [https://perma.cc/5QFX-NP8F] (ob-
serving the conservative delegation’s dedication to targeted COVID-19 relief over long-term spending 
packages). 
 242 See Letter from Susan M. Collins, U.S. Sen., Lisa Murkowski, U.S. Sen., Bill Cassidy. U.S. 
Sen., Mitt Romney, U.S. Sen., Rob Portman, U.S. Sen., Shelley Moore Capito, U.S. Sen., Todd 
Young, U.S. Sen., Jerry Moran, U.S. Sen., M. Michael Rounds, U.S. Sen., & Thom Tillis, U.S. Sen., 
to President Joseph Biden (Jan. 31, 2021) (on file with U.S. Senate) (reiterating the importance of 
economic support through direct stimulus payments, unemployment benefits, and nutritional assis-
tance, but not paid leave). 
 243 See Press Release, Kirsten Gillibrand, U.S. Sen., Gillibrand, DeLauro Introduce Fam. Act, Urge 
Congress to Pass Permanent Paid Leave Solution to Spur Econ. Recovery (Feb. 5, 2021) (on file with 
author), https://www.gillibrand.senate.gov/news/press/release/gillibrand-delauro-introduce-family-act-
urge-congress-to-pass-permanent-paid-leave-solution-to-spur-economic-recovery [https://perma.cc/
TC9S-F4FR] (noting Democrats’ desire to enact paid leave legislation immediately). 
 244 See generally H.R. 1185, 116th Cong. (2019) (making PFML available to all individuals re-
gardless of the size of their employer). 
 245 See Table F. Distribution of Private Sector Employment by Firm Size, supra note 191 (dis-
playing the percentage share that different sized employers occupy within the entire United States 
labor market, organized by year and measured by total number of employees). 
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workers––women and people of color––who are statistically more likely to fall 
through the cracks of FMLA coverage.246 Due to the outsized impact that large 
companies have as the nation’s largest employers, progressives believe that 
any meaningful PFML policy must cover these corporations.247 
Overall, as COVID-19 worsened throughout 2020 and continues to per-
sist, federal PFML has garnered a renewed sense of immediacy.248 Despite the 
tragic losses of the Pandemic, it also provides a rare opportunity to reassess the 
legislative strategy surrounding PFML, offering some hope for the future.249 
III. APPLYING THE FMLA MODEL TO PFML POLICY 
Thirty years of the FMLA and a global Pandemic have ripened the United 
States to implement national PFML.250 Although nine states successfully im-
plemented PFML laws and many businesses see its benefits, companies at 
large continue to block PFML at the federal level.251 Lawmakers have grappled 
with this opposition repeatedly since the early 1980s.252 
                                                                                                                           
 246 See BROWN ET AL., supra note 126, at 8 (displaying data that FMLA-ineligible employees are 
more likely to be female, people of color, leading single-income households, or to have a high school 
diploma or lower level of education); Claire Cain Miller, Walmart and Now Starbucks: Why More Big 
Companies Are Offering Paid Family Leave, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/01/24/upshot/parental-leave-company-policy-salaried-hourly-gap.html [https://
perma.cc/HL5C-QV9R] (stating that hourly workers at large corporations are the most in need of paid 
leave but less likely to receive it than salaried workers). Employees with a greater need for paid leave 
tend to be women, Black, Latinx, or people whose education level does not go beyond a high school 
diploma. Id. 
 247 See generally Editorial, supra note 240 (criticizing the exception for large companies). 
 248 See Lisa Nagele-Piazza, Will Biden Administration Push to Expand Paid-Leave Benefits?, 
SOC’Y FOR HUM. RSCH. MGMT. (Nov. 24, 2020), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/legal-and-
compliance/employment-law/pages/biden-administration-paid-leave.aspx [https://perma.cc/PX9Z-
4HXN] (reporting on the enthusiasm in the new Biden administration for expanding the FMLA and 
creating paid leave). 
 249 Id. 
 250 See ISAACS ET AL., supra note 212, at 1 (stating that the United States is “ripe” for national-
ized PFML); NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMS., supra note 197, at 15 (presenting data that shows 
eight out of ten Americans think that Congress should revisit the FMLA); Bellware, supra note 13 
(remarking on how the Pandemic has revived enthusiasm for paid leave policy); Igielnik, supra note 3 
(stressing the difficulties of parenting and obtaining child care during COVID-19). 
 251 See Hasan & Monnay, supra note 151 (illustrating the tactics of pro-business lobbyists to 
create a carveout for corporations in the FFCRA bill). 
 252 See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 212, at 18 
(questioning why the United States still does not have PFML despite its proven benefits for numerous 
businesses). After the swine flu outbreak in 2009, employers expressed concerns that paid leave for 
working parents would be harmful to their businesses. Kulow, supra note 21, at 91. Even then, data 
proving the financial benefits of family-centered policies was widely available to combat these con-
cerns. Id. 
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COVID-19 must be the watershed moment for PFML reform.253 Section 
A of this Part highlights the reasons why the traditional case companies make 
against PFML does not apply in a modern, post-Pandemic America.254 Section 
B analyzes the formidable obstacles the business-lobby poses to enacting 
PFML in the future.255 Finally, Section C discusses how the FMLA coalition-
building model from the 1980s should inspire policy-makers today in remov-
ing some of those challenges.256 
A. The Corporate Case Against Paid Leave 
American author Mark Twain said, “[h]istory doesn’t repeat itself, but it 
often rhymes.”257 This adage neatly encapsulates the familiarity of the present 
PFML policy debate to the FMLA’s evolution from decades ago.258 Since pro-
gressive lawmakers first introduced the idea of PFML in the early 1980s, cor-
porations have recycled the same arguments to oppose the policy.259 Business-
es raise two main points: (1) PFML imposes unfair costs or unnecessary re-
strictions on larger employers that already offer some form of paid leave; (2) 
PFML will hurt smaller employers that cannot afford such benefits.260 Alt-
hough these concerns may have been valid in the 1980s, they do not command 
                                                                                                                           
 253 See Kulow, supra note 21, at 108 (cautioning against the government’s reliance on businesses 
to voluntarily implement effective policy change). Paid leave reform is overwhelmingly popular in the 
United States. See HOROWTIZ ET AL., supra note 197, at 4 (reporting that 85% of Americans support 
paid medical leave, 82% support paid maternity leave, 69% support paid paternity leave, and 67% 
support paid family leave). This enthusiasm and the devastating effects of COVID-19 on working 
women created heightened urgency for national PFML. See Vesoulis, supra note 5 (predicting that 
any progress made to narrow the gender pay gap will be frozen or reversed as a result of the COVID-
19 economic fallout against women). It is time for Congress to enact legislation to reflect the changing 
attitude toward PFML. See Kulow, supra note 21, at 108 (“[C]ultural change is so often a product of 
both legislative enforcement and social evolution.”). 
 254 See infra notes 259–286 and accompanying text. 
 255 See infra notes 287–302 and accompanying text. 
 256 See infra notes 303–326 and accompanying text. 
 257 Brian Adams, History Doesn’t Repeat, but It Often Rhymes, HUFFPOST (Jan. 18, 2017), https://
www.huffpost.com/entry/history-doesnt-repeat-but-it-often-rhymes_b_61087610e4b0999d2084fb15 
[https://perma.cc/9GXG-AJMX]. 
 258 See id. (analogizing the similarities between the PFML and FMLA to Mark Twain’s famous 
quote about the repetition of history). 
 259 See WISENSALE, supra note 85, at 145 (explaining that the Chamber of Commerce fought 
against paid leave in the 1980s because the group believed it would be too costly); cf. Chamber of 
Commerce Letter 2021, supra note 223 (opposing the expansion of paid leave after COVID-19 be-
cause it would create federally imposed mandates without adequate funding). 
 260 See supra notes 172, 176 and accompanying text (introducing the arguments that pro-business 
groups originally asserted against PFML when lawmakers first proposed it in the 1980s); see also 
Nelson, supra note 27, at 662 (indicating that one of the arguments employers raise most frequently 
against paid leave is that it restricts their freedom to contract employee benefits). 
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as much relevance today and certainly do not outweigh the benefits national 
PFML would bring for American employees and families.261 
First, the myth that PFML imposes prohibitive costs on employers must 
be dispelled.262 Now that several states have implemented PFML programs, 
policy-makers possess hard data proving that paid leave policies do not neces-
sarily harm employers, large or small.263 For example, in 2004, benefits from 
California’s state-level Paid Family Leave program began to pay out to claim-
ants.264 Seven years later, the majority of employers in California reported ei-
ther a positive effect on their bottom line or no effect at all.265 Other PFML 
states have reported similarly positive outcomes from their programs.266 Indi-
vidual businesses with generous PFML policies have also seen improvements 
in profitability, employee retention, and workplace morale.267 In fact, the mul-
titude of state-level policies cropping up in the absence of national PFML has 
increased compliance costs for many employers.268 Therefore, a national 
standard for PFML would actually suppress costs for businesses by eliminating 
the complexity of complying with multiple state programs.269 Policy-makers’ 
apprehension in the 1980s over federally mandated leave made sense because 
                                                                                                                           
 261 See Press Release, The White House Briefing Room, supra note 155 (noting that expanded 
mandates could reach over 100 million Americans who currently cannot access paid leave). Today, it 
is well-documented both that mothers are struggling without a national PFML guarantee and that 
more generous paid leave policies actually help businesses at the bottom line. See COUNCIL OF ECON. 
ADVISORS, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 212, at 17 (observing that paid leave helps 
businesses in their recruitment, profitability, creating a positive work environment, and retaining 
women in the workforce); ISAACS ET AL., supra note 212, at 3 (reporting that mothers who did not 
graduate from college were less likely to have access to paid parental leave, and thus more likely to be 
fired or forced to quit their jobs after childbirth); 50 Prominent Women Run Full Page Ad in the New 
York Times Calling on President Biden to Implement Marshall Plan for Moms in First 100 Days, 
supra note 14 (listing high-profile American executives and celebrities demanding legislative action 
for PFML to help struggling mothers). 
 262 See Chamber of Commerce Letter 2021, supra note 223 (stating the opposition of mid-sized 
employers to paid leave policies because of their cost). 
 263 See APPELBAUM & MILKMAN, supra note 135, at 4 (reviewing the positive outcomes for Cali-
fornia employers after the state passed its paid family leave law). 
 264 Id. at 1. 
 265 See id. at 4 (reporting that 89% of employers documented either a beneficial or no effect on 
their business from California’s paid leave program). 
 266 See NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMS., supra note 135, at 2 (reporting beneficial results for 
employers in New Jersey, Rhode Island, and New York). 
 267 See, e.g., Senate Hearing 2018, supra note 24, at 16 (statement of Carolyn O’Boyle, Manag-
ing Director, Deloitte Services LP) (reporting that the expanded paid leave program offered by 
Deloitte accrued lower costs than the company expected and marked improvements in employee re-
tention); Stroman et al., supra note 216 (noting that Google LLC’s move to augment paid maternity 
leave corresponded to a 50% reduction in female employee turnover). 
 268 See Nelson, supra note 27, at 629 (stating that the “tortured web of direct paid leave laws” 
imposes “Herculean compliance efforts” upon large employers). 
 269 See id. at 681 (theorizing that the benefits of a national paid leave law would help employers 
by standardizing benefits, creating predictable legal outcomes, and minimizing burdensome compli-
ance costs). 
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no proof of its effectiveness existed.270 But today, after decades of experimen-
tation at the state-level and among individual companies, policy-makers have 
the data and experience necessary to implement PFML nationally.271 
Additionally, the popular claim that most large employers already offer 
PFML was simply untrue by 2020.272 Reports concerning private sector paid 
leave benefits often confuse paid sick time, which is fairly common, with 
PFML, which is extremely uncommon.273 In March 2019, approximately sev-
enty-two percent of employees working for businesses with more than five 
hundred employees did not have access to paid family leave.274 Companies 
purposefully obfuscate PFML and paid sick time, allowing these businesses to 
enjoy an underserved reputation for generous paid leave benefits when, in real-
ity, they do not offer PFML at all.275 
Corporations must be held accountable for perpetuating the false narrative 
that the United States does not need PFML because most large companies al-
ready provide it.276 As long as lawmakers believe this myth, corporations will 
be able to carve out exclusions in future PFML bills just as they did in the 
                                                                                                                           
 270 See House Hearing 1985, supra note 77, at 13 (statement of Wendy W. Williams, Associate 
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center) (supporting the cautious approach to paid 
leave because of the administrative hurdles and structural uncertainties). 
 271 See generally JACOB ALEX KLERMAN, KELLY DALEY & ALYSSA POZNIAK, ABT ASSOCS. 
INC., FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE IN 2012: TECHNICAL REPORT (2014) (providing meticulous data 
concerning the effectiveness and coverage of the FMLA); NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMS., supra 
note 131, at 1 (demonstrating the numerous models states have created for a national PFML program). 
 272 See Ranji et al., supra note 156, at 8 (showing a table of paid family leave accessibility among 
the American workforce in 2020). Although access to paid family leave was much more common 
among higher wage earners and larger employers in 2020, the rate of availability in these groups was 
only approximately 30%. Id. 
 273 See, e.g., Rosalsky, supra note 231 (using the statistic that 89% of big businesses offer paid 
sick leave as evidence to support the notion that most large employers already offer paid leave bene-
fits, when that statistic reports the provision of paid sick time, not PFML). 
 274 U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., supra note 12, at 120. 
 275 See id. (illustrating the reality that PFML is an uncommon benefit for most American employ-
ees). In reality, many businesses allow employees to run other forms of paid leave, such as paid sick 
time, concurrently with their unpaid FMLA leave in order to receive wages during their extended time 
off. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(D)(2) (allowing employees to run different types of leave concurrently with 
leave under the FMLA). This approach is not, however, the same thing as providing separate PFML 
because it forces employees to sacrifice their other paid leave entitlements to cover family and medi-
cal needs. See id. (permitting employees to accept paid forms of leave during unpaid FMLA leave as a 
means of receiving wages during long-term work absences). 
 276 U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., supra note 12, at 120 (showing that most companies with over five 
hundred employees do not offer paid family leave). Even among large corporations with generous 
PFML policies, there is wide variety of the benefits offered. See Miller, supra note 246 (displaying a 
table of the paid parental leave offered by the some of America’s largest corporate employers). The 
range of benefits available in corporate America provides additional evidence that the patchwork of 
PFML policies in the United States provides unreliable coverage for employees. See id. (showing that 
the length of paid maternity leave among large corporate employers ranges from twenty weeks to zero 
weeks). 
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FFCRA.277 If big businesses are as generous as they claim to be, then they 
should have no problem abiding by a national PFML standard and proving 
their compliance by applying for an exemption.278 Even the Supreme Court 
reasoned that corporations will always sink to the lowest common denominator 
when it comes to leave benefits.279 Congress must pass a federal law that raises 
the floor above the FMLA standard to close loopholes for large employers and 
make leave paid.280 
Second, lawmakers must prevent big corporations from using small busi-
nesses as scapegoats.281 Business interest groups continue to vocalize the po-
tentially adverse effects of PFML on small businesses.282 Studies of state 
PFML programs show, however, that many small businesses have benefited 
from PFML laws at the state level.283 Even so, the concerns of the small busi-
                                                                                                                           
 277 See Hasan & Monnay, supra note 151 (discussing the compromise between House Speaker 
Nancy Pelosi and Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin to change the employer eligibility requirement). 
 278 See, e.g., Benefit Requirements for Private Paid Leave Plan Exemptions, supra note 135 (al-
lowing employers with existing leave programs to apply for an exemption from the state policy); Vol-
untary Plans, supra note 135 (same). If anything, employers already offering PFML to employees 
should be the most unaffected by a federal law because they already supply the service the law would 
seek to guarantee. See Nelson, supra note 27, at 681 (“[T]hose employers already offering industry-
standard paid leave to their employees should be unaffected.”); cf. Summers, supra note 54, at 180 
(explaining the underlying economic theory for the relative valuation of an employee benefit by an 
employer versus a government mandate). 
 279 See Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 96 (2002) (noting that when em-
ployers offer leave benefits that are more generous than the FMLA standard, they complicate their 
own compliance obligations). Employers do not benefit from providing benefits above and beyond the 
FMLA requirements. Id. 
 280 See id. (explaining why employers have no incentive to be more generous than the FMLA 
requires). If employers offer unique leave benefits, these can be difficult to categorize and report with-
in the FMLA system. Id. Misreporting FMLA leave penalizes employers, and thus many businesses 
find the risk of creating more generous benefits for employees is simply too great. Id. 
 281 See Letter from Susan M. Collins, supra note 242, at 1 (focusing legislative priorities on im-
mediate COVID-19 relief); Findlay, supra note 227 (criticizing the five-hundred-employee threshold 
Congress embedded in the FFCRA). The FFCRA incorporated waivers for small businesses able to 
demonstrate that the law’s regulations would unduly harm their business. See Families First Corona-
virus Response Act (FFCRA), H.R. 6201, 116th Cong § 110(a)(3)(B) (2020) (enacted) (providing a 
carveout for small businesses that can prove the law’s requirements would “jeopardize the viability of 
[their] business”); Paid Leave Under Families First Coronavirus Response Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 19,336 
(Apr. 6, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 826) (specifying the threshold requirements for circum-
venting FFCRA regulations). These regulations are evidence that PFML can be implemented nationally 
while giving small businesses the allowances they need to survive. See, e.g., H.R. 6201 § 110(a)(3)(B) 
(illustrating an example of an exception for small businesses); Paid Leave Under Families First Coro-
navirus Response Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 19,336 (Apr. 6, 2020) (same). 
 282 See, e.g., NFIB Press Release Jan. 15, supra note 223 (demonstrating the outrage from the 
small business community over paid leave reforms); NFIB Press Release Jan. 6, supra note 229 
(same). 
 283 See, e.g., APPELBAUM & MILKMAN, supra note 135, at 4 (finding that small businesses were 
even less likely than big businesses to report negative outcomes from paid leave); see also Flores, 
supra note 27, at 333 (reporting positive outcomes from California businesses under the state’s PFML 
law, particularly for employee retention and morale). 
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ness community are valid.284 Congress should not, however, give large corpo-
rations a handout by extending to them the same leniencies that they extend to 
small businesses.285 Big businesses should be held to a higher standard because 
they can afford to comply with more generous leave benefits than the FMLA 
currently requires.286 
B. The Roadblocks 
Despite the hollow corporate case against PFML, the business community 
still poses formidable roadblocks to passing PFML in the future.287 First, the 
corporate lobby controls tremendous spending power in Washington.288 In 
2020, the National Federation of Independent Business and the United States 
Chamber of Commerce PACs spent over one million dollars combined in offi-
                                                                                                                           
 284 See, e.g., Chesto, supra note 230 (discussing small business owners’ struggles with the new 
Massachusetts PFML law); Watkins, supra note 232 (reporting the pros and cons of paid family leave 
for Colorado business under the new state law). 
 285 See Chesto, supra note 230 (exemplifying the difficulty small businesses face to provide their 
employees with more generous paid leave laws); Watkins, supra note 232 (same). 
 286 See Findlay, supra note 227 (recognizing that with carveouts for the largest and smallest em-
ployers, federal paid leave mandates exclude millions of American employees). By 2018, employers 
with over five hundred employees comprised about 47% of the American workforce. Table F. Distri-
bution of Private Sector Employment by Firm Size, supra note 191. Only 28% of the employees in that 
group had access to paid family leave. U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., supra note 12, at 120. These statis-
tics show that most employees working at companies with more than five hundred employees do not 
have access to PFML. Id. The number of employees without PFML access at large companies sums to 
approximately 43 million people, hardly a negligible number. Table F. Distribution of Private Sector 
Employment by Firm Size, supra note 191; U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., supra note 12, at 120. 
 287 See Jones & Miller, supra note 167, at 189 (noting the significant impact of PACs and corpo-
rate spending on the landscape of federal elections and American politics more broadly). Republicans 
and business interest groups have already laid the groundwork for separating COVID-19 emergency 
legislation from permanent policy frameworks post-Pandemic. See Chamber of Commerce Letter 
2020, supra note 223 (urging Congress to address Pandemic and permanent legislative proposals 
separately). The highly contagious nature of COVID-19 created an unprecedented threat to business 
and workplace safety that may never be paralleled. See Hafiz et al., supra note 145, at 23 (discussing 
the prioritization of “spatio-behavioral management” during the most critical moments of the Pandem-
ic); Maclean et al., supra note 10, at 2 (exploring the phenomenon of “presenteeism behavior” and the 
intersection of employee benefits and contagious diseases). Generally, people are more likely to go to 
work sick if there is no social safety net that allows them to take time off and be paid. Id. As a result, 
certain policy proposals, such as increased paid sick time, may bolster the “spatio-behavioral” regula-
tion of COVID-19. Hafiz et al., supra note 145, at 23. These dynamics explain why some may view 
the Pandemic as a long-awaited opportunity to enact PFML, while others see it merely as a unique set 
of circumstances illustrative of other human behaviors that do not lend themselves to permanent, uni-
form legislative change. Compare Sawhill & Welch, supra note 142 (suggesting that permanent paid 
leave reform should be a prerequisite for reopening the economy), with Chamber of Commerce Letter 
2020, supra note 223 (framing COVID-19 legislation as a temporary fix for a specific problem, not a 
window for sweeping legislative reform). 
 288 See Jones & Miller, supra note 167, at 188 (laying the foundation for PACs and the transfor-
mation of the political process after corporate money became a part of elections); Hasan & Monnay, 
supra note 151 (noting that in 2019 business lobbying groups spent over $121 million on federal elec-
tions). 
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cial campaign donations to political candidates––all Republicans.289 This 
spending yields tangible results, including the lobbying effort responsible for 
adopting the five-hundred-employee threshold into the FFCRA.290 Meanwhile, 
the primary Democratic PFML bill in Congress does not possess a single Re-
publican co-sponsor.291 Barring major changes in campaign finance law, the 
political spending power of corporations will be a significant barrier to enact-
ing PFML legislation that includes a mandate for large corporations.292 
Second, the PFML proposals currently on the table in Congress are highly 
partisan.293 The leading Democratic bill––the FAMILY Act––is a progressive 
wish list for PFML, but not a realistic bipartisan option.294 Most notably, Dem-
                                                                                                                           
 289 See National Federation of Independent Business Federal Political Action Committee, supra 
note 168 (reporting $699,646.46 in total spending to the official campaigns of political candidates in 
the 2020 election cycle); Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America PAC (US Chamber 
PAC), supra note 168 (reporting $695,700.00 in total spending to the official campaigns of political 
candidates in the 2020 election cycle). Notably, the total contributions reported represent the dona-
tions made by the organization’s official PACs to the campaigns of political candidates subject to the 
contribution limits imposed by the Federal Election Commission. See Making Disbursements as a 
PAC, supra note 168 (explaining the differences between PACs and other contributing entities). Addi-
tional donations made by individuals, corporations, and Super PACs are not included in these totals. 
Id. 
 290 See Technical Corrections to H.R. 6201 § 110(a)(1)(B), supra note 151 (inserting a cutoff to 
the FFCRA at employers with more than five hundred employees); Hafiz et al., supra note 145, at 43 
(suggesting that the Technical Corrections to H.R. 6201 were the result of a last-minute shift in the 
policy dynamics and incentives amongst political actors); Hasan & Monnay, supra note 151 (report-
ing on the lobbying effort to get the Technical Corrections implemented in the FFCRA bill). 
 291 See S.463—FAMILY Act, supra note 209 (listing two Independent senators as the only two 
non-Democrat co-sponsors to the FAMILY Act). 
 292 See generally Jones & Miller, supra note 167 (studying the impacts and implications of cam-
paign finance law on corporate political donations). 
 293 See McDonald Garrison et al., supra note 27, at 358–61 (outlining the paid leave bills from the 
Democratic side and the Republican side). The proposals from opposite sides of the political aisle 
share very little policy overlap, principally in their funding mechanisms. See id. (distinguishing be-
tween the Democratic approach to increase taxes and the Republican approach to avoid any tax in-
creases). 
 294 See S.463—FAMILY Act, supra note 209 (showing an utter lack of Republican support for the 
FAMILY Act). Sen. Gillibrand has stated that large employers support her bill. See Senate Hearing 
2018, supra note 24, at 9 (statement of Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand) (“[The FAMILY Act] has . . . been 
endorsed by a lot of larger businesses that already provide leave, because they know how good it is for 
their business.”). Sen. Gillibrand reintroduced the FAMILY Act to Congress in the new legislative 
session on February 4, 2021. See S.248—FAMILY Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/
bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/248/text?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22%5C%22paid+family+
and+medical+leave%5C%22%22%5D%7D&r=20&s=1 [https://perma.cc/9M86-WWD8] (providing 
information on the newest version of the FAMILY Act and stating that the Senate most recently re-
ferred it to the Senate Committee on Finance in February 2021). The bill text is the same as the ver-
sion previously proposed and still does not possess any Republican co-sponsors. Id. The absence of 
Republican co-sponsors on the legislation, paired with the significant financial contributions Republi-
can candidates receive from the business lobby, suggests that there is not as much business support for 
Sen. Gillibrand’s bill as she claims. See About the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supra note 166 (de-
claring that the Chamber of Commerce represents businesses of all sizes and acts as their advocates in 
Washington); Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America PAC (US Chamber PAC), supra 
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ocrats insist on funding PFML through a payroll tax, which is not a winning 
strategy at the federal level.295 The strong aversion to payroll taxes bears a long 
history in the Republican party.296 Although Democrats and Republicans agree 
on the overall need for PFML, the parties remain in a stalemate over the pay-
roll tax.297 
Finally, the growing pushback from major corporations against the rights 
of independent contractors and the proliferation of worker misclassification 
lawsuits casts a shadow on the prospect of PFML.298 In the United States, em-
ployee benefits are limited to “employees,” and thus contingent workers, inde-
pendent contractors, on-call workers, and various other groups outside this cat-
                                                                                                                           
note 168 (showing that the Chamber of Commerce’s political spending is universally supportive of 
Republican political candidates). 
 295 See Lenhoff, supra note 33, at 7 (distinguishing between state and federal policy-making). 
Sen. Gillibrand endorses the payroll tax model based on its success at the state level, but as history 
shows, state-level policies cannot simply be transposed to the federal level. See id. (explaining that the 
level of effort, investment, and resources required to mobilize change at the federal level is unparal-
leled compared to the state level). As with the FMLA, enacting PFML nationally may require Con-
gress to weigh different political compromises and solutions than state legislators. See id. (acknowl-
edging that state populations are often more liberal than the nation as a whole). 
 296 See supra note 115 and accompanying text (noting President Bush’s tax incentives proposal 
for companies offering paid leave); see also Tharpe, supra note 32, at 396 (explaining that Republi-
cans initially opposed the FMLA because of its potential impact on the private sector). In 1992, Presi-
dent Bush stated his aversion to funding paid parental leave through payroll taxes and suggested tax 
credit incentives as an alternative. Supra note 115. Incidentally, President Bush’s 1992 proposal was 
also the first time the five-hundred-employee threshold was suggested, a vestige that the business-
lobby unearthed decades later during the FFCRA negotiations. See id. (clarifying that the five-
hundred-employee threshold was not a novel creation of conservatives in 2020); see also supra note 
151 (reporting the effort by big businesses to lobby for an exclusion to the FFCRA provisions for 
companies with more than five hundred employees). 
 297 Compare Senate Hearing 2018, supra note 24, at 8 (statement of Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand) 
(urging Republicans to support her bill, the FAMILY Act, funded by a payroll tax and denouncing 
plans funded through Social Security), with Senate Hearing 2018, supra note 24, at 7 (statement of 
Sen. Joni Ernst) (advocating for paid leave funded through Social Security while noting that “[f]ew 
businesses can afford more taxes”). 
 298 See, e.g., Harper v. Amazon.com Servs. Inc., No. 19-21735, 2020 WL 4333791, at *8 (D.N.J. 
July 28), appeal filed, No. 20-2614 (3d Cir. Aug. 11, 2020) (denying Amazon.com, Inc’s motion to 
compel arbitration without prejudice, with the stipulation that arbitration may be compelled after dis-
covery); Cunningham v. Lyft, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 3d 37, 39 (D. Mass.), denied stay pending appeal, 
No. 1:19-cv-11974, 2020 WL 2616302 (D. Mass), appeal filed, No. 20-1567 (1st Cir. filed June 17, 
2020) (disputing the classification of app drivers); Colopy v. Uber Techs. Inc., No. 19-cv-06462, 2019 
WL 6841218, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2019) (claiming that Uber app drivers were misclassified as 
independent contractors). In some of these cases, state attorneys general have been taking an active 
role to advocate for workers’ rights. See, e.g., Healey v. Uber Techs., Inc. & Lyft, Inc., No. 2084-cv-
01519, at *1 (Mass. Supp. Mar. 25, 2021) (finding that Attorney General Healey presented a case 
concerning the classification of Uber and Lyft drivers); Complaint, District of Columbia v. Power 
Design, Inc., No. 2018-CA-005598, at 2 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 8, 2018) (asserting that an electric 
company misclassified its workers in an attempt to “slash costs, evading taxes and costs associated 
with payroll that are concomitant with a typical employer-employee relationship”). 
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egory are not covered by employee-based leave laws.299 Amid the rise of the 
gig economy, benefits coverage for these workers represents an increasingly 
prevalent issue.300 As long as companies are able to avoid granting workers 
“employee” status, many employers will be able to circumvent PFML regula-
tions.301 Thus, on a broad scale, worker misclassification practices threaten to 
undermine the impact of any future PFML law.302 
C. The Path Forward 
The FMLA-era path of coalition-building grooms a hopeful road ahead 
for the future of PFML.303 Democrat and Republican lawmakers both support 
PFML.304 Even though the underlying policy motivations for both parties dif-
fer, this was also the case for the FMLA.305 By reframing the FMLA as a fami-
ly values bill, Democrats gained the needed support from traditionally con-
servative lawmakers and interest groups, ultimately allowing the bill to pass.306 
Paid leave advocates can deploy the same strategy today by identifying 
key interest groups that will amass a supportive, diverse coalition behind 
PFML.307 For example, advocates of PFML reform need to reframe the policy 
as friendly, not merely palatable, for employers.308 Clearly, large corporations 
                                                                                                                           
 299 See Rosenfeld, supra note 58, at II.-116 (explaining the different rights of employees and non-
traditional workers in the American system). 
 300 See generally How Well Are Independent Workers Prepared for Retirement?, supra note 58 
(describing the different categories of workers in America and their various rights). 
 301 See id. (illustrating the large segment of Americans who work in non-employee status jobs). 
 302 See Looman, supra note 57 (emphasizing the threat of worker misclassification to withhold 
critical benefits and care to millions of Americans). 
 303 See LENHOFF & BELL, supra note 30, at 5 (remarking on the broad diversity among the inter-
est groups that ultimately supported the FMLA). 
 304 Jagoda & Elis, supra note 211 (acknowledging the rare bipartisanship behind paid leave re-
form); Noguchi, supra note 198 (describing the underlying common ground between political parties 
on paid leave). 
 305 See WISENSALE, supra note 85, at 141, 146 (noting the various policies that different advoca-
cy groups and politicians hoped to advance or represent through the FMLA). The FMLA coalesced 
the interests of advocates from the disability community, the Catholic Church, the retired community, 
pro-life Republicans, and labor unions to formulate the bill. Id. at 141, 146. 
 306 Id. at 146. 
 307 See LENHOFF & BELL, supra note 30, at 14 (“The federal FMLA history shows . . . that work-
family advocates can succeed if they have a well-developed legislative strategy, a broad coalition, a 
solid lobbying and public education infrastructure, a well-developed message, and a readiness to seize 
opportune moments, especially when the political winds shift in their favor.”). Although some policy-
makers have, historically, viewed PFML as a women’s rights issue, a political alliance could arise by 
connecting the policy more explicitly with the rights of workers of color. See Flores, supra note 27, at 
330–31 (explaining how the fifty-employee threshold embedded in the FMLA disadvantages Hispanic 
men over white men in the construction industry); BARTEL ET AL., supra note 128, at 7 (presenting 
evidence that the lack of national PFML adversely affects Hispanic people and employees of color 
more than white employees). 
 308 Cf. WISENSALE, supra note 85, at 146 (explaining how policy-makers reframed the FMLA to 
gain conservative support). 
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that voluntarily gave employees generous paid leave benefits before COVID-
19 see business advantages to the policy.309 Progressive lawmakers need to 
amplify these success stories and aggressively promulgate the positive data 
outcomes for employers in PFML states.310 
PFML proponents should also retain the carveout for small businesses in-
cluded in the FFCRA and communicate that proposal to small businesses.311 If 
small businesses do not feel targeted or threatened by PFML, policy-makers 
are much more likely to recruit powerful business interest groups to their 
side.312 
Further, if Democrats are serious about recruiting a bipartisan coalition 
around PFML, the party must be willing to set aside the payroll tax.313 In the 
1980s, pro-business groups immediately identified paid leave as a nonstarter 
and rather than digging their heels in, drafters promptly pivoted to other provi-
sions that offered common ground.314 Today, Republican lawmakers propose 
                                                                                                                           
 309 See Mayer, supra note 141 (recognizing big businesses that are voluntarily expanding their 
paid leave benefits); Stroman et al., supra note 216 (stating that for many businesses the benefits are 
worth the expense of providing paid family leave). 
 310 See, e.g., Stroman et al., supra note 216 (listing the many positive results for large employers 
that adopted generous paid leave policies); NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMS., supra note 135, at 2 
(showing beneficial results for employers in New Jersey, Rhode Island, and New York). The govern-
ment has both the power and the responsibility to advocate for PFML policies that have been proven 
to help businesses and employees. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, 
supra note 212, at 18 (calling for government action on spreading awareness of the efficacy of paid 
family leave in the private sector). 
 311 See Paid Leave Under Families First Coronavirus Response Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 19,336 (Apr. 6, 
2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 826) (describing the qualifications for small business waivers 
from the FFCRA regulations). 
 312 See id. (exemplifying how federal policies can shield small businesses from burdensome paid 
leave requirements). 
 313 See Noguchi, supra note 198 (suggesting there is room for compromise between the political 
parties on paid leave). Payroll taxes are the dominant source of funding for American social entitle-
ment programs, which explains why Democrats and state PFML policy-makers have defaulted to this 
model. See Lester, supra note 27, at 54 (noting that payroll tax revenues are the historically popular 
method for funding programs like Social Security and Medicare). In contrast, many European coun-
tries fund PFML programs through general revenue taxes, meaning that the funds are pulled from a 
broader base of taxpayers rather than the narrower pool of people likely to benefit from the tax. Id. at 
61. The fundamental differences in these approaches to taxpayer-funded social programs explains why 
the United States has not implemented similar paid leave policies to European nations. See id. (ex-
plaining that the European model of general tax revenue funding distributes the cost of paid leave 
more evenly, lessening the burden on employers); see also supra note 8 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the generous paid leave policies available in most industrialized European countries). The 
economic theory behind paid leave goes beyond the scope of this Note, but the range of financing 
models available underscores the point that Democrats should not pigeonhole themselves and fellow 
policy-makers into relying only on the payroll tax. See Lester, supra note 27, at 66 (“A number of 
models have been proposed for implementing a paid family leave program.”). 
 314 See WISENSALE, supra note 85, at 138 (explaining the decision by Democrats to drop paid 
leave early on in the negotiation process in the interest of appealing to influential Republicans). 
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several financing schemes that do not involve increasing payroll taxes.315 To 
gain support from Republicans, and the business groups that contribute heavily 
to their campaigns, Democrats must consider financing options beyond a pay-
roll tax.316 Alternatively, paid leave laws contain many other elements––such 
as employee eligibility requirements––that provide other opportunities for 
compromise.317 The FMLA proved that meaningful change is possible when 
policy-makers endure hard sacrifices.318 Overall, Democrats must demonstrate 
a greater willingness to accommodate the concerns and interests of the busi-
ness community in the interest of coalition-building that will lead to greater 
legislative outcomes.319 
Equally important, proponents of PFML must capitalize on the public en-
thusiasm in support of paid leave.320 As history proved when Congress passed 
                                                                                                                           
 315 See McDonald Garrison et al., supra note 27, at 359–61 (outlining the various paid leave pro-
posals introduced by Republican senators). The most notable bills on the Republican side involve 
advancing funds from existing entitlements like Social Security or the Child Tax Credit in lieu of 
increasing payroll taxes. Id. Although most state PFML programs operate through a payroll tax, poli-
cy-makers must set different expectations for what policies are viable at the federal level. See Lenhoff, 
supra note 33, at 7 (describing the difference between enacting policy change at the state versus fed-
eral level). 
 316 See, e.g., Paid Family and Medical Leave, supra note 201 (outlining a proposal from Demo-
cratic candidate Hillary Clinton to tax the wealthiest Americans to pay for PFML rather than putting 
the burden on businesses); Miller, supra note 201 (same). Although, at the time of this writing, the 
Democratic Party holds the majority in both chambers of Congress and may not feel they need to 
compromise, the margin of this majority is razor-thin. Jennifer Haberkorn, Fragile Senate Majority 
Means a Tightrope Act for Democrats, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.latimes.com/politics/
story/2021-01-06/what-georgia-senate-results-mean-for-congress-biden [https://perma.cc/DK5N-
KZTM]. Relying on their technical majority is not an advisable strategy for enacting lasting policy 
change necessary to help American families. See id. (observing that even a small number of Demo-
cratic abstentions could derail the passage of key policies); see also Tharpe, supra note 32, at 396 
(pointing out that when President Bush vetoed the FMLA bills in the early 1990s Democrats were the 
majority party, and yet the party had insufficient votes to override the two-thirds veto threshold). 
 317 See Nelson, supra note 27, at 655–61 (listing several components of paid leave laws including 
employee coverage, the length of leave, leave accrual, methods of payment, notice requirements, 
retaliation provisions, and more). Paid leave laws are complex and contain a multitude of elements 
that offer opportunities for policy compromises. Id. at 655–56. These elemental details provided the 
windows of compromise necessary to pass the FMLA, and offer the same potential for PFML. See 
supra note 106 and accompanying text (noting that Rep. Roukema’s amendment on the employer 
eligibility threshold gained significant Republican support on the FMLA bill). 
 318 See Lenhoff, supra note 33, at 2 (detailing the various compromises legislators and policy-
makers made to pass the FMLA). Iterating the compromises embedded in the FMLA, including the 
absence of paid leave, an exception for employers with fewer than fifty employees, and restrictions 
regarding the employees and types of illnesses covered. Id.; see also WISENSALE, supra note 85, at 
144 (detailing the significant push and pull between Democrats and Republican over the specific pa-
rameters for the FMLA). 
 319 See Lenhoff, supra note 33, at 2 (urging that policy-makers can learn important lessons from 
how policy-makers in the 1980s built and advocated for the FMLA). 
 320 See generally HOROWITZ ET AL., supra note 197, at 4 (demonstrating broad-based support for 
some form of national PFML). 
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ERISA in 1974, public opinion pulls a powerful lever in Washington.321 Through 
the ongoing devastation of the Pandemic and the unprecedented challenges faced 
by American families, parents are literally screaming for change.322 Currently, 
eighty-five percent of Americans believe medical leave should be paid and 
eighty-two percent believe maternity leave should be paid.323 The public over-
whelmingly supports this policy, which means lawmakers have the wind at their 
backs for passing PFML.324 
Lastly, the continued activism from state Attorneys General to fight 
worker misclassification lawsuits will play a critical long-term role in leave 
benefits reform.325 Until non-traditional workers receive the same benefits as 
bona fide employees, there will be a gaping and growing hole in any future 
PFML law that leaves millions of hard-working Americans behind.326 
                                                                                                                           
 321 See Wooten, supra note 65, at 684 (“A calamity is more likely to draw attention to a social 
problem when people interested in the problem are prepared to take advantage of the opportunity the 
calamity presents.”). COVID-19 has certainly created a calamity that policy-makers must be ready to 
convert into real, lasting change for American families. Cf. LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 26, at 92 
(emphasizing the critical role public opinion played to pass ERISA). 
 322 See Carmel, supra note 1 (describing the plight of at-home work and parenting during 
COVID-19). 
 323 See HOROWITZ ET AL., supra note 197, at 4 (showing poll data on public support for PFML). 
 324 See 50 Prominent Women Run Full Page Ad in the New York Times Calling on President 
Biden to Implement Marshall Plan for Moms in First 100 Days, supra note 14 (demonstrating the 
strong call to action for the government to enact paid leave reform). 
 325 See GERSTEIN, supra note 238 (noting the significant efforts from state Attorneys General to 
advocate for workers’ rights, including in worker misclassification cases). For example, the District 
Attorney of Washington D.C. raised a major lawsuit against a utility company for misclassifying its 
workers as independent contractors. See generally Complaint, District of Columbia v. Power Design, 
Inc., No. 2018-CA-005598, at 2 (D.C. Super. Ct. filed Aug. 8, 2018). In 2018, the New York Attorney 
General settled a two-million-dollar lawsuit with FedEx for misclassifying its drivers. See generally 
Settlement Agreement, New York v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. 402960/10, at 1 
(S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 20, 2018). Some Attorneys General take other active measures to prevent worker 
misclassification in the gig economy. See, e.g., Healey v. Uber Techs., Inc. & Lyft, Inc., No. 2084-cv-
01519, at *1 (Mass. Supp. Mar. 25, 2021) (ruling on a claim brought by Massachusetts Attorney Gen-
eral Maura Healey against rider app companies alleging worker misclassification of drivers as inde-
pendent contractors); DoorDash, AG Shapiro and DoorDash Announce Expanded Gig Worker Protec-
tion During COVID-19 Emergency, CISION: PR NEWSWIRE (May 4, 2020), https://www.prnewswire.
com/news-releases/ag-shapiro-and-doordash-announce-expanded-gig-worker-protection-during-
covid-19-emergency-301052195.html [https://perma.cc/BM4S-H4FD] (announcing a partnership 
between the Attorney General of Pennsylvania and DoorDash, Inc., a mobile app delivery company, 
collaborating to create protections for workers). 
 326 See Summers, supra note 54, at 181 (“The most obvious problem with mandated benefits is 
that they only help those with jobs.”). In May 2017 there were over 10.6 million people in the United 
States working as independent contractors. Press Release, U.S. Bureau of Lab. Stat., Contingent & 
Alternative Emp’t Arrangements—May 2017 (June 7, 2018) (on file with author). Some policies, such 
as Sen. Gillibrand’s FAMILY Act, avoid the worker misclassification problem by simply expanding 
the eligibility threshold to include all workers, not just official employees. See Senate Hearing 2018, 
supra note 24, at 91 (statement of Vicki Shabo, Vice President for Workplace Policies and Strategies, 
National Partnership for Women & Families) (noting the inclusion of independent contractors in Sen. 
Gillibrand’s bill). While this strategy is a noble attempt at inclusivity, it presents yet another reason 
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CONCLUSION 
COVID-19 exposed a major fracture in the American social safety net––
the lack of PFML. The United States is the only industrialized country that 
does not provide government-guaranteed PFML to private sector employees. 
During the Pandemic, the fallout from this national shortcoming was cata-
strophic, forcing many Americans to continue working despite the need to care 
for children, ill family members, or themselves. 
Today, a perfect storm of circumstances makes PFML a reality for the 
first time in decades. After COVID-19, the American public resoundingly sup-
ports PFML. Politicians on both sides of the political aisle support the policy 
in some form. And finally, state-level PFML laws and some corporate policies 
offer ample evidence to support its effectiveness. But despite all of this mo-
mentum, PFML is still not the law of the land because corporations oppose it. 
The business-lobby has been able to successfully manipulate specific provi-
sions in PFML bills, like the employer threshold, to create convenient carve-
outs for corporations. Any future federal PFML mandate that does not bind the 
largest companies (and employers) in America, and therefore largest employ-
ers, will be effectively useless. 
Right now, politicians agree on the overarching policy of PFML, but con-
tinue to squabble over the details. To succeed, lawmakers must learn from 
FMLA policy-makers in the 1980s and 1990s. The FMLA was not a perfect 
law––but it passed. Politicians today ignore the history of the FMLA and the 
model it offers for converting big policies ideas into major, lasting legislative 
reform. Without a conscious effort to compromise and build cross-party coali-
tions, the support for PFML will not be strong enough to overcome the power-
ful and well-funded resistance of corporations. 
CAROLINE M. GELINNE 
                                                                                                                           
why pro-business Republicans are unlikely to back the policy. See U.S. CHAMBER COM., supra note 
41, at 56 (encouraging any future PFML policy to follow the existing employee eligibility require-
ments of the FMLA, which do not cover independent contractors). 
